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I. INTRODUCTION
The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws have
come to embody the rule that most persons in possession of mate-
rial, nonpublic information about an issuer of publicly-held securi-
ties must either disclose that information to the general investing
public, or abstain from trading in the affected securities.' The de-
velopment of this "disclose or abstain" rule has brought with it a
unique set of problems for multi-service financial institutions.
These firms are also obligated to their individual trading custom-
ers not to recommend or execute transactions in securities unless
fully justified in light of all the information relating to the invest-
ment that is known to the institution. Multi-service securities
firms-those that have combined the functions of investment
banking and corporate counselling with investment advisory, in-
vestment management, and retail broker-dealer services-are par-
ticularly subject to potentially conflicting duties with respect to the
confidential information they possess. On the one hand, the firm is
obliged to retain the confidentiality of any nonpublic information it
acquires from a corporate client,2 as well as to abstain from either
trading on that information or "tipping" it to its retail customers.3
At the same time, however, the firm owes a duty to its retail bro-
kerage and investment management clients to disclose all material
information in its possession that is relevant to any proposed
transactions in the affected securities. 4
In an effort to reconcile these disparate legal duties, integrated
securities firms, as well as other multi-service financial institu-
tions, have established internal policies and procedures to restrict
1. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907 (1961). See also Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983).
2. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
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interdepartmental flows of material nonpublic information about
the firm's corporate clients. These policies, which have come to be
known collectively as "Chinese Walls," generally operate to isolate
inside information within the department of the firm that initially
receives it.
The legal sufficiency of a Chinese Wall in insulating the multi-
service firm from liability under the insider trading provisions of
the securities laws, and also the effect of such internal policies on
the firm's obligations to its trading customers, has been much dis-
cussed,5 but rarely litigated.6 In the final analysis, however, the
question facing the "walled" firm, either in a charge of trading or
tipping in violation of the antifraud laws, or in a claim of insuffi-
cient disclosure or an improper recommendation to its retail cus-
tomers, is whether the nonpublic information isolated within one
department of the firm will be attributed to the firm as a whole, or
to its retail trading and advisory personnel.7
The purpose of this Article is to explore these questions, both in
the context of the insider trading provisions, and of the rules gov-
erning the relationship of a securities firm to its retail customers.
In general, this Article supports the contention that the Chinese
Wall should operate to rebut the presumption that the knowledge
of one of the firm's agents or departments of a firm is the knowl-
edge of the firm as a whole in those situations where the firm does
not have a marked economic conflict of interest with the party in
whose favor a judgment of liability is sought. There are cases,
however, where the firm's own economic interests are demonstra-
bly at odds with the interests of the investing public. This will oc-
cur, for example, when the firm engages in securities transactions
5. See, e.g.,, N. WOLFSON, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: INVESTMENT BANKING (1976);
Chazen, Reinforcing the Chinese Wall: A Response, 51 N.Y.U.L, REV. 552
(1976); Lipton & Mazur, The Chinese Wall: A Reply to Chazen, 51 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 579 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Lipton & Mazur, Reply ]; Lipton & Mazur,
The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50
N.Y.U.L. REV. 459 (1975); Note, Conflicting Duties of Brokerage Firms, 88
HARv. L. REV. 396 (1974). See also E. HERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: COM-
MAERC AL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENT (1975); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 843-51 (1983); Herzel & Coiling, The Chinese Wall and
Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAw. 73 (1978); Huck, The Fatal Lure of
the "Impermeable Chinese Wall", 94 BANK. L.J. 100 (1977); Mndez-PLnate,
The Bank Chinese Wall: Resolving and Contending With Conflicts of Duties,
93 BANK. L.U. 674 (1976); Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust De-
partment and the "Wall", 14 B.C. IND. & CoMm. L, REV. 21 (1972).
6. See, e.g. r Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.) (denial of defendant's motion for partial
summary judgment), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974), settlement ap-
proved, 79 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).




for its own account, in a manner akin to that of any other investor.
There are also instances where the firm's interests are likely to
conflict with those of its retail customers, such as the case during
formal underwritings of new securities. In these instances, attrib-
uting knowledge throughout the firm, irrespective of the existence
of a Chinese Wall, better comports with the economic realities of
the situation. In light of this conclusion, multi-service securities
firms which are in possession of inside information should refrain
from purchasing or selling securities for accounts in which the firm
has a proprietary interest. In addition, to avoid untoward misrep-
resentations to its trading customers and improper transactions in
managed accounts, the firm should also avoid recommending the
purchase of outstanding securities of those issuers for which the
firm is simultaneously engaged as an underwriter of a new issue
until the formal sales campaign for the new issue actually begins.
Part II of this Article will explore the various relationships of
multi-service securities firms which regularly give rise to the re-
ceipt of inside information by the firm, as well as the firm's legal
obligations with respect to information in its possession to its cor-
porate clients, its retail customers, and the investing public at
large. Part I discusses the administrative and judicial treatment
accorded the Chinese Wall approach in reconciling these poten-
tially conflicting duties. Part IV examines the approach of the
American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code with
regard to questions of corporate knowledge generally, including
the "knowledge" of multi-service financial institutions which have
adopted internal policies to attempt to deal with the inside infor-
mation problems faced by the firm. Part V explores the question of
the legal sufficiency of the Chinese Wall as a defense to a charge
that a firm has improperly utilized inside information in violation
of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Part VI,
in turn, discusses the effect of the Wall on the firm's obligations to
its retail customers in the context of the various types of relation-
ships with corporate clients which are likely to give rise to the re-
ceipt of inside information by the firm. Finally, Part VII
summarizes the conclusions developed in the earlier sections of
the Article.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING DUTIES
A. Sources of Inside Information
Securities firms doing business in today's capital markets have
increasingly integrated a number of different professional func-
tions into a common corporate head which offers a full range of
market services to the investment community. As early as 1963,
[Vol. 63:197
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the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) described the
structure of the American securities industry in the following
manner
A striking phenomenon of the securities industry is the extent to which
any one participant may engage in a variety of businesses or perform a
variety of functions. A single firm with customers of many kinds and sizes
may, and often does, combine some or all of the functions of underwriter,
commission house in listed securities, retailer of unlisted securities, cus-
todian of funds and securities, investment adviser to discretionary ac-
counts, to others on a fee basis, and to one or more corporations. Its
principals may invest or trade for their accounts in securities also dealt in
for others...
In addition, it is common practice for the principals, officers,
and employees of such "integrated" firms to serve as directors of
companies whose securities are traded in the public markets.9
In performing its obligations in a number of these functional
areas, integrated firms regularly come into possession of unpub-
lished information about the issuers of publicly-held securities-
information which, if publicly disseminated, would likely cause a
movement in the trading price of the company's outstanding is-
sues.'0 For example, in its role as investment banker to a company
that is contemplating a new issue of its stock or debt, the firm is
both expected and (at least where a registered offering is pro-
posed) obliged to conduct a full investigation into the issuer's busi-
ness." In the course of any such investigation, the firm's
8. SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 5, 65-66 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SEC, SPECIAL STUDY].
See also Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 460, 464; Note, supra note 5, at 396-
97. See generally SEC, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILrrY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE
COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND BROKER (1936).
The trend toward integration, and the increasing industry concentration that
has ensued, has probably not been purely a matter of competitive economics.
Cf. S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECUnrrIES MARKETS § 1.02, at 3 (1977)
("The industry is characterized by an uneasy blend between undercapitaliza-
tion, and intense concentration.").
9. See SEC, SPECIAL STUDY, .supra note 8, pt. 1, at 428-29. See generally infra
notes 244-60 and accompanying text.
10. Such information is often referred to as "material nonpublic information," or
simply as "inside information." A more descriptive term, however, to convey
the intended meaning is that used in the 1980 British Companies Act, i.e. "un-
published price-sensitive information." Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 73(2).
Cf. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(56) (1980) (definition of "fact of special signifi-
cance") (see infra note 169 for the text of the statute).
11. When acting as underwriter, the securities firm regularly conducts an exten-
sive investigation into the issuer's business, background, and financial condi-
tion in order to allocate shares among the members of the underwriting
syndicate, to determine the offering price of the issue, and generally to pro-
vide information which will aid in the success of the distribution. See Note,
supra note 5, at 396 n.6. In addition, at least in connection with public offer-
ings requiring registration under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15
1984]
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investment banking personnel will, ex necessite, inspect a consid-
erable amount of confidential information about the issuer which,
for one reason or another, has not been disclosed to the investing
public.12 In addition, a firm may acquire inside information about
a company through a partner or employee's service (or. connection
with) the issuer's board of directors,13 or also (although on a far
less systematic basis) through a research employee's investigation
of a company or industry in connection with the firm's investment
advisory services.14
At the same time that one department or working group within
a multi-service firm is in possession of disclosed inside information
about a company, other departments of the firm may be effecting
market transactions in that issuer's outstanding securities. The
classic case occurs when the underwriting or investment banking
division acquires confidential information about a corporate issuer
while the broker-dealer or investment management personnel in
the firm are executing transactions or recommending those securi-
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982), the underwriter's responsibility to fully investigate
the issuer is necessitated by the act's liability provisions. Under § 11 (a) (5),
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (5) (1982), an underwriter may be held liable for false and
misleading statements in the registration statement on it effective date un-
less he can meet the "due diligence" defense of §11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b) (3) (1982).
12. For cases illustrating the receipt of confidential information by a securities
firm in its role as investment banker to the issuer, see, e.g., Slade v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH) % 94,329
(S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974), settlement approved, 79
F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (see infra notes 78-134 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Slade); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Lewis v. Spiral Metal Co., 317 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Van Alstyne,
Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080 (1969); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968); In re M.S. Wien & Co., 23 S.E.C. 735 (1946).
13. See, e.g., Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr.
157 (1968); In re Pennaluna & Co., 43 S.E.C. 298 (1967), affd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part, 410 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007
(1970). Cf. Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1970) (broker was a member of
issuer's board of directors yet allowed salesmen to recommend stock on the
basis of unconfirmed rumors).
14. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 160-62 (2d Cir. 1980);
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977) (referring to corporate
officers' dealing with analysts as "a fencing match conducted on a tight-
rope"); SEC v. Avis, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 94,419 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 1974) (summary of complaint); Hawk In-
dus., Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also
Parker, Ethical Issues for the Financial Analyst, reprinted in CORPORATE FI-
NANCIAL REPORTING: ETHICAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS 165 (1972).
Inside information may also come to the firm's attention in a far less ex-
pected way. In Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983), an officer of a broker-
dealer received information from a former corporate officer that the corpora-
tion's assets were overstated as a result of internal corporate fraud.
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ties on the basis of public information that is inconsistent with the
inside information known to the investment banking department.' 5
In this unhappy situation, it appears at first blush that the firm
is faced with a potentially inconsistent set of legal obligations. On
the one hand, it has a common law duty (which is undoubtedly
incorporated into a contract) to its investment banking client to
retain the confidentiality of undisclosed information acquired in
the course of its investment banking relationship. 6 It also has a
duty to the investing public imposed by the securities laws to re-
frain from transacting in securities on the basis of inside informa-
tion.17 At the same time, however, the firn is obliged to deal fairly
with its retail clients and to reveal all material information in its
possession which might have an effect on the customer's invest-
ment decision.' 8
While the remainder of this Article is concerned with the na-
ture and scope of these obligations in the context of a multi-service
securities firm, it is worth noting at the outset that the problem is
by no means unique to the securities industry. Similar conflicts
are also faced by other financial institutions, particularly multi-
service commercial banks. Even though commercial banking insti-
tutions are prohibited by statute from underwriting securities is-
sued by private corporations,' 9 they remain quite active in
numerous securities-related activities. 20 The most acute conflict of
obligations faced by multi-service banks occurs when the commer-
cial lending department receives adverse information about a pub-
licly-held corporate customer at the same time that the bank's
fiduciary trust or assets management department is purchasing se-
curities of that issuer for its managed trust accounts.2 ' In these
circumstances, the bank, like the securities firm, shares with inves-
15. See, e.g., Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974),
settlement approved, 79 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Black v. Shearson, Ham-
mill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968). Cf. O'Brien v. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979)
(plaintiffs claimed, but the court did not decide, that a multi-service bank is
obliged to utilize inside information to prevent harm to trust customers).
16. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
19. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378 (1982).
20. See Little & Phillips, The Chinese Wall and the Conflict of Regulatory Obliga-
tions, in ALI-ABA COEMITEE ON CoNTrrNUIG PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, RE-
SOURCES MATERIALS: FRAUD, INSIDE INFORMATION AND FIDUcIARY DuTy UNDER
RULE 10B-5 593, 593-94 (1976). See also E. HERMAN, supra note 5; Herzel &
Coiling, supra note 5; Huck, supra note 5; MWndez-Penate, supra note 5; Sa-
fanda, supra note 5.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982) permits banks to purchase and sell securities upon the
order of, and for the accounts of, its customers. See also Schoenbaum, Bank
1984]
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tors generally the obligation to refrain from trading in securities on
the basis of inside information.22 At the same time, however, the
bank as trustee is impressed with duties to the beneficiaries of the
trust accounts under its control to avoid unsound investments
based on all of the information which is reasonably ascertainable
by the bank.23
B. Conflicting Functions/Conflicting Duties
1. The Duty to Retain Corporate Confidences
In its role as investment banker or corporate financial advisor to
a publicly-held corporation, the multi-service securities firm is
obliged to respect the confidential nature of any nonpublic infor-
mation it acquires as a result of that relationship.24 Likewise, a
partner or employee of a securities firm who obtains inside infor-
mation by virtue of his service on a company's board of directors is
prohibited from using that information either for his own benefit
and from communicating it to others,25 and may either be enjoined
at the instance of the corporation 26 or held liable to it for any prof-
Securities Activities and the Need to Separate Trust Departments from Large
Commercial Banks, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 4 (1976).
22. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. In addition, a bank may have a
conflict in its legal obligations between customers when it is involved in the
financing of an unfriendly tender offer for the stock of one of its corporate
customers. See, e.g., Washington Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594 (3d Cir.
1979); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Wis. 1979);
American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chi-
cago, 475 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1977). See generally Note, Bank Financing of
Involuntary Takeovers of Corporate Customers: A Breach of Fiducary Duty?,
53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 827 (1978); Note, Conflicts oflnterest: The Chinese Wall
and Bank Financing of Hostile Tender Offers, 37 WASH. & LEE L REV. 963
(1980).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958): "Unless otherwise
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the principal not to use or communi-
cate information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him
during the course of or on account of his agency .... " (Emphasis added.)
See also W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 152, at 249 (1964)
(agent is under a duty not to use or disclose confidential information except
for principal's benefit). The firm's obligation to protect corporate confidences
continues even after the formal agency relationship between the parties is
terminated. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra, § 396(b); W.
SEAVEY, supra, § 154, at 250, 252; Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 144
A.2d 306 (1958).
25. See W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.1
(rev. perm. ed. 1975 & 1982 Supp.); Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d
327, 411 P.2d 921, 49 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966). See also supra note 24.
26. See, e.g., Schwayder Chemical Metallurgy Corp. v. Baum, 45 Mich. App. 220,
206 N.W.2d 484 (1973). See also W. FLETCHER, supra note 25.
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its made from its use.27 The purpose of this admonition against
disclosure of confidential information is to permit business entities
to plan transactions and other business activities without jeopard-
izing the company's relationships with third parties. 28
2. The Firm's Duty to the Investing Public
Of even greater importance to the multi-service securities firm
than its obligation to its investment banking clients, however, is
the prohibition against the use of material nonpublic information
imposed by the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
It has become axiomatic that engaging in securities transactions
on the basis of inside information violates SEC rule 10b-5,29 at least
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, comment (c) (1958); 3 A. SCoTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 505 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1981). In Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), the court held
that a director who traded in the stock of his corporation on the basis of in-
side information was accountable to the corporation for his trading profits,
even in the absence of specific proof of injury to the corporation. In Schein v.
Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lehman
Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), on remand, 519 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1975), the
Second Circuit suggested that liability of this type might extend to the direc-
tor's "tippees" as well. See also Thomas v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 1393
(3d Cir. 1975). But see Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975) (rejecting
the rule of Diamond v. Oreamuno); Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir.
1978) (same; applying federal court's view of Indiana law, the court rejected
the rule of Diamond v. Oreamuno).
28. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 474; Note, supra note 5, at 400-01.
29. SEC Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, adopted pursuant to § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), pro-
vides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceipt upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). The language of the rule is quite similar to that of
§ 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), the principal difference be-
ing that rule lOb-5 applies to purchases and sales, while § 17(a) is limited to
fraudulent behavior only in the sale of securities. Because the rule was
promulgated prior to the 1946 passage of the Administrative Procedure Act,
60 Stat. 237, codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1982), there is very little administra-
tive history of the Commission's action. For what little there is, see Freeman,
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793,
922 (1967); Loss, The Opinion, 24 Bus. LAw. 527, 535 (1969). See also 5 A. JA-
coBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RuLE 1OB-5 § 5.02 (2d ed. 1981); Note,
SEC Action Against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 HAv. L. REV.
19841
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if that information emanated, directly or indirectly, from the issuer
of those securities.3 0 The genesis of the prohibition against trading
on undisclosed information came in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. ,31 an
SEC disciplinary proceeding against a registered broker-dealer
and Gintel, one of the firm's partners. In that case, Gintel had re-
ceived a telephone call from an associate of the firm who served on
the board of directors of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation informing
him of a decision by the Curtiss-Wright board to cut the company's
annual dividend. On the basis of that call and prior to the public
dissemination of the news about the dividend decision, Gintel sold
Curtiss-Wright stock both for himself and for several discretionary
accounts managed by the firm.
The SEC had little difficulty in holding that Gintel's market
sales of Curtiss-Wright stock on the basis of the undisclosed news
about the corporation's dividend reduction were at least violative
of clause (3) of rule lOb-5.
769, 770 (1946). For textual treatment of rule lOb-5, see A. BROMBERG, SECURI-
TIES LAw-FRAuD: SEC RULE 1OB-5 (1977); 5 A. JACOBS, supra; L. Loss, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 818-946, 1125-52 (1983); 3 L. LoSS,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1448-74, 1757-97 (2d ed. 1961); W. PAINTER, FEDERAL
REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1968 & Supp. 1978); 6 id. at 3556-3647, 3864-
3925 (Supp. 1969). See also Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HAxv. . REV. 322 (1979).
30. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court held that
mere silence as to material facts in the purchase or sale of securities is ac-
tionable under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 only if there is some special relation-
ship of trust and confidence existing between the parties to the transaction
which gives rise to a duty to speak on the part of the defendant. Thus, in
Chiarella, the Court reversed a criminal conviction under the rule for trading
in the securities of a target corporation on the basis of unpublished knowl-
edge that a tender offer was about to be made which was garnered from
sources affiliated with the offeror, rather than the target. In Dirks v. S.E.C.,
103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983), the Court reaffirmed its decision in Chiarella, holding
that the "disclose or abstain" rule does not arise merely from the possession
of nonpublic information. Rather, there must be some fiduciary relationship
between the corporation and the person who acquires the information. Con-
tra United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (misappropriation of
inside information from offeror's investment banker violates rule lOb-5). See
also Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375
(1976) (under state securities statute, mere nondisclosures failed to give rise
to a cause of action in the absence of factual allegations demonstrating a duty
to disclose). But see Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201
(1963) (failure of seller to disclose facts regarding value of property which
buyer could not otherwise acquire constitutes actual fraud). See generally
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 695-97 (4th ed. 1971);
Morrison, Silence is Golden: Trading on Nonpublic Market Information, 8
SEC. REG. L.J. 211 (1980); Note, A Corporate Outsider's Duty to Disclose Under
Rule 10b-5, 12 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 540 (1981); Note, The Affirmative Duty to
Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 203 (1981).
31. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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We have already noted that the antifraud provisions are phrased in terms
of "any person" and that a special obligation has been traditionally re-
quired of corporate insiders, e.g., officers, directors, and controlling stock-
holders. These three groups, however, do not exhaust the classes upon
whom there is such an obligation [to disclose material facts or abstain
from trading]. Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal ele-
ments; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indi-
rectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose
and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent un-
fairness involved where a party takes advantage of that information know-
ing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.3 2
The SEC's formulation of the obligation either to disclose mate-
rial inside information or refrain from trading in the securities of
the company involved received judicial endorsement in the
landmark case of S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.33 In that case,
the Commission brought an action against several of a corpora-
tion's directors, officers, and employees who had made market
purchases of the company's stock (or had "tipped" others to do so)
on the basis of undisclosed information that the company had
made an important new mineral discovery. In reversing the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the complaint against a number of the in-
siders, the Second Circuit formulated its now famous "disclose or
abstain" rule for investors who possess material nonpublic infor-
mation about the issuer of publicly-traded securities:
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either dis-
close it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in
order to protect a corporate confidence, or if he chooses not to do so, must
either abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned
while such information remains undisclosed.
3 4
Finally, in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,35 the Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Texas Gulf
32. Id. at 912.
33. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
34. Id. at 848. The "disclose or abstain" rule has also been adumbrated under
other antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, e.g. § 206 of the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982). See SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); SEC Securities Exchange
Act Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1983) (adopted pursuant to § 14(e) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) (regulating tender offers)). See also Brud-
ney, supra note 29, at 322-23 & nn.6-7.
35. 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974) aj-g 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156,165-68 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other
grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Butcher &
Sherrerd, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9894, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 79,135 (Dec. 11, 1972); In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968). See generally R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 947-53 (4th ed.
1977) (discussing the various classes of persons upon whom there is placed a
duty to disclose or abstain from transacting).
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Sulphur and found it clearly controlling to impose liability even on
a "tipper" of material corporate information received in its role as
the prospective managing underwriter of a new issue of the com-
pany's securities, even though the defendant did not itself trade in
the securities involved. Thus, taken together, the decisions in
Cady, Roberts, Texas Gulf Sulphur, and Shapiro make abundantly
clear that a securities firm that reveals confidential information
about a publicly-held company to its customers, or uses that infor-
mation to form the basis of a trading recommendation, will be ex-
posed to the possibility of both administrative sanctions and
private civil liability.36
3. The Firm's Obligation to its Retail Customers
In addition to its duty to keep corporate secrets secret and to
abstain from trading on or tipping material nonpublic information
acquired from its corporate clients, the multi-service securities
firm is also impressed with obligations to its retail trading custom-
ers. As a broker engaged in the execution of securities transac-
tions for clients on a strict commission basis, the common law
regards the firm as an agent of its retail customer.37 As an agent,
the firm owes a duty to its principal to reveal any and all informa-
tion in its possession relevant to any proposed transaction which
the customer would reasonably want to know.38 In addition, to the
36. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 472; Note, supra note 5, at 399-400. The
American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code, while not mak-
ing tipping unlawfulper se, see ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603, comment (b) (1980
& 2d Supp. 1981), would also generally hold a "tipper" civilly liable to the
same extent as his trading "tippee." Id. at § 1724(c). In Dirks v. S.E.C., 103
S.Ct. 3255 (1983), however, the Court held that, under existing law, a "tipper"
will be held liable only if he has breached a duty to the corporation in disclos-
ing the nonpublic information, and "the test is whether the insider personally
will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Id. at 3265.
37. See McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684
(1937) (broker is an agent and, thus, a fiduciary); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones
& Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968). See also S.
JAFFE, supra note 8, § 7.09, at 146. Cf. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 975-76 (D.C.
Cir. 1949) (under federal securities laws, even a dealer may be deemed a
fiduciary).
38. See, e.g., Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr.
157 (1968); Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 441 P.2d 101, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589
(1968); Schweiger v. Loewi & Co., 65 Wis. 2d 56, 221 N.W.2d 882 (1974). RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958) states the rule thus:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reason-
able efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to the
affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the prin-
cipal would desire to have and which can be communicated without
violating a superior duty to third persons.
It could probably be argued that this formulation of the agent's disclosure
obligation, to the extent that it correctly represents the law, relieves the firm
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extent that the firm also engages in investment or money manage-
ment for retail clients (such as through the exercise of transac-
tional authority over a discretionary account), the firm becomes
subject to the even more demanding fiduciary obligations imposed
by the law of trusts. As a trustee of its clients' property, the firm is
obligated to manage the trust corpus with the same skill and care
that it would use in dealing with its own property,39 and to make
investments for the trust only on the basis of all relevant informa-
tion in the firm's possession or reasonably ascertainable by it.40
Of greater significance to the broker-dealer firm than its com-
mon law obligations, however, are the requirements of the federal
securities laws that the firm have an adequate factual basis for any
of any obligation to disclose inside information to its retail brokerage clients,
because to do so would violate both the firm's obligation to its investment
banking client and to the investing public at large. The fallacy in this analy-
sis, standing alone, is that it presumes what it seeks to prove; that is, that the
integrated firm's duty to retain corporate confidences, and to refrain from
trading or tipping in violation of rule 10b-5, is indeed "superior" to the disclo-
sure obligations owed to its retail customers, an issue about which the rule of
§ 381 does not purport to speak. But cf. id. § 395 (agent's duty not to disclose
confidential information). In any event, any attempt to resolve the issues in-
volved on the basis of agency law principles is largely an academic exercise
in the wake of the obligations imposed upon brokers and dealers by the fed-
eral securities laws. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
39. See Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252, 261, 103 N.E. 148, 152 (1913):
[TIrustees are bound in the management of all the matters of the
trust to act in good faith and employ such vigilance, sagacity, dili-
gence and prudence as in general prudent men of discretion and in-
telligence in like matters [would] employ in their own affairs. The
law does not hold a trustee acting in accord with such rule, responsi-
ble for errors in judgment.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959); 2 A. Scorr, supra
note 27, §§ 174, 174.1. As to the trustee's duty of loyalty to the trust, see the
classic statement of Judge Cardozo, in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464,
164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928):
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sen-
sitive, is then the standard of behavior... Uncompromising rigid-
ity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating ero-
sion" of particular exceptions ....
40. See xrrrLE & PmL.zps, supra note 20, at 596. In addition, the trustee remains
subject to a continuing obligation to monitor the investments in the trust
portfolio and to dispose (within a reasonable time) of any investments which,
though proper when made, have subsequently become improper. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 231, comment (b) (1959); 3 A. Scorr, supra
note 27, § 231. It should be noted, however, that the trustee is neither obliged
nor privileged to violate the law in the performance of his obligations under
the declaration of trust. See IND. CODE § 30-4-2-12 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS, §§ 61, 166 (1959); 1 A. ScoTT, supra note 27, § 61, at 571; 2 A.
ScoTT, supra note 27, § 166, at 1265. Cf. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 211 (2d ed. rev. 1979) (a trust created for illegal purposes is void).
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recommendations it makes, and that it disclose any adverse infor-
mation in its possession relevant to any proposed transaction.4 1
The source of these heightened disclosure obligations is the so-
called "shingle" theory developed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. The underlying premise of that theory is that, by
hanging out his "shingle," a broker-dealer impliedly warrants that
he will deal fairly with the investing public.4 2 The ultimate scope
of these federal disclosure obligations is by no means certain.43
But it is clear is that literal compliance with the language of the
courts44 by a firm in possession of inside information would man-
date its disclosure to the firm's retail customers, at least in any in-
stance where that information is contrary to that in the hands of
41. See, e.g., Feeney v. SEC, 564 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1977); Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d
856, 858 (2d Cir. 1970); Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1969); R.A.
Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966), modified on other grounds,
377 F.2d 665 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967); In re Alexander Reid &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 986, 990 (1962). See generally Brudney, Origins and Limited
Applicability of the "Reasonable Basis" or "Know Your Merchandise" Doc-
trine, in PLI FOURTH ANNUAL INsTrruTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 239
(1973); Jacobs, The Impact of the Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 on Bro-
ker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 869, 876-81 (1972).
42. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1482-93; 6 id. at 3682-92; Jacobs, supra note 41,
at 877; Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 465 n.16; Note, supra note 5, at 398. For
early administrative decisions invoking the shingle theory, see In re Duker &
Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939), and In re Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321 (1963). The
theory first received judicial sanction in Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139
F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944), in which the Second
Circuit affirmed a finding by the Commission that a registered broker-dealer
violated § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), and § 15(c) (1) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1982), by selling over-the-counter securities at
prices substantially in excess of those prevailing on the over-the-counter
(OTC) market without disclosure of the firm's abnormally large markup. See
Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970) (disclosure of
firm's market maker status); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972) (same).
43. The SEC, for example, is of the view that the broker-dealer's obligation to
disclose all material information in its possession which might influence its
customer's investment decision is applicable not only to recommend transac-
tions, but to unsolicited purchases and sales as well. See SEC, Statement on
Future Structure of Securities Markets, [Special Studies Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 74,811, at 65,620 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SEC,
Statement on Future Structure ]. But see Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F.
Supp. 282, 286-89 (E.D. La. 1974), affid, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam).
44. See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1969): "A Securities dealer
occupies a special relationship to a buyer of securities in that by his position
he implicitly represents [that] he has an adequate basis for the opinions he
renders.... He cannot recommend a security unless there is an adequate
and reasonable basis for such recommendation. He must disclose facts
which he knows and those which are reasonably ascertainable." (Footnotes
omitted.) See also SEC, Statement on Future Structure, supra note 43.
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the investment community generally.45 Thus, the multi-service
securities firm which obtains material nonpublic information
about the issuer of publicly-traded securities may find itself in a
position where literal compliance with its disclosure obligations to
its retail customers will render it guilty of impermissible "tipping"
in violation of rule 10b-5,46 and where a failure to so "tip" may
render any recommendation it makes without an adequate basis in
light of all information about the issuer known to the firm.
C. Building a Wall
Because of the perceived conflicts between its obligations to its
corporate clients and the investing public on the one hand, and its
retail trading and investment advisory customers on the other,
most integrated securities firms and other multi-service financial
institutions have established internal policies and procedures to
attempt to avoid the legal hazards flowing from the possession of
inside information by one of the firm's departments. Central to the
firms' efforts is the erection of what has come to be known as the
"Chinese Wall," not a particularly apt metaphor for what is essen-
tially a set of rules, regulations, and (at least in some instances)
physical arrangements designed to prevent the communication of
unpublished price-sensitive information about issuers of publicly-
held securities to those departments of the firm that might misuse
the information for market trading purposes.47
45. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 465 & n.16. See also Slade v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L, REP. 94,329
(S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974); Black v. Shearson, Hammill
& Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968) (state law).
46. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974). See also supra note 35.
47. The metaphoric reference to the Great Wall of China is too obvious to let pass
without a remark. It is of at least passing interest (to historians if not to law-
yers) to note that the true Chinese Wall is over 1,400 miles long and is some
20-30 feet high and 15-20 feet thick. It was completed by Ch'in Shih Huang Ti
about 228 B.C. as an impermeable defense mechanism for China's northern
border with Mongolia. See WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMER-
ICAN LANGUAGE 355 (student ed. 1968); 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANICA 556
(1953). At least one prominent investment banking firm refers to its isolation
policy as the "Iron Curtain," see N. WOLFsON supra note 5, at 62, and in the
United Kingdom, the term "Bamboo Curtain" is apparently an acceptable
substitute. See Rider, Conflicts of Interest and the Chinese Wall, in THE REG-
ULATION OF THE BRITIsH SEcURTrrIEs INDusTRY 81, 90 (B. Rider ed. 1979). Mr.
Rider also reports that the Chinese Wall has been "adopted" in many coun-
tries, citing. Recommendation of the Commission of the EEC Concerning a
European Code of Conduct Relating to Transactions in Transferable Securi-
ties, General Principle 6 and Supplementary Principle 8 (1977); Statement of
the Commission des Operations de Bourse (France), Les Intermdiaires Fin-
anciers et les Opdrations de Bourse (March 1974); Hojinkankei-shain no
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The operative theory of the Chinese Wall is that adequate con-
trols over access to inside information will preclude its misuse.48
This, in the case of a multi-service securities firm, generally means
that personnel in the retail sales and investment advisory divisions
are denied access to information garnered by the firm's investment
banking division.49 There is no particular uniformity in the precise
manner in which either securities firms or other multi-service
financial institutions have implemented their particular proce-
dures for dealing with inside information possessed by one of the
firm's departments. Common to all Chinese Walls, however, is a
policy statement, which need not be particularly formal, prohibit-
ing personnel who have, or are likely to have, material nonpublic
information about a publicly-held corporation from communicat-
ing that information to personnel in other departments of the
firm.5 0 In addition, some firms incorporate the wall concept into
fukumukitei seibi ni kansuru moshiawase (June 1973) (Japan); SEC Broker-
Director Rule, SEC BED Bo. 902-A-4, and SEC Weekly Bulletin (Jan. 1978)
(Philippines); Canadian Corporate Securities Regulations National Policy
Statement No. 13 (April 1971) (Canada); and Conflict of Interes Registrants
Acting as Corporate Directors, Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin 78
(May 1969). See Rider, supra at 92, 102 n.30.
48. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 466-67. The same principle has also been
attempted in the context of law firm disqualification. See id. at 472 n.38. See
also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr McGee Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,169 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting the Chinese Wall defense to law firm
disqualification). See generally Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law Firm
Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 677 (1980).
49. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 466. See also Miller, Chinese Walls, 8
REV. SEc. REG. 865, 865 (1975).
50. A typical policy statement is that adopted by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., in settlement of "tipping" charges brought against it by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission:
Material information obtained from a corporation by the Under-
writing Division in connection with the consideration or negotiation
of a public or private offering of its securities and which has not been
disclosed by the corporation to the investing public, and conclusions
based thereon, shall not be disclosed by any member of the Under-
writing Division to anyone outside that Division except to
(a) senior executives of the firm and its Legal Department;
(b) lawyers, accountants, and other persons directly involved
with the underwriters in connection with the proposed offering;
(c) appropriate personnel of the Research Division whose views
in connection with the proposed offering are to be sought by the Un-
derwriting Division; and
(d) members of the buying departments of other firms who are
prospective members of the underwriting group for the purpose of
enabling [them] to decide whether, the extent to which or the price
at which, they will participate in the proposed offering.
Any employee of the firm who receives such information pursuant
to the foregoing shall not disclose such information or any conclu-




ongoing educational programs regarding insider trading, through
restrictions on access to files containing (or which may contain)
nonpublic information, and through controls on personnel trans-
fers between departments and membership on interdepartmental
committees.5 1 Finally, some larger institutions have established
an even more formal physical separation of the "problem" depart-
ment from the remainder of the firm,52 and, with respect to broker-
dealer directorships, some firms simply prohibit partners and em-
ployees from serving as directors of publicly-held companies. 5 3
In addition to a Chinese Wall policy for isolating information
within a firm to those personnel who may utilize it lawfully, some
firms have adopted additional internal regulations restricting the
firm's investment advisory or retail brokerage personnel from rec-
ommending the securities of companies about which the firm has
(or is likely to receive) inside information. If the firm's Chinese
Wall policy is effective in restricting interdepartmental flows of
nonpublic information, additional policies are unnecessary to pre-
vent the firm's trading personnel from improperly utilizing that in-
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968), re-
printed in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 77,629, at
83,351 (Exhibit A). See also H.R. 5700, H.R. 3287, and H.R. 7440: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
at 751 (1971), in which David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board of the Chase
Manhattan Bank, reported on the bank's Wall as follows:
To assure the proper use and control of information received by the
bank in its several capacities, there is no flow, or incidental commu-
nication of inside information, from the commercial departments or
divisions of the bank to the fiduciary investment department or to
the pension or personal trust divisions of the trust department.
51. See generally Herzel & Colling, supra note 5, at 88-91; Carswell, Construction
of the Chinese Wall, 14 Ti. MGMT. UPDATE 1 (1979).
52. Regarding physical separation, it has been noted that:
In some instances, this is accomplished by housing the staff of the
isolated department in offices which are removed from the quarters
of the rest of the firm; in others, by creating a separate subsidiary or
affiliate through which the department thereafter functions....
Physical and corporate separation, though, are often costly and im-
practical solutions for those securities firms, investment companies
and similar business entities that are faced with inside information
conflict problems; furthermore, such a requirement would approxi-
mate in result a mandate for separation through divestiture ....
Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 496.
53. See SEC, SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 1, at 432; SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1046, 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Note, supra note 5, at 407. Cf.
§ 17(c) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79q(c)
(1982) (prohibiting registered public utility holding companies from having
investment bankers on their boards of directors), noted at SEC, SPECAL
STuDY, supra, at 431 n.429. This prohibition would be retained in the pro-
posed Federal Securities Code. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1510(1) (1980 & 2d
Supp. 1981). As to the author's views on broker-dealer directorships, see in-
fra notes 244-60 and accompanying text.
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formation to effect market transactions. Instead, the perceived
need for such "reinforcements" 4 to the firm's Chinese Wall stems
from the concern that, because there is a wall, the broker-dealer
department may be making recommendations based on available
public information which the investment banking department, be-
cause of the inside information in its possession, knows to be false
or misleading,5 5 or which, if it were known, would render the firm's
recommendation without an adequate basis.56
One variant of these additional protective devices is the "no
recommendation" policy.57 A firm with such a policy, in effect, sus-
pends any outstanding recommendation with respect to the securi-
ties of an issuer about which one department is likely to obtain
confidential information. Generally, the no recommendation pol-
icy is commenced at the outset of any relationship giving rise to
potential inside information problems, and is terminated when the
possibility of further receipt of confidential information has
expired.5 8
Another procedure implemented in some multi-service firms is
the "restricted list." When a security is put on the list, the firm's
investment advisory personnel are immediately precluded from
making any recommendation (either favorable or unfavorable)
with respect to that security, and the firm itself ceases any trading
in the security for its own account. Depending upon the practice of
the particular firm, a security can be listed either when one depart-
ment actually receives nonpublic information, or whenever one de-
partment of the firm enters into a relationship giving rise to the
likelihood that confidential information will be acquired.59
In addition to supplementing whatever policies a firm may have
for restricting the interdepartmental transfer of inside informa-
54. The term is borrowed from Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 499-511.
55. See, e.g., Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 11973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
Cf. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157
(1968).
56. See supra note 41.
57. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 467.
58. See id. at 467 nn.19-20. If a no recommendation policy is enforced strictly with
respect to securities of an issuer whose board of directors includes a partner
or employee of the broker-dealer, then the firm would be effectively pre-
cluded from ever recommending the securities of that company because the
potential for receiving inside information always exists in such a case.
59. See generally id. at 467-68. In smaller multi-service institutions, where con-
struction and enforcement of an effective Chinese Wall may be impossible
because the firm's functions often overlap in a single individual, a prophylac-
tic prohibition of this type against any trading in or recommending securities
about which the firm has (or may have) inside information may be the only
practical solution. Cf. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (C) (ii) (H) & comment
(4) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981).
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tion, a formal restricted list procedure also serves to realize other
goals. 60 The practice was originally designed, and is still useful, for
preventing untoward violations of rule 10b-6 during a public distri-
bution.61 It also operates to prevent the firm's broker-dealer de-
partment from making overly enthusiastic "buy"
recommendations for outstanding securities of an issuer which
might subsequently be held to have been unlawful offers of regis-
tered securities in violation of the 1933 Act.62 It should be noted,
60. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 468-69.
61. SEC Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-6 provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance" as used in section 10(b) of the act for any person,
(1) Who is an underwriter or prospective underwriter in a par-
ticular distribution of securities, or
(2) Who is the issuer or other person on whose behalf such a
distribution is being made, who is an affiliated purchaser, as that
term is defined in paragraph (c) (6) of this section, or
(3) Who is a broker, dealer, or other person who has agreed to
participate or is participating in such a distribution, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange, either alone or with one or more other persons, to bid for
or purchase for any account in which he has a beneficial interest, any
security which is the subject of such distribution, or any security of
the same class and series, or any right to purchase any such security,
or to attempt to induce any person to purchase any such security or
right, until after he has completed his participation in such distribu-
tion ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1983). See, e.g., In re Burns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C.
652, 659-61 (1962); Collins Securities Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 11,766, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L, REP. (CCH) 80,327,
at 85,799-801 (Oct. 1975). See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1571-1614, 6
id. at 3764-78; Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 468 n.22.
62. Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c)
(1982), makes it unlawful either to offer to sell or offer to buy "any security"
unless a registration statement has been filed with the SEC with respect to
that security or unless an exemption from registration is available under § 3
or § 4 of that act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, d (1982). In turn, § 2(3) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982), defines an "offer" to include "every attempt to dispose
of... a security.., for value." This broad definition of the term "offer"
catches within its sweep many pre-registration activities which, though not
amounting to an offer in the common law sense, "so contribute to condition-
ing the public mind or arousing the public interest in the issuer or in the
securities of an issuer in a manner which raises a serious question whether
the publicity is not in fact part of the selling effort." SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 3844, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 3250, at 3254 (Oct. 8, 1957). Thus,
even recommendations by a broker-dealer about the outstanding securities
of a company proposing to register a new issue may be tantamount to an offer
under § 2(3), especially in those instances where the broker-dealer is (or will
be) part of the underwriting syndicate or selling group for the upcoming dis-
tribution. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5101 [1970-71 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 77,929 (Nov. 19, 1970).
See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 5180 [1970-71 Transfer Binder]
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though, that a firm's concern with "gun jumping" or illegal
purchases during public distributions in violation of rule 10b-6 are
generally unrelated to the specific problems it faces as a result of
the combination of broker-dealer and investment banking func-
tions, and cannot be alleviated through implementation of a Chi-
nese Wall alone.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
TREATMENT OF THE WALL
After the SEC's decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. ,63 it quick-
ly became apparent within the securities industry that multi-ser-
vice firms that possessed material inside information about
publicly-held companies, regardless of the source of that informa-
tion, might simultaneously face inconsistent obligations to the
firm's customers and to the investing public generally. 64 Despite
the concern about what was perceived to be a Hobson's choice be-
tween liability to the firm's investment banking clients and to the
investing public for selective disclosure of inside information, or
liability to the firm's trading customers for remaining silent, and
despite doubts about the efficacy of the Chinese Wall as a defense
to either, there has been surprisingly little official attention paid to
either the wall per se or to other procedures designed to reconcile
these seemingly disparate obligations. Moreover, what little offi-
cial heed has been paid has left the industry in nearly as great a
conundrum as it was at the genesis of the legal rules that it is com-
manded to follow.
A. The NYSE Position on Broker-Dealer Directorships
The SEC's holding in Cady, Roberts provided that a securities
firm violated rule lOb-565 when it sold securities on the basis of un-
disclosed information about an issuer's forthcoming dividend re-
duction which it had received from an employee affiliated with the
issuer's board.66 Against this backdrop, the first official attempt to
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,192 (Aug. 16, 1971) (Guidelines For the Release
of Information by Issuers Whose Securities are in Registration); In re Carl M.
Loeb, Rhodes & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959); SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); Lipton v. Mazur, supra note 5, at 469 n.23. See generally V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE
803-16 (2d ed. 1979); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 35, at 59-80; 1 L Loss,
supra note 29, at 212-23; 4 id. at 2316-20.
63. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAw. 939
(1962).
65. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See supra note 29 for the text
of rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
66. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961).
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resolve the conflicts in the broker-dealer's legal obligations, at
least in the context of broker-dealer directorships, was put forward
by the New York Stock Exchange.67 In a 1962 position paper, the
Exchange took the position (to which it still adheres) that the obli-
gation owed by a director to his corporation to retain the confiden-
tiality of corporate secrets 68 was one that he was not free to waive,
even in the presence of an arguably conflicting duty to his firm's
retail trading customers.
Every director has a fiduciary obligation not to reveal any privileged infor-
mation to anyone not authorized to receive it. Not until there is full public
disclosure of such data, particularly when the information might have a
bearing on the market price of the securities, is the director released from
the necessity of keeping information of this character to himself. Any di-
rector of a corporation who is a partner, officer or employee of a [New
York Stock Exchange] member organization should recognize that his
first responsibility is to the corporation on whose Board he serves. Thus, a
member firm director must meticulously avoid any disclosure of inside in-
formation to his partners, employees of the firm, his customers or his re-
search or trading departments.
6 9
This early "don't tell your partner"70 approach to dealing with
67. N.Y. Stock Exchange (N.Y.S.E.), M.F. Educ. Circular No. 162 (June 22, 1962)
[hereinafter cited as 1962 N.Y.S.E. Circular]. See also N.Y.S.E., Expanded
Policy on Timely Disclosure § A-21 (1968).
68. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
69. 1962 N.Y.S.E. Circular, supra note 67. The Exchange is also of the view that
confidential information about an issuer which is acquired by a N.Y.S.E.
member organization in an advisory capacity should be dealt with under
much the same "ground rules." N.Y.S.E. Company Manual § A-22. Thus, the
Exchange insists that in those cases where a matter requires consultation
with a firm, "[a] dequate measures should be taken to guard the confidential
nature of the information to prevent its misuse within or outside" the firm.
Id. Thus, without specifying the nature or the extent of the procedures to be
followed by N.Y.S.E. member firms, it is clear that the Exchange endorses the
Chinese Wall approach to handling the inside information problems of
securities firms that have combined investment banking/corporate finance
activities with retail trading, management, and advisory departments. Cf.
American Stock Exchange Disclosure Policies 11 (1970): "If counsel, account-
ants, or financial or public relations advisers or other outsiders are consulted
steps should be taken [by the issuer] to ensure that they maintain ... pre-
cautions within their respective organizations to maintain confidentiality [of
material, nonpublic information]."
70. The phrase is borrowed from Professor Loss. 6 1- Loss, supra note 29, at 3595.
It should be noted that the quoted language from the 1962 N.Y.S.E. Circular,
supra note 67, was relied upon by the defendant in Black v. Shearson, Ham-
mill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362,72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968), for the proposition that
a broker-dealer director's responsibility to the company on whose board he
sits is of.a higher order than this disclosure responsibility to his firm's retail
clients. In rejecting the argument, the California court said: "The officer-di-
rector's conflict in duties is the classic problem encountered by one who
serves two masters. It should not be resolved by weighing the conflicting du-
ties; it should be avoided in advance. . . or terminated when it appears." Id.
at 368, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 161. The Black case, however, is quite clearly distin-
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the inside information problems of integrated firms undoubtedly
foreshadowed the somewhat later development of more formal
Chinese Wall policies to systematically restrict the flow of confi-
dential corporate information among the various departments of
the firm. The underlying premise of the N.Y.S.E. policy, however,
is essentially the same as that of the wall. That is, confidential
price-sensitive information about the issuers of publicly-traded se-
curities possessed by one department or individual within a multi-
service institution should be rendered unavailable to those who
might misuse it to effect market transactions in the securities of
that issuer. Moreover, at least in the general case, to the extent
that inside information does not so permeate the wall, the firm has
satisfied its duties to both the issuer and the investing public,71
without adversely affecting its obligations to its retail trading or
investment advisory clients.72
B. The Merrill Lynch Proceeding
The Securities and Exchange Commission's first formal en-
counter with the problems created by interdepartmental flows of
confidential corporate information came in a 1968 enforcement pro-
ceeding against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ("Mer-
rill Lynch"),73 a large integrated firm with both an active
underwriting division and an extremely broad-based retail sales
organization. In that case, Merrill Lynch, acting as the prospective
managing underwriter of a new issue of debentures of Douglas Air-
craft Company ("Douglas"), had received a confidential report
from Douglas which indicated that the company's earnings would
be substantially lower than earlier public predictions had indi-
guishable from the typical situation in which a firm (or one of its officers) is
in possession of inside information. In Black, the Shearson partner who pos-
sessed the "bearish" information not only failed to appraise the firm's sales-
men, but at the same time sold stock of the issuer (on whose board he
served) for his own account and those of some of his personal clients. This
dichotomy in treatment could not help but have moved the court toward im-
posing liability. Thus, on its facts, Black is quite akin to Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), aFfig 353 F.
Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 476-78.
71. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however,
that the Exchange's policy statement was issued some six years prior to the
judicial formulation of the "disclose or abstain" rule in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, Coates v. SEC, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). As to the latter case and its progeny, see supra notes 33-35
and accompanying text.
72. See generally supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text; infra notes 261-320
and accompanying text.
73. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933 (1968). See
also Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 487-88.
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cated. Merrill Lynch, in turn, disclosed this bearish news to cer-
tain of its favored institutional customers who, prior to the public
dissemination of the revised earnings forecast, sold (and sold
short) Douglas common stock. At the same time, however, Merrill
Lynch's retail division was effecting purchases of Douglas shares
for other customers who remained in the dark about the adverse
information.7 4
In accepting Merrill Lynch's offer of settlement, the S.E.C. took
special cognizance of the firm's undertaking to "adopt, implement,
and ensure compliance with, revised procedures to provide more
effective protection against disclosure of confidential informa-
tion .... "75 In particular, the Commission noted with approval
the firm's adoption of a "Statement of Policy" 7 6 that contained pro-
visions prohibiting the transmission of confidential information re-
ceived from an issuer by the firm's underwriting division to anyone
other than those individuals within the firm (or the buying depart-
ments of co-underwriters) involved directly in the issuer's new of-
fering. The Commission took pains to point out, however, that it
was expressing no opinion on whether Merrill Lynch's "Chinese
Wall" would prove adequate in all circumstances to insulate the
firm from liability, and made clear that the preferred approach for
handling material changes in an issuer's condition which might af-
fect the trading price of its securities is to promptly disseminate
the information to the investing public generally.77
74. The facts of the Douglas Aircraft-Merrill Lynch snafu perhaps did more than
any other case to contribute to the administrative and judicial development
of the contours of rule 10b-5. See In re Investors Mgt. Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971)
(enforcement proceeding against Merrill Lynch's "tippees"); Shapiro v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), affg 353 F.
Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (class action by purchasers of Douglas stock
against Merrill Lynch, its employees, and the trading tippees); Financial In-
dustrial Fund., Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.) (per
curiam) (private action by market purchaser of Douglas stock against issuer
and Merrill Lynch for alleged untimely disclosure of the reduced earnings
forecast), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). See generally V. BRUDNEY & M.
CBmLsTEir, supra note 62, at 1012-38, 1071-78.
75. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 43 S.E.C. 930, 938 (1968). See also
Rule 9.7(d) of the Comptroller of the Currency, which requires national
banks, inter alia, to adopt "written policies and procedures to ensure the na-
tional bank trust departments shall not use material inside information in
connection with any decision or recommendation to purchase or sell any se-
curity." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d) (1983).
76. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 43 S.E.C. 930, 938 (1968). See
supra note 50 for the text of Merrill Lynch's statement of policy.
77. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 43 S.E.C. 930, 938 (1968). The
SEC has, however, urged multi-service financial institutions, such as com-
mercial banks, to "consider the necessity of segregating information flows
arising from a business relationship with a company as distinct from informa-
tion received in an investor shareholder capacity." SEC INSTrrUONAL IN-
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C. The Slade Case
Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc. 78 represents the only
significant judicial foray into the question of the legitimacy of the
isolation technique in the context of a suit by dissatisfied custom-
ers who purchased securities on the basis of a recommendation
that was inconsistent with inside information allegedly "walled
off" in the firm's investment banking department. In Slade, the
plaintiffs were all former retail customers of Shearson, Hammill
Co., Inc. ("Shearson"), a large integrated investment banker/bro-
ker-dealer firm. They alleged that Shearson's corporate finance
department had come into possession of material adverse informa-
tion about the cash flow position of one of its clients, Tidal Marine
International Corporation ("Tidal Marine"), yet continued to pro-
mote the sale of Tidal Marine stock to the customers of the firm's
retail sales organization.
Shearson moved in the district court for summary judgment on
two different theories. First, the firm claimed that it did not be-
come aware of any adverse information about Tidal Marine until
well after the plaintiffs had purchased their shares of Tidal Marine
stock. Second, Shearson maintained that even if its corporate
finance department was aware of the adverse information at the
time of the plaintiffs' purchases, the firm was precluded by the an-
tifraud rules from using that information to prevent the individual
members of its retail sales organizations from soliciting purchases
of Tidal Marine during the time that the news remained
undisclosed.7 9
VESTOR STUDY, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2539 (1971). See also
SEC v. Lum's, Inc., (1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,659 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (similar settlement agreement to that with Merrill
Lynch); In re Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1080 (1969) (same); In re
Blyth & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1037 (1969) (same). Cf. SEC v. Union Planters Corp.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,003 (W.D. Tenn.
1975) (consent order; co-defendant agreed, inter alia, to submit to all appro-
poriate personnel a statement of the legal requirements for securities trans-
actions); In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249 (1973) (agreement to "wall off"
research department).
78. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.) (denial of
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment), question certified, [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,439 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded,
517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974), settlement approved, 79 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
79. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and to Strike Class Action Allegations at 20-25, Slade v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,329
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). In addition, Shearson argued, apparently orally, that the
Chinese Wall policy in effect in the firm precluded its investment banking
personnel from communicating inside information to its retail sales force.
See Brief for Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellant at 22, Slade v. Shear-
son, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Shearson
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The district court found "no factual predicate" for Shearson's
first theory.80 More importantly, however, the district court flatly
rejected the firm's assertion that it should be absolved from liabil-
ity because it was legally disabled from revealing, to its clients or
otherwise, information acquired in the course of a confidential re-
lationship with a corporate client. The court apparently saw a dis-
tinction between a firm's revelation of inside information to its
retail customers and the prevention of its sales personnel from
soliciting brokerage customers on the basis of current public infor-
mation which the firm knows to be false or misleading because of
the inside information it has acquired. While the former would
clearly constitute conduct prohibited by rule 1Ob-5,81 the latter, ap-
parently, would not.8 2 The only source cited for the district court's
distinction was a singular reference to the "disclose or abstain"
principle adumbrated by the Second Circuit in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case,83 which the court read as requiring the sales depart-
ment of an integrated firm to abstain from making recommenda-
tions to customers that are inconsistent with any inside
information in its possession.84
Finally, the district court seemed untroubled by the fact that
the seemingly inevitable result of its application of the "disclose or
abstain" rule to these facts would be to put brokerage firms that
Brief]. The district court's opinion does not specifically mention Shearson's
Chinese Wall, and it is not referred to by name in Shearson's moving papers,
but it is addressed in the Second Circuit's opinion remanding the case for
further factflnding. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398, 401 (2d
Cir. 1974). See also Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 478 & n.64.
80. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 9 94,329, at 95,131. Shearson did, however, attempt to garner fac-
tual support for its motion. See Affidavit of Sidney T. Bogardus at 9I 13, 18,
Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as Bogardus Affidavit].
81. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933
(1968).
82. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 94,329, at 95,131.
83. Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must
either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from
disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or if he
chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending
the securities concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed.
Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 94,329, at 95,132 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, Coates v. SEC, 394
U.S. 976 (1969)) (emphasis in original).
84. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,329, at 95,132.
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possess inside information, and who would thus be disabled from
soliciting customers to purchase (or sell) the affected securities, at
a disadvantage with those firms that do not. Implicit in its opinion
was the belief that this commercial disadvantage flowed, not from
rule lOb-5 per se, but rather from Shearson's voluntary assumption
of a fiduciary obligation to Tidal Marine, its investment banking
client, at the same time that the firm already owed fiduciary duties
to its retail customers. "[H]aving assumed fiduciary responsibili-
ties, Shearson is required to incur whatever commercial disadvan-
tage fulfillment of those obligations entails."85 At no point in the
court's discussion of this manifestation of the investment banker/
broker-dealer conflict did the district judge acknowledge or discuss
that there may be effects on an integrated firm's retail clients ensu-
ing from the firm's disability from providing any investment advice
whatsoever concerning the securities of issuers with which the
firm also has an investment banking or other confidential
relationship.8 6
On reargument, however, the district judge reconsidered his
original holding and, recognizing that the case was indeed one of
first impression under rule 10b-5, certified the following question
for review by the Court of Appeals:
Is an investment banker/securities broker who receives adverse material
nonpublic information about an investment banking client precluded from
soliciting customers for that client's securities on the basis of public infor-
mation which (because of its possession of inside information) it knows to
be false or misleading?87
By this time, the importance of the issues in the Slade litigation
to the securities industry had become apparent,88 and the appeal
attracted amicus briefs from the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission as well as from two industry giants--Salomon Brothers, a
leading market maker, block positioner, and investment banking
firm, and Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc. ("Paine, Webber"),
a multi-service firm active in both investment banking and retail
brokerage. Even the trial judge in the course of granting Shear-
son's request for certification of the interlocutory appeal appar-
ently recognized the significance of his earlier ruling on the motion
for summary judgment.
The instant case has far reaching ramifications for the structure of the se-
curities industry... apparently not foreseen by Texas Gulf Sulphur and
its progeny. To require organizations like defendant's to refrain from ef-
85. Id. Cf. Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 368, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 157, 161 (1968).
86. See generally infra notes 304-06 and accompanying text.
87. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) [ 94,439, at 95,530 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
88. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 479 n.76.
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fecting transactions in securities of companies about which they have
learned adverse inside information may be to render it exceedingly diffi-
cult for any such organization to function as an investment banker for a
company and at the same time function as a broker-dealer in that com-
pany's securities.
8 9
In its argument on appeal, Shearson characterized the district
court's denial of summary judgment as an implicit requirement
that an integrated securities firm with both corporate finance and
broker-dealer departments "[m]ust use nonpublic, investment
banking information for the benefit of its public customers under
certain circumstances." 90 So characterized, Shearson found the
trial court's ruling inconsistent with the policy of the insider trad-
ing decisions. Shearson's main line of attack was that it was pro-
hibited by the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
from using nonpublic information acquired by its corporate
finance department for the benefit of its retail customers, 91 and
that it was under no other independent fiduciary obligation to do
SO.92
Shearson premised its argument on the distinction it drew be-
tween formal recommendations by the firm's retail sales organiza-
tion to purchase particular securities, which were placed on the
firm's confidential "Master Buy List," and the personal recommen-
dations of Shearson's individual sales representatives, which were
based solely on the available public information about the particu-
lar issuer. Thus, pursuant to its internal policy of not formally rec-
ommending securities of issuers with which the firm's corporate
finance department has an investment banking relationship,
Shearson never placed Tidal Marine stock on its Master Buy List.93
Shearson did, however, transmit public information about Tidal
Marine to its individual account executives in the form of internal
"wires," and it was on the basis of this information (which was
quite favorable) that some of the firm's sales personnel indepen-
dently recommended the purchase of Tidal Marine stock to a
number of customers, including the Slade plaintiffs. 94
89. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) % 94,439, at 95,532.
90. Shearson Brief, supra note 79, at 8.
91. Id. at 9-17.
92. Id. at 17-22.
93. See Bogardus Affidavit, supra note 80, 1 10, 28-32. See also Affidavit of R.
Paul Evans at T1 5, 6, Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.
1974).
94. Shearson Brief, supra note 79, at 5-7. Each of the written materials (the
"wires") relating to Tidal Marine bore a legend similar to the following.
Attention is called to the fact that [Shearson] is acting as financial
advisor in connection with the private placement of securities of
[Tidal Marine] and maintains a trading market in the stock. This
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In addition, Shearson argued that, for the purposes of the an-
tifraud rules, the relevant "market" in Tidal Marine's securities in-
cluded not only its immediate purchasers and sellers, but also
those investors who abstain "for the moment" from transacting in
Tidal Marine's shares. Because granting an information advantage
to any one of these groups would affect the quantity of shares
traded, and hence the trading price, any use of inside information
by the firm would have created an "unfair market" in Tidal Marine
stock of the type condemned by the insider trading provisions of
the securities laws. Thus, Shearson concluded, it could not law-
fully utilize the confidential information possessed by its corporate
finance department to prevent its individual account executives
from individually recommending the purchase of Tidal Marine
stock.95
Plaintiffs' took issue both with Shearson's characterization of
the facts and the applicable law governing the multi-
service firm in possession of inside information. As to the "wires"
containing bullish public information which emanated from the
firm's corporate finance department, the plaintiffs pointed out that
Shearson's own policy "required" the firm's retail account execu-
tives to utilize the information they contained in any discussions
about Tidal Marine with the firm's retail customers.96 Thus, the
Slade plaintiffs characterized the situation as not involving any
true separation of departmental functions at all, but rather one in
which Shearson "inexplicably" permitted its retail sales force to
tout Tidal Marine stock when the investment banking department
was well aware that it was worthless. 97
Moreover, the plaintiffs apparently took issue with Shearson's
characterization of the relevant marketplace for Tidal Marine's
stock, and thus challenged the firm's contention that the "disclose
or abstain" rule rendered it legally powerless to prevent its retail
salesmen from individually recommending the purchase of Tidal
Marine on the basis of the available public information about the
company.
Nobody is unfairly hurt or disadvantaged by the fact that the customers of
wire should not be construed as an endorsement or recommendation
of the Company's securities.
Id. at 6 (citation omitted). See also Bogardus Affidavit, supra note 80 (Exhib-
its B, C, D, G). Shearson also claimed that it transmitted all news, good or
bad, which it received about Tidal Marine. See Reply Brief for Defendant,
Third-Party Plaintiff Appellant at 2, Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517
F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Shearson Reply Brief].
95. Shearson Brief, supra note 79, at 8, 17.
96. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 5, Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d
398 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Slade Brief].
97. Id. at 6.
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Shearson would not be buying worthless stock. The argument that all the
other customers of brokerage concerns may continue to buy worthless
stock would seem to lead Shearson to the conclusion that all members of
the public have an equal right to be cheated; if some are spared by Shear-
son, Shearson has injured all the other purchasers throughout the land.
The argument is the sheerest exercise in sophistry. The spectacle of a
broker seeing his customers defrauded by the broker's own agents and
being powerless to pick up an intercom and say "Don't sell", is too
much.98
Instead, the Slade plaintiffs would have had Shearson enforce
its no recommendation policy down to the level of the individual
account executive, coupled if necessary with an explanation that it
is firm policy not to recommend the securities of companies with
which it has a current investment banking relationship. This ap-
proach, according to the plaintiffs, would have satisfied the firm's
obligations to its customers without any corresponding misuse of
inside information possessed by the corporate finance
department.99
In addition to the conflicting considerations advanced by the
parties to the Slade appeal, a great deal of light was shed on both
the Chinese Wall and other internal procedures of multi-service
securities houses in the briefs filed by the three amici. Salomon
Brothers, apparently the first to join in the fray, posited that the
Chinese Wall device serves a legitimate purpose in controlling in-
formation flows among the various departments of an integrated
firm. It argued, however, that Shearson's position, if adopted,
would give it an unwarranted imprimatur beyond what is neces-
sary to accommodate the competing concerns of the investing pub-
lic and the firm's retail customers.0
Initially, Salomon Brothers took issue with the district court's
use of the word "soliciting" in the certified question.1Ol The firm
argued that the term should be confined to situations in which the
broker-dealer makes an affirmative "suggestion" or "recommenda-
tion" with respect to a security, but that it should not be extended
to cover a technical "solicitation" in which a broker merely con-
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id. But see infra notes 299-306 and accompanying text for the drawbacks in
such an approach. The plaintiffs also pointed out that, in addition to Shear-
son's position as investment banker to Tidal Marine, it had an additional con-
flict of interest in that it was the principal market maker for Tidal Marine
stock, and thus the firm had a pecuniary interest in recommending the
purchase of the stock by its customers to the extent that delivery was made
out of its own inventory. Slade Brief, supra note 96, at 11. See also infra
notes 239-43 and accompanying text (own-account investing).
100. See generally Brief of Salomon Brothers as Amicus Curiae, Slade v. Shear-
son, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Salomon
Brief].
101. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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tacts a potential customer to ascertain whether the latter is inter-
ested in purchasing particular securities, but does not make any
"recommendation" as to their investment merits. 0 2 In Salomon's
eyes, this distinction is crucial. Under its interpretation of the an-
tifraud rules, a broker-dealer should be prohibited only from ac-
tively "recommending" securities on the basis of public
information which the firm's investment banking department
knows to be false or misleading because of confidential informa-
tion it has received. 0 3 Salomon's view was premised on its asser-
tion that even though a retail customer of a multi-service firm has
no right to receive inside information, the customer does have the
right not to be actively misled by a broker who is touting a stock
which another department knows is overpriced. The upshot, then,
is that a multi-service firm can neither recommend trading in se-
curities on the basis of inside information nor continue to make
recommendations that are contrary to that information. 0 4
Salomon Brothers would, however, find a legitimate role for the
Chinese Wall, standing alone, in those instances where the firm's
trading department merely "solicits" a customer to purchase par-
ticular securities, but does not make any recommendation, express
or implied, as to their merits. In these cases, according to Salomon
Brothers, the firm has not taken advantage of any special relation-
ship of trust or confidence between itself and its customers, and
thus the latter have not been actively misled into buying a worth-
less product.10
The distinction drawn by Salomon Brothers between "recom-
mending" and merely "soliciting" transactions in securities may
seem largely semantic, 0 6 but it can be easily understood in the
context of Salomon Brothers' business, which consists largely of a
combination of investment banking and block positioning (i.e., the
sales of large blocks of securities to institutional traders).107 In ad-
dition, the firm is a leading market maker of over-the-counter se-
102. Salomon Brief, supra note 100, at 1 n*.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id. at 14, 15.
106. Indeed, it was so characterized by another of the amici. See Brief of Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 5, Slade v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Paine, Webber
Brief]. See also Shearson Reply Brief, supra note 94, at 13-14.
107. Salomon Brief, supra note 100, at 4-5; Paine, Webber Brief, supra note 106, at
5-9. For a discussion of block trading generally, see I. FniEND, G. HoFFmAN, W.
WiN, M. HAMBURG, & S. SCHOR, THE OVER-THE-COUNTER SECUmRTMS MAR-
KETS 19-20, 412-42 (1958); 2 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1235-39; 5 id., at 3256-59.
See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Rule 17a-17, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-17
(1983) (notices and reports by block positioners).
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curities.108 Unlike the typical retail sales activities of most large
securities firms, these activities of Salomon Brother do not typi-
cally involve the recommending of securities to customers on the
basis of comprehensive market and industry research. Instead,
the firm "solicits" customers to purchase blocks of securities out of
its own inventory and the portfolios of its large institutional bro-
kerage customers.109 Thus, sanctioning the Chinese Wall as a de-
fense to a dissatisfied customer in those cases where no affirnative
"recommendation" or "touting" is involved would permit firms like
Salomon Brothers to continue their trading activities pretty much
as usual, while at the same time requiring integrated firms with
more broadly-based retail sales activities to suspend trading in se-
curities anytime one department of the firm (even though effec-
tively "walled") is likely to acquire inside informdtion.
In light of this competitive effect that the "solicitation-yes, rec-
ommendation-no" rule advanced by Salomon would have on the
industry as a whole, it is not surprising that it was excoriated in
the amicus brief filed by Paine, Webber.1 0 Paine, Webber is one
of the nation's largest investment banking/broker-dealer firms,
and, like Salomon Brothers and many others, it maintains a "re-
stricted list" procedure to deal with SEC-imposed restrictions on
trading in advance of or during a public distribution of new securi-
ties."' It disagreed sharply with Salomon Brothers, however, on
the need to maintain a "restricted list" to deal with problems cre-
ated by the possession of inside information by the firm's invest-
ment banking personnel."] 2 In Paine, Webber's view, the
distinction between "soliciting" and "recommending" securities
transactions was in conflict with precedents which it read as not
sanctioning a difference between active and passive
misrepresentations." 3
108. Salomon Brief, supra note 100, at 4, Paine, Webber Brief, supra note 106, at 5-
8. SEC Securities Exchange Act Rule 17a-9(f) (1) defines a "market maker"
as "a dealer who, with respect to a particular security, holds himself out...
as being willing to buy and sell for his own account on a continuous basis
otherwise than on a national securities exchange." 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-9(f) (1)
(1983). See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 35, at 708-10; T. LOESER,
THE OVER THE COUNTER SECURITIES MARKET: WHAT IT is AND How rr OPER-
ATES 5-6 (1940).
109. See Paine, Webber Brief, supra note 106, at 7 n.* (reporting that Mr. William
R. Salomon, Managing Partner of Salomon Brothers, testified before the SEC
in 1971 that, in fiscal year 1970, Salomon Brothers' average daily inventory in
securities was valued at $2.2 billion.).
110. Id. at 5-9.
111. Id. at 4. See also supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
112. Paine, Webber Brief, supra note 106, at 4, 5-9.
113. Id. at 8-9 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 138 (1972)).
See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963);
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC,
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[T]here can be no rational basis for the distinction put forth by Salomon.
It would hold a securities firm liable for money damages if its broker-
dealer department "recommended" the purchase of a security based on
public information which was contradicted by non-public information in
the possession of its investment banking department. It would exonerate
the firm, however, if its broker-dealer department "solicited" the purchase
of a particular security from inventory at a price which the non-public in-
formation in its investment banking department would demonstrate to be
grossly inflated. From the customer's perspective it can make absolutely
no difference whether he was actively or passively misled. In either case,
he was induced by public information to make a decision which he pre-
sumably would not have made if the non-public information had been
made available to him.
1 1 4
In Paine, Webber's view, the only acceptable solution to the
conflicting obligations of a multi-service firm in possession of in-
side information is rigid adherence to the firm's Chinese Wall, and
without resort to a "restricted list" policy of withdrawing recom-
mendations with respect to the securities of the firm's investment
banking clients.11 5 Moreover, the firm was particularly critical of
the practice of listing securities at the time a firm actually receives
confidential information about a corporate client. First, it con-
tended that the mere act of "listing" a security prior to the exist-
ence of any outstanding recommendation would amount to an
impermissible "signal" that the firm possessed inside information
of one sort or another with respect to that security, a signal that
could not be effectively camouflaged by the firm.116
Second, Paine, Webber argued that such a listing in the situa-
tion where there is an outstanding recommendation would pose
even more serious difficulties: a failure to withdraw the recom-
mendation would place the firm in Shearson's position in Slade,
while withdrawal of the recommendation would expose it to liabil-
ity for improperly signalling its customers or the market as to the
existence of inside information."17 They observed that "[i] n Paine,
Webber's experience, the mere act of withdrawing the recommen-
dation would, as a practical matter, inevitably be taken by the cus-
tomer as a signal that the firm has come into possession of inside
139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
114. Paine, Webber Brief, supra note 106, at 9. Paine, Webber also took issue with
what it termed the "distant early warning system" approach of the SEC. Id.
at 2, 10-14. See also Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Ami-
cus Curiae, Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974)
(summarized in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH)
94,848) [hereinafter cited as SEC Brief]. See generally infra notes 121-31 and
accompanying text.
115. Paine, Webber Brief, supra note 106, at 14.
116. Id. at 15.
117. Id. at 15-17.
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information 'contrary to the recommendation'."118 In addition,
even if this were not the case, "the signal would set-off speculation
and rumor... [inducing] holders of the security to sell and specu-
lators to sell short."119 In sum, according to Paine, Webber, any ap-
proach other than simple but strict adherence to the firm's policy
of isolating inside information within the department that receives
it would place the multi-service firm (other than, perhaps, Salo-
mon Brothers) in the unhappy position where there is nothing it
can do to avoid liability under the securities laws.12 0
In addition to providing the only thorough public airing of the
multiple policy considerations underlying the investment banker/
broker-dealer conflict, perhaps the most important result of the
Slade litigation was that it induced the Securities and Exchange
Commission to express its views on the efficacy of the Chinese
Wall as a defense to a complaint by an unhappy customer.121 The
Commission opined that the certified question 22 could be an-
swered affirmatively without wreaking havoc in the industry.
Thus, in the Commission's view, rule lOb-5's prohibition against
the misuse of inside information, and the duty of a broker-dealer to
treat its customers fairly, could adequately be accommodated
without major structural changes by multi-service institutions.
If the persons within an integrated firm who actually make in-
vestment decisions and recommendations are effectively pre-
cluded by a "leakproof" wall from receiving inside information,
then the Commission saw no contravention of the insider trading
rules.123 With respect to the firm's duties to its retail customers,
118. Id. at 16 (citing SEC Brief, supra note 114, at 11-12).
119. Paine, Webber Brief, supra note 106, at 16. Depending upon the character of
the public information and the rumors surrounding the particular company,
presumably the opposite reaction could occur as well, i.e., customers might
buy up whatever holdings are available, and buy calls on the stock on the
options market.
120. Id. at 17. Paine, Webber gave rather short shrift, however, to the unfortunate
position of the Slade plaintiffs:
[Sjuch a result [i.e., adherence to the Chinese Wall alone] would do
no injustice to customers who happen to be in the same situation as
plaintiffs.... Neither the District Court, nor the Commission, nor
Salomon Brothers has suggested that such customers are entitled to
receive inside information. If one of [Shearson's] salesmen misled
plaintiffs herein, it was because the law prohibited the disclosure of
inside information .... Defendant should not be penalized, in
short, for complying with the law against the misuse of inside infor-
mation and giving the same advice based on the same information
thaVplaintiffs would have received had they transacted business with
any other firm.
Id. at 18. But see infra notes 307-20 and accompanying text.
121. See SEC Brief, supra note 114.
122. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
123. See SEC Brief, supra note 114, at 9-10. Such an admission on the part of the
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however, the SEC took the position that if a recommendation with-
out an investigation sufficient to yield an "adequate basis" was
fraudulent,124 then "afortiori Rule lOb-5 prohibits a recommenda-
tion contrary to facts about the security in question known by the
broker-dealer."' 25 Further, "[t]he preservation of necessary re-
strictions upon the use of material inside information does not re-
quire that such misrepresentations be condoned."'126
In order to resolve the apparent conundrum created by these
arguably conflicting duties, the SEC adopted a stance quite similar
to that of Salomon Brothers' 2 7-any sales effort on the part of a
broker-dealer which involves an "affirmative representation,"
either express or implied, as to the merits of the securities being
offered, should be prohibited.128 One way in which the Commis-
sion suggested this could be effected without serious disruption in
industry practices is through the adoption of procedures, such as a
restricted list, whereby outstanding recommendations are with-
drawn and additional recommendations prohibited until there is
full public disclosure of the nonpublic data.12 9 The SEC took pains
to point out, however, that any such listing "must be effected in a
manner which avoids disclosure as to whether any material inside
information possessed by the firm is in accord with or contrary to
the recommendation,"' 30 and that this result could best be accom-
plished through listing the security at the genesis of any relation-
ship with an issuer which is likely to give rise to the receipt of
confidential information.131
In spite of (or perhaps because of) the thorough exploration of
the problems created by the combination of investment banking
and retail brokerage provided by the parties and amici in the
Slade case, after oral argument the panel of Second Circuit to
which the case had been assigned determined that permission to
hear the interlocutory appeal had been improvidently granted. 32
Commission would appear to be inevitable after its acceptance of a Chinese
Wall in the settlement of In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43
S.E.C. 933, 938 (1968). See also Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 488.
124. See, e.g., Hanley v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969). Accord SEC v. Van
Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966). See also supra notes 37-45 and accompany-
ing text.
125. SEC Brief, supra note 114, at 7-8.
126. Id. at 10-11 (footnote omitted).
127. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
128. SEC Brief, supra note 114, at 7-8, 11 & n.13.
129. Id. at 11.
130. Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 12. "Of course, the best way of avoiding problems in this area is for the
firm to take steps to bring about prompt public disclosure of the material in-
side information." Id. See also infra notes 218-26 and accompanying text.
132. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398, 400 (2d Cir. 1974). It should be
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The court saw "at least" three factual questions, the answers to
which might have a bearing on the ultimate resolution of the legal
questions presented: first, whether Shearson in fact possessed the
adverse information about Tidal Marine prior to the last of the
plaintiffs' purchases; second, whether (as the plaintiffs claimed)
the firm's investment banking department had given the retail
sales force misleading information about Tidal Marine at the same
time that it knew of the adverse information; and third, if, and to
what extent, there is a difference (as Salomon Brothers claimed)
between "solicitations" and "recommendations" in connection
with the sale of securities. 3 3 Thus, in sum, the Court saw the situ-
ation in Slade as "precisely the kind of case in which the implica-
tions are so considerable that in the proper exercise of judicial
restraint, an abstract answer to an abstract question is the least
desirable of judicial solutions." 3 4
The Court's opinion left both the securities industry and other
multi-service financial institutions in considerable uncertainty.
Nevertheless, it represents the only significant judicial scrutiny
given to date, to the Chinese Wall and other techniques designed
to resolve the conflicting obligations of integrated firms that pos-
sess inside information.
D. Exchange Act Rule 14e-3
Despite some intimations by the SEC that it might adopt a com-
prehensive rule to govern the inside information problems of
multi-service financial institutions, 35 to date the only significant
exercise of the Commission's rulemaking authority in this direc-
tion has been in the tender offer context. In late 1979, the SEC
noted, as the court was quick to recognize, that § 1292(b) of the Judicial Code,
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982), which governs interlocutory orders "involv[ing] a
controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for differ-
ence of opinion," limits the appeal to the "order" made by the District Court,
which, in the Slade case, was simply the denial of Shearson's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Thus, the Court of Appeals was in no way required to render
an opinion on the precise legal question formulated by the trial judge. See
supra note 87 and accompanying text. See also P. BATO, P. MIsiCIN, D. SHA-
PImo & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1544, 1564-65 (2d ed. 1973); id. at 433 (1981 Supp.) (interlocu-
tory appeals under § 1292(b)).
133. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398, 400, 402 (2d Cir. 1974).
134. Id. at 400 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 403.
135. See Statement of SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., Securities Regulation
Symposium, Dallas, Texas, in BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 299, at A-18 (sum-
mary) (noted in Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 488 n.137). See also SEC,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 77 (advocating the adoption of




released for public comment proposed rule 14e-3136 under section
14(e) of the Exchange Act.137 Broadly speaking, the purpose for
the proposed rule was to extend the "disclose or abstain" principle
developed under rule 10b-5 to situations involving trading in the
securities of a target company prior to the public dissemination of
the announcement of a tender offer for the target's stock. In its
release accompanying the proposed rule, the Commission made
clear that while the abuse at which the proposal was aimed is the
"actual misuse" of inside information relating to a tender offer, the
literal language of the rule's provisions, as drafted, was capable of
being applied to a corporate entity, even though the individuals in-
136. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16-385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349 (1979);
[1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,374 (Nov. 29, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Release No. 16-385]. The rule, as proposed and as
ultimately adopted, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1983), see SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 17,120, 45 Fed. Reg. 60, 410, 60,418 (1980); [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980), makes it unlawful to
trade in securities of a target company on the basis of material, nonpublic
information relating to a tender offer. In addition, rule 14e-3(d) prohibits in-
siders from "tipping" others about the tender offer under circumstances
where it is likely that the "tippee" or "tippees" will trade in the target's stock
on the basis of the tip. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (1983). See generally Note,
Trading on Material, Nonpublic Information Under Rule 14e-3, 49 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 539 (1981).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Section 14(e), originally added to the Exchange Act
by the Williams Act Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, 457
(1968), as amended by Pub. L. 91-567, § 5, 84 STAT. 1497, 1497-98 (1970), which
added the last sentence, reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of
security holders in opposition of or in favor of any such offer, request,
or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsec-
tion, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reason-
ably designed to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
A "tender offer," though undefined in the statute, generally refers to:
[a] general invitation to all of the shareholders of a company to
purchase their shares at a specified price, sometimes subject to a
minimum and/or maximum that the offeror will accept, communi-
cated to the shareholders by means of newspaper advertisements
and (if the offeror can obtain the shareholders list, which is not often
unless it is a friendly tender) by a general mailing to the entire list of
shareholders.
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 35, at 741. See also SEC Release No. 16-
385, supra note 136; at 70,350-51; [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,374, at 82,603-04; ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(166) (1980). See gener-
ally Note, Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1973).
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volved in making the actual decision to purchase the target's se-
curities were unaware of any inside information relating to the
tender offer.138
This could occur, for example, where one department of a multiservice
financial institution received material, nonpublic information relating to a
tender offer while a separate and independent department of the same
organization made the decision to purchase (or sell) securities of the sub-
ject company without any knowledge of or access to such information.139
Thus, paragraph (b) of the proposed rule also provided that
transactions in the target's securities by a person "other than a
natural person" would not run afoul of rule 14e-3(a), even though
the entity involved possessed inside information about the.tender
offer, if it could show both that the individuals actually making the
investment decision did not know of the inside information and
that they did not have access to it. In determining whether the
individuals who made the decision to purchase (or sell) had access
to any inside information, the rule also provided that "[t] he exist-
ence of policies and procedures to ensure that material, non-public
information will not be used in violation of [rule 14e-3] may, de-
pending on the facts and circumstances, be taken into account."140
The final version of rule 14e-3(b) adopted by the SEC in 1980141
liberalized this required showing by a multi-service institution,
and thus constitutes the Commission's strongest statement to date
in support of the premises underlying the Chinese Wall, at least in
the context of a charge of improper insider trading. 4 2 As adopted,
138. SEC Release No. 16-385, supra note 136, at 70,353; [1979-80 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 82,608.
139. Id.
140. Proposed § 240.14e-3(b), SEC Release No. 16-385, supra note 136, at 70,359.
141. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg.
60,410, 60,418 (1980); 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. 24,297 (effective date Oct. 14, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Release No. 17,120]. Rule 143-3(b) provides as
follows:
(b) A person other than a natural person shall not violate [rule 14e-
31 if such person shows that:
(1) The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalf of
such person to purchase or sell any security described in [rule 14e-
3(a)] or to cause any security to be purchased or sold on behalf of
others did not know the material, nonpublic information; and
(2) Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies
and procedures, reasonable under the circumstances, taking into
consideration the nature of the person's business, to ensure that in-
dividual(s) making investment decision(s) would not violate [rule
14e-3], which policies and procedures may include, but are not lim-
ited to, (i) those which restrict any purchase, sale and causing any
purchase and sale of any such security or (ii) those which prevent
such individual(s) from knowing such information.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b) (1983). See also L. Loss, supra note 29, at 867-70. Cf.
AL FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (C) (ii) (I), (H) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981).
142. Of course, the defense afforded by rule 14e-3(b) is available only in the con-
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rule 14e-3(b) provides that an artificial person will not be held in
violation of the "disclose or abstain" aspect of the rule if the indi-
viduals making the decision to trade in the affected securities did
so unaware of inside information possessed by other individuals in
the firm, provided the institution itself has established reasonable
policies to ensure that such individuals do not receive inside
information.
In its release accompanying formal adoption of rule 14e-3, the
SEC took pains to note that a "Chinese Wall" is neither mandated
by the rule nor is it a foolproof defense to a charge of insider trad-
ing.143 Despite its unwillingness to make that commitment, how-
ever, the history of the rule leaves no doubt that, at least in the
general case, it is the use of inside information to reap trading prof-
its, as opposed to the mere possession of the information, upon
which the fraud rules are ultimately bottomed.144 Given this oper-
ational premise, the Commission's support for the isolation tech-
nique, albeit a somewhat grudging one, follows as a matter of
course.
IV. THE APPROACH OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE
A. Introduction
The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities
Code,145 while taking great strides in proposing far-reaching
text of a firm engaged in the purchase or sale of securities of a company sub-
ject to a tender offer. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the more
general policy considerations leading to the promulgation of the rule are ma-
terially different from those which underlie the more general proscription of
rule lOb-5. Indeed, the "potential harm to investors and the securities mar-
kets," SEC Release No. 17,120, supra note 141, at 60,410, 60,412, resulting from
trading in a target's stock on the basis of inside information about a tender
offer are functionally the same as those which ensue from insider trading
generally. But cf. Note, supra note 136, at 546 (suggesting that the authority
granted to the SEC by § 14(e) "might not include the power to impose a duty
to disclose or abstain in all circumstances in which an inequality of access to
information exists"). It may be worth noting that, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), it is possible
that trading in the stock of a target company on the basis of inside informa-
tion received from the offeror will never be held to violate rule lob-5 (see
supra note 30 for a discussion of Chiarella).
143. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410, 60,415 (1980). Cf. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 938 (1968) (SEC refused to concede that a Chinese
Wall would prove adequate in all circumstances to insulate a multi-service
securities firm from liability under rule lOb-5). See supra note 77 and accom-
panying text.
144. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
145. The ALI's Federal Securities Code Project had its beginning in the 1963 rec-
ommendation of the SEC's SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, that a program be
undertaken for synthesizing the disclosure requirements of the Securities
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changes in many areas of federal regulation of securities and se-
curities transactions,146 has stepped quite gingerly in its approach
to the Chinese Wall and related devices for reconciling the con-
flicts problems of multi-service securities firms and other financial
institutions. Early drafts of the Code did not mention the prob-
lem;147 in fact, nothing appeared in print until the 1978 Proposed
Official Draft ("POD") of the work.148 The approach of section
Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771-77aa,
78a-78hh-1 (1982). The project which ultimately led to the Code itself, which
was published by the American Law Institute in 1980, stemmed from two con-
ferences on codification of the federal securities laws held by the American
Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law. The
first of the conferences was held in late 1966, see 22 Bus. LAw. 793 (1967) (pub-
lication of proceedings), and the second was held in May, 1969. The actual
preparation of the Code was undertaken by the Council of the ALI, with Pro-
fessor Louis Loss of Harvard Law School serving as the Reporter. See gener-
ally ALI FED. SEC. CODE xix-xxi (1980) (Reporter's Introduction). See also
Loss, The American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus.
LAW. 27 (1969). The Proposed Official Draft of the Code, dated March 15, 1978,
was formally approved by the membership of the ALI in 1978. See PROCEED-
INGS OF THE AMERICAN LAw INsTrrTE, 55TH ANNuAL MEETING (1978) 499
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 55 A.L.I. Pxoc.]. See also PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, 57TH ANNuAL MEETING (1980) 375-85 (1981) (report
by Professor Loss regarding Code's status and post-approval amendments to
the Proposed Official Draft).
The three principal purposes of the Code are to simplify existing law, to
eliminate (to the extent possible) duplicative regulation, and to reexamine
"the entire scheme of investor protection with a view to increasing its effi-
ciency. . . ." AU FED. SEC. CODE, supra at xix. Legislative enactment of the
Code has received the unanimous approval of the American Bar Associa-
tion's House of Delegates, see id. at xxii-iii, as well as two endorsements by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, one during the Carter administra-
tion and another by the Reagan Commission. See SEC Release Nos. 33-6242,
34-17,153, 35-21,716, 39-586, IC-11,362, IA-730, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) f 82,655 (Sept. 18, 1980); SEC Release Nos. 33-6377, 34-18,437,35-
22,367, 39-692, IC-12,178, IA-790, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 83,090 (Jan. 21, 1982).
146. For example, the Code would abandon the "archaic centrality," ALI FED. SEC.
CODE xix, of the registration requirement for public offerings imposed by § 5
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982), in favor of company registration and
continuous disclosure through annual reports, proxy solicitations, and the
like. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 401-06 (issuer registration); §§ 501-15 (distri-
butions); §§ 601-07 (postregistration requirements) (1980 and 2d Supp. 1981).
147. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE, Tentative Drafts Nos. 1 (Apr. 25, 1972), 2 (March,
1973), 3 (Apr. 1, 1974), 4 (Apr. 1, 1975), 5 (Apr. 1, 1976), & 6 (Apr. 1, 1977).
148. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 287 (Proposed Official Draft March 15, 1978). The lan-
guage of § 287 of the Proposed Official Draft very nearly mirrors that of
§ 202 (86) of the final version of the Code that was published in 1980 (see infra
note 149 for the text of § 202(86)). Thus, it is not reprinted here. The section
initially came into the Proposed Official Draft as the result of the efforts of a
special task force consisting of the Reporter and others. The task force ini-
tially intended to draft a provision 'that would preclude liability in appropri-
ate instances" if the defendant had erected a Chinese Wall. ALI FED. SEC.
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287(c) of the POD, which contains nearly identical language to that
of section 202(86) of the finished product,149 is essentially to pro-
vide a legislative mandate to the courts and the SEC to consider
the existence of a Chinese Wall or other procedures in the context
of determining whether to impute the knowledge of one individual
(or department) to another or other individuals within a firm or to
the firm itself.150 Before examining the particulars of this required
inquiry, however, it is useful to examine the various contexts (in
CODE § 202(86) (C), comment (2) (1980) (emphasis in original). Ultimately,
however, after numerous drafts, the task force abandoned this goal, taking
the position that codification was premature because of the complexity of the
issues involved. Id.; Interview with Professor Louis Loss, Reporter, Ameri-
can Law Institute Federal Securities Code, in Cambridge, Massachusetts
(April 1, 1982). Thus, as is not uncommon in proposing legislative solutions to
complex problems, the draftsmen of § 287 went up the hill and down again in
a very short time. Cf. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 791-92 (1980) (discussing the efforts of the Kutak Commis-
sion of the ABA to draft a mandatory pro bono publico requirement for the
legal profession).
149. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (1980) provides as follows:
Knowledge.-
(A) Dependent on context.-"Know" and its derivatives are not
defined. Their meaning is left to construction in context. But see the
definition of "scienter" in section 202(47).
(B) Company plaintiffs.-The fact that any or all of the directors
and officers of a company plaintiff are defendants with knowledge of
a fact does not of itself establish the company's knowledge of the
fact.
(C) Agency and similar relationships.-(i) Questions of imputa-
tion of the knowledge, scienter, belief, or negligence of an agent, part-
ner, or director to his principal or company (or to another agent,
partner, or director of his principal or company) are governed by the
principles of common law and equity, applied as a matter of Federal
jurisprudence.
(ii) In determining, for purposes of sections 915(a) (3) (B),
1602(a), 1603(a) and 1604(c), whether to make an imputation pursu-
ant to section 202(86) (C) (i) with respect to facts concerning an is-
suer or its securities that are not generally available, the court or the
Commission shall consider whether the principal or company oper-
ated under established procedures reasonably designed (I) to pre-
vent transmission of those facts to persons other than those who
have responsibility for administering those procedures or who act in
furtherance of a purpose for which access to those facts was given by
the issuer or another person, or (II) to prevent transactions in and
recommendations concerning securities of the issuer.
Section 202(147), in turn, defines "scienter" as follows:
A person makes (or, within the meaning of section 2006(c), causes or
gives substantial assistance to the making of) misrepresentation
with "scienter" if he knows that he is making a misrepresentation (or
a misrepresentation is being made) or acts in reckless disregard of
whether that is so.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(147) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). See also infra note 178.
150. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). See also infra notes 176-
87 and accompanying text.
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the Code's scheme of things) in which the question is likely to
arise.
B. Recommendations of Securities to Customers
As a part of its effort to codify existing law, the Federal Securi-
ties Code would enact into the statute itself four of the most com-
mon, and oppobrious, manifestations of the "shingle theory" as it
has been applied by the courts and the SEC to brokers and deal-
ers. 15 1 Section 913 of the Code would proscribe, without the neces-
sity for further rulemaking by the Commission: (1) a broker or
dealer's failure to execute promptly a customer's order 152 (2) the
effectuation of purchases or sales of securities of an issuer which is
in a control relationship with the broker-dealer;153 (3) unauthor-
ized brokerage transactions for customers' accounts;1 5 4 and (4) un-
reasonable spreads in purchases and sales by a dealer (unless the
customer is an institutional investor that is aware of the size of the
spread).155 A violation of any provision of section 913 automati-
cally gives rise to civil liability on the part of the broker or
dealer. 5 6
In addition, the Code would grant rulemaking authority to the
SEC to define and establish prevention techniques over other
151. See generally supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. See also infra notes
286-98 and accompanying text.
152. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 913(1) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). See, e.g., Bateman Eich-
ler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18,401 [1981-
82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 83,088 (Jan. 8, 1982).
153. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 913(2). See also SEC Securities Exchange Act Rule
15cl-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-5 (1983). As to "control" generally, see ALI FED.
SEC. CODE § 202(29) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981); 2 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 764-
783; 5 id. at 2696-2708.
154. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 913(3) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). See, e.g., Lewis v. Wal-
ston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); SEC v. First Securities Co. of Chicago,
463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, McKy v. Hochfelder, 409 U.S. 880 (1972).
Cf. AU FED. SEC. CODE § 1717 (1980) (churning); SEC Securities Exchange
Act Rule 15cl-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1983). See also Miley v. Oppenheimer
& Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir.
1974); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Stevens v.
Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Va. 1968); Lorenz v. Watson,
258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966); In re Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865
(1946), affd, 177 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See generally Rosenman, Discre-
tionary Accounts and Manipulative Trading Practices, in 5 INST. ON SEC.
REG. 245 (1974); Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REV. 869
(1967).
155. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 913(4) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). See also Charles Hughes
& Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). In
addition to the regulations imposed upon brokers and dealers by § 913, § 914
would make unlawful various egregious practices in the investment advisory
industry. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 914 (1980).
156. AI FED. SEC. CODE § 1715 (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981).
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forms of conduct by brokers and dealers in specified areas that
amounts to "unfair dealing" with the firm's customers or clients.157
In particular, section 915 (a) (3) of the Code 5 8 would give the Com-
mission the power to declare unlawful any recommendations by a
broker-dealer concerning a security, unless the broker-dealer rea-
sonably believes that the particular purchases or sale is "not un-
suitable" for that customer 5 9 on the basis of information supplied
by the customer after inquiry and "any other information" known
by the broker-dealer. 60 The scope of the "other information" is
not defined, and thus the information base upon which the suita-
bility of recommendations is to be judged is left for judicial
development.
157. Id. at § 915. See also Exchange Act § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1982).
158. Section 915(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for a broker, dealer, municipal broker, or mu-
nicipal dealer, in contravention of the rules of the Commission-
(1) to buy or sell a security without disclosing (A) that he is a
marketmaker in the security, or an underwriter, participant, or
otherwise financially interested in a current distribution of the secur-
ity...
(2) to recommend a transaction in a security unless the issuer is
a registrant or reasonable information with respect to the issuer and
the security is otherwise available; or
(3) to recommend a transaction in a security unless he reason-
ably believes that it is not unsuitable for the customer on the basis of
(A) information furnished by the customer on reasonable inquiry
with respect to his investment objectives, financial situation, and
needs, and (B) any other information known by the broker, dealer,
municipal broker, or municipal dealer.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 915(a) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). As to § 915(a) (1) (A), see
SEC Securities Exchange Act Rules 10b-10(a)(5)(ii), 15cl-6, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.10b-10(a) (5) (ii), 240.15cl-6, (1983); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970). As to § 915(a) (2), see SEC Securities Exchange Act
Rule 15c2-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1983). As to § 915(a) (3), see SEC Securi-
ties Exchange Act Rule 15b10-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1983); N.Y. Stock Ex-
change Rule 405, N.Y.S.E. GuIDE (CCH) 2405; NAS.D. Rules of Fair
Practice, art. LI, § 2, N.A.S.D. MANuAL (CCH) 2152.
159. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 915(a) (3) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). See also Clark v. John
Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1978) (recommendation of an
unsuitable transaction with "scienter" violates rule 10b-5).
160. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 915(a) (3) (B) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). Implicit in the
requirement that the broker reasonably believe that the transaction is "not
unsuitable" for the customer is that he have a reasonable basis for any rec-
ommendations he makes.
It should be noted that a violation of a Commission rule promulgated
under § 915 would not automatically give rise to civil liability on the part of
the broker-dealer. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 916 (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). In-
stead, the existence of a private right of action thereunder (if any) is left to
judicial implication under § 1722, which contains standards designed to com-
ply with the criteria for implication set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
See AL FED. SEC. CODE § 1722(a) & comment (1) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). See
also infra note 190 and cases cited therein.
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C. Fraudulent and Manipulative Activity
In addition to the regulation of the broker-customer relation-
ship imposed by sections 913 and 915, the Code would also rational-
ize and harmonize much of the existing law with respect to
fraudulent and manipulative activities in connection with securi-
ties transactions. The residual "catch all" is section 1602(a),161
which simply makes it unlawful to engage in a "fraudulent act"162
or to make a misrepresentation 63 in connection with almost any
161. Section 1602(a) provides as follows:
It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or to make
a misrepresentation in connection with (a) a sale or purchase of a
security, an offer to sell or buy a security, (2) a proxy solicitation or
other circularization of security holders with respect to a security of
a registrant, (3) a tender offer or a recommendation to security hold-
ers in favor of or opposition to a tender offer, or (4) any activity or
proposed activity by an investment adviser with respect to a client or
a prospective client.
AM FED. SEC. CODE § 1602(a) (1980).
162. Section 202(61) of the Code, which defines "fraudulent act," provides in perti-
nent part as follows:
(A) General.-"Fraudulent act" includes an act, device, scheme,
practice, or course of conduct that (i) is fraudulent or deceptive, or
(ii) operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit.
(B) Inaction or silence.-Inaction or silence when there is a
duty to act or speak may be a fraudulent act.
(C) Knowledge or recklessness.-(i) For purposes of an action
or proceeding under Part XVII or section 1821(a) (2), a person en-
gages in a fraudulent act only if he acts with knowledge that his con-
duct is of the type specified in section 202(61) (A), or in reckless
disregard of whether his conduct is of that type.
(ii) For purposes of any other action or proceeding, a person en-
gages in a fraudulent act if he engages in an act, device, scheme,
practice, or course of conduct that is likely to defraud or deceive, re-
gardless of whether fraud or deception is intended.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(61) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). The obvious intent of
this broad language, especially that of § 202(61) (A), is to preserve the con-
struction given to existing antifraud provisions by the courts and the SEC,
see id. at § 202(61) & comment (1) (1980), as well as to leave room for admin-
istrative and judicial development of the language to catch future mice that
may not otherwise fit in today's traps.
163. Section 202(96) provides as follows:
(A) GeneraL---"Misrepresentation" means (i) an untrue state-
ment of a material fact, or (ii) an omission to state a material fact
necessary to prevent the statement made from being misleading in
the light of the circumstances under which they are made.
(B) Estimates, etc.-A statement of a fact within the meaning of
section 202(55) (A) [forecasts and the like, see infra note 167] is not a
misrepresentation if it (i) is made in good faith, (ii) has a reasonable
basis when it is made, and (iii) complies with any applicable rule so
far as underlying assumptions are concerned. See also section
1602(b) (2).
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(96) (1980). In addition, section 202(92) defines a
"material fact" as one in which there is a "substantial likelihood that a rea-
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relevant securities-related activity. In addition to this omnibus
provision, some manifestations of which are specifically spelled
out in the Code, 6 4 two particular activities which are specifically
made unlawful raise concerns relevant to the presence or absence
of an institutional Chinese Wall or other procedures designed to
inhibit the transmission of nonpublic information to areas in which
it could be misused to effect market transactions.
Section 1603 would govern trading in an issuer's securities by a
statutorily-defined "insider."165 Although the section is quite
clearly derived in large measure from the judicial and administra-
tive exposition of rule 10b-5,166 it would also introduce into the law
sonable person would consider it important under the circumstances in de-
termining his course of action." Id. at § 202(92) (1980). See TSC Indus., Inc.
v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 30, at
718-20. See also ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202 (147) (1980) (definition of scienter).
As to § 202(96) (B), see SEC Securities Act Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1983),
and SEC Securities Exchange Act Rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1983) (safe
harbor rule for projections in documents filed with the SEC), adopted by
SEC Securities Act Release No. 6084, 17 SEC DOCK. 1048 (June 15, 1979). See
also SEC Securities Act Release No. 5993, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,251 (1978) (propos-
als for safe harbor rules); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5992, 43 Fed. Reg.
53,246 (1978) (disclosures of projections of future economic performance).
164. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1605 (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981) (misrepresentation of
official approval); id. § 1606 (churning); id. § 1607 (touting); id. § 1608 (ficti-
tious quotations).
165. Section 1603, entitled "Insiders' Duty to Disclose When Trading," provides in
pertinent part as follows:
(a) General.-It is unlawful for an insider to sell or buy a secur-
ity of the issuer, if he knows a material fact with respect to the issuer
or the security that is not generally available, unless-
(1) the insider reasonably believes that the fact is generally
available;
(2) the identity of the other party to the transaction (or his
agent) is known to the insider and (A) the insider reasonably be-
lieves that that party (or his agent) knows the fact, or (B) that party
(or his agent) knows the fact from the insider or otherwise; or
(3) the insider proves that the fact is not a fact of special signifi-
cance, except that this defense is not available in [SEC injunctive
and disciplinary actions].
(b) Insider.-For the purposes of [§ 1603], "insider" means
(1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person controlling, con-
trolled by, or under common control with, the issuer, (3) a person
who, by virtue of his relationship or former relationship to the issuer,
knows a material fact about the issuer or the security ... that is not
generally available, or (4) a person [who is a "tippee" or a "tippee's
tippee"] with knowledge that the person from whom he learns the
fact is [an insider], unless the Commission or a court finds that it
would be inequitable, on consideration of the circumstances and the
purposes of this code (including the deterrent effect of liability), to
treat the person within [this § 1603(b) (4) ] as if he were [an insider].
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603 (2d Supp. 1981).
166. The Reporter's Comment to § 1603 also cites the Cal. Corp. Sec. Act § 25,402,
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in this area at least one significant change from existing law.
Under section 1603, trading in securities by an insider on the basis
of a material fact167 that is "not generally available"' 68 is prohib-
ited. But, unlike current implied civil liability under rule lOb-5,
under section 1603 (a) (3) the insider would be afforded a defense if
he proves that the nonpublic fact upon which his liability is predi-
cated is not a "fact of special significance."1 69
Finally, 7 0 section 1604(c) of the Code would enact legislatively
that aspect of the Texas Gulf Sulphur decisionll making it unlaw-
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25,402 (West 1977), as source material for the section. ALI
FED. SEC. CODE § 1603 (1980) ("Source").
167. Section 202(55) provides as follows:
Fact.--"Fact" includes (A) a promise, prediction, estimate, projec-
tion, or forecast, or (B) a statement of intention, motive, opinion, or
law. See also section 202(96) (B).
AU FED. SEC. CODE § 202(55) (1980). See also id. at § 202(96) (B) (estimates,
projections, and the like).
168. Section 202(64) provides as follows:
Generally available.-A fact is "generally available" one week (or
any other period prescribed by Commission rule) after it is disclosed
by means of a filing or press release or in any other manner reason-
ably designed to bring it to the attention of the investing public.
Otherwise the burden of proving that a fact is "generally available" is
on the person who so asserts.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(64) (1980). Also, see id. at § 1603, comment (5) (b),
which makes it clear that the risk is on the defendant who trades on the basis
of material nonpublic information that the fact in question will not be found
to have been "generally available" at the time of the challenged transactions.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603, comment (5) (b) (1980).
169. AI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(a) (3) (2d Supp. 1981) (see supra note 165 for the
text of § 1603). In turn, section 202(56) provides as follows:
Fact of special signiflcance.-A fact is "of special significance" if
(A) in addition to being material it would be likely on being made
generally available to affect the market price of a security to a signifi-
cant extent, or (B) a reasonable person would consider it especially
important under the circumstances in determining his course of ac-
tion in the light of such factors as the degree of his specificity, the
extent of its difference from information generally available previ-
ously, and its nature and reliability.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(56) (1980). It should be noted that the defense af-
forded by § 1603(a) (3) is not available in SEC injunctive and disciplinary ac-
tions. See id. § 1603(a), comment (1) (2d Supp. 1981).
170. The reader should be cautioned that this section is not intended to be an
exhaustive discussion of the scope of the various forms of conduct that the
Code would make unlawful in the sense of being "fraudulent" or "manipula-
tive," or constituting a misrepresentation, but is limited to those sections hav-
ing a particular bearing on the Chinese Wall and related procedures. The
best source for somewhat broader treatment of part XVI of the Code is the
Code itself and the explanatory comments of the Reporter. See ALI FED. SEC.
CODE §§ 1601-14 (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). As to civil liability under the Code,
see generally id. §§ 1701-28 (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981).
171. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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ful for a company to issue press releases or generate other public-
ity which constitutes a "fraudulent act"172 or contains factual
misrepresentations173 when it is reasonably foreseeable that the
inaccurate publicity will induce others to trade (or not to trade) in
the company's securities or the securities of another company in a
control relationship with the company making the publicity. 7 4
Moreover, the clear intent of the draftsmen of section 1604(c) is
that it is not limited to the issuer and "related" companies; instead,
the comments assert that the section is "[b]road enough to cover
broker-dealers who issue false market letters.' 1 75
D. The Code and the Wail
Against this proposed statutory backdrop, the relevance and
importance of a Chinese Wall or a "restricted list" procedure to a
multi-service financial institution, such as an integrated securities
firm, is readily apparent. In any private actions or criminal prose-
cutions brought under the Code which are bottomed on a "fraudu-
lent act" on the part of the defendant, the very definition of that
term requires a showing either that the defendent knew of the
fraudulent nature of his conduct, 76 or perhaps that he acted in
reckless disregard of whether his conduct was fraudulent.177 In
addition, the private actions available for "misrepresentations"
either require proof that the defendant knew of the falsity of his
172. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(61) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981) (see supra note 162
for the text of § 202(61)).
173. See id. § 202(96) (1980) (see supra note 163 for the text of § 202(96)).
174. Section 1604(c) provides as follows:
Publicity.-It is unlawful for any company, or a person acting on
its behalf, to engage in a fraudulent act in connection with, or to
make a misrepresentation in, a press release or other form of public-
ity (other than a filing) relating to the company if it is reasonably
foreseeable that the publicity will induce other persons to buy, sell,
or not to buy or sell securities of the company or of a controlling,
controlled, or commonly controlled company.
ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1604(c) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981). Note that § 1604(c)
would not operate of its own force to impose liability for the failure to issue
any release at all unless there is insider trading. See id. § 1604(c), comment
(4) (1980). See also Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
175. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1604(c), comment (6) (1980). The literal language of
§ 1604(c), however, does not seem to support this assertion beyond the situa-
tion in which the broker-dealer is acting on behalf of the company involved.
(see supra note 174 for the text of § 1604(c)).
176. Id. § 202(61) (1980 & 2d Supp. 1981) (see supra note 162 for the text of
§ 202(61)).
177. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(61) (C) (i) (2d Supp. 1981). Other actions, however,
such as SEC enforcement proceedings or injunction actions, do not require
such a scienter-type showing. See id. § 202(61) (C) (ii).
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statement,178 or afford defenses based on the nonexistence of sci-
enter (or negligence).179 A partnership, firm, corporation, or other
artificial person obviously cannot possess knowledge or act with a
particular state of mind per se,180 but can act only through its
agents who, ex hypothesi, must ultimately be individuals. Thus,
the initial inquiry in any private action under the Code against a
securities firm or other multi-service institution must then be
whose knowledge (or scienter or state of mind) within the firm
should be attributed to the firm for purposes of making the re-
quired proof.181 And it is to this question that the provisions of
178. See, e.g., id. § 1706(a) (underwriter not liable for false certification under
§ 510(c) (3) absent proof of scienter); id. § 1707(a) (action for misrepresenta-
tion for false publicity under § 1604(c) requires showing of scienter); id.
§ 1709(a) (1) (fiduciary liability for misrepresentation requires showing of sci-
enter). But cf. id. § 1714 (liability for shortswing insider trading).
179. See, e.g., id. § 1703(f) (1): "A defendant has a defense-to an action for viola-
tion of section 1602(a) (1) to the extent that it is based on a misrepresentation
if he proves that... he reasonably did not believe that there was a misrepre-
sentation.. ." See also id. § 1705(f) (3) (2d Supp. 1981) (defense of lack of
scienter to civil actions based on false filings). As to present law, see Aaron v.
SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (allegation of scienter necessary to sustain civil en-
forcement actions by SEC under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983), and also under § 17(a) (1) of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1) (1982), but not under §§ 17(a) (2), (3) of the act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77q(a) (2), (3) (1982)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (al-
legation of scienter necessary to sustain private damage action under § 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5); Bell v. Cameron Meadow Land Co., 669
F.2d 1278, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1982) (recklessness sufficient to meet scienter re-
quirement). See also 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1766; 6 id. at 3883-85.
180. Thus at one time the common law courts were unwilling to hold a corporation
criminally liable whatsoever. See Anonymous, 12 Mod. 560, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518
(KB. 1701) ("A corporation is not indictable, but the particular members of it
are."). See also 1 BLACKSTONE, ComErrAmiEs* 476 (noted in R. PERKNS,
CamuN,1.-LAw 639 (2d ed. 1969)). The law has since moved away from this
overly formalistic view, even if crimes requiring specific intent or mens tea.
See United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909); New York
Central & H.R.R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-96 (1909); United States
v. Koppers Co., Inc., 652 F.2d 290 (2d Cir.) (criminal conviction of corporation
for violating Sherman Act), cert. denied, 454 J.S. 1083 (1981); United States v.
T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974) (corporation convicted for
violating ICC regulation prohibiting truckers from driving while ill; proof
based on collective knowledge of dispatcher and officers). See also Inland
Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1951); United States
v. Sawyer Transp., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29, 30-31 (D. Minn. 1971), affid, 463 F.2d
175 (8th Cir. 1972). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Corporate
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv.
L. REV. 1.227 (1979).
181. See 10 W. FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 4942, at 620-21 (1978). See also supra
note 180 and sources cited therein; infra notes 184, 192-99 and accompanying
text. The general rule, of course, is that, absent some justification for doing
otherwise, the knowledge of a corporation's agent is imputed to the corpora-
tion. See 19 C.J.S., Corporations § 1078 (1940). Agency principles have regu-
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section 202(86) (C) are directed.182
With this structural background in mind, then, perhaps the
most significant contribution of section 202(86) (C) is its mandate
that questions regarding the imputation of knowledge between or
among agents and the principal are to be resolved "by the princi-
ples of common law and equity, applied as a matter of Federal ju-
risprudence."183 Thus, the Code's scheme would focus analysis of
the Chinese Wall issue into an existing body of law, an approach
developed through the course of judicial decisions in analogous
cases.184 This approach is surely the correct one. The question of
the validity of the isolation technique, as well as the need for addi-
tional policies and procedures to deal with the inside information
problems of multi-service firms, should not be approached ex ante
with an unfocused concentration on the fraud rules or the effect of
one rule of law or another on the securities industry, investment
performance, customer expectations, and the like. These are obvi-
ously legitimate considerations underlying the potential legal diffi-
culties facing the firm in possession of insider information. But
the legal question (which has been struggled with in other con-
texts) remains one of corporate knowledge, and a systematic appli-
cation of workable rules requires that the question be analyzed
broadly in all of its facets.185
Beyond this "focusing" of the issue, however, the Code does not
larly been relied upon by the courts in securities litigation in determining
whether to impute knolwedge of an officer or employee to the corporation.
See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 211-12 (2d Cir.), rev'd en
banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
182. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (C) (1980) (see supra note 149 for the text of
§ 202(86) (C)).
183. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (C) (i) (1980).
184. This is not to suggest that there is a developed common law "answer" to the
imputation question in any of the various situations in which it may arise in
the context of an integrated securities firm or other multi-service institution
which has constructed a Chinese Wall or implemented other procedures
(such as a restricted list) to attempt to deal with its inside information
problems. There are numerous cases dealing with the question of when the
knowledge or notice of a corporate agent will be attributed to his principal
See, e.g., 19 C.J.S., supra note 181, at § 1078. See also infra notes 192-99 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless Slade v. Sherson, Hammill & Co., 11973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517
F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974), settlement approved, 79 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), is
still the only case in which the validity of the Chinese Wall solution to the
investment banker/broker-dealer conflict was squarely litigated. Bufcf. Haz-
ard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1936), affid, 257 A.D. 950, 14
N.Y.S.2d 147 (1939), affd, 282 N.Y. 652, 26 N.E.2d 801, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 708
(1940) (see infra note 263 for a discussion of Hazard).
185. Analysis of the considerations underlying the Chinese Wall and other solu-
tions to the investment banker/broker-dealer conflict is reserved for infra
parts V and VI.
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stray very far. The only other significant mandate of section
202(86) (C) is its admonition to the courts and the SEC to "con-
sider" whether the entity involved has constructed a Chinese Wall
to isolate inside information,186 or has adopted some variant of a
"restricted list" procedure to prevent transactions in and recom-
mendations about the securities of issuers about which the firm
has (or may acquire) confidential price-sensitive information.187
There is no effort, however, on the part of the draftsmen to provide
any legislative guidance to either the courts or the Commission as
to when (or even if) a wall or other device is an appropriate solu-
tion to the firm's conflicts problems. Perhaps half a loaf is better
than no loaf at all, but the half loaf provided by the Federal Securi-
ties Code is not a very big one.1 88
186. ALI FED. SEC. CODE §202(86)(C)(ii)(I) (1980). See also id.
§ 202(86) (C) (ii) (I), comment (2).
187. Id. § 202(86) (C) (ii) (HI) & comment (4). Professor Loss has described the op-
eration of the section as follows:
[W] e have come forward with the present [§ 202(86) (C) ] with a Note
... which says to the courts, "You work this out as a matter of fed-
eral common law, and, in working out this problem in the common
law tradition, bear in mind that there is a Chinese Wall when there is
one and give it whatever regard you think it deserves." That is by no
means the kind of solution that would be ideal, but it is the best we
can come up with.
55 A.L.I. PRoc., supra note 145, at 336-37. It is clear, however, that the section
will never absolve a person who transacts in or makes recommendations with
respect to securities if the individual involved has knowledge of scienter, or
acts negligently, without regard to imputation under § 202(86) (C). See ALI
FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (C), comment (5) (1980).
188. This is probably not too surprising in light of the divergence of views as to the
efficacy of the wall device and the complexity of the issues involved. An
amendment was offered on the floor of the American Law Institute's 1978 an-
nual meeting which would have deleted the words "consider whether" in
§ 287(c) of the Proposed Official Draft, and insert the court "shall not, in the
absence of unusual circumstances, make an imputation where the principal
or company operated under" an established Chinese Wall. 55 A.L.I. PRoc.,
supra, note 145, at 337. The amendment was defeated on a voice vote, id. at
338-39, after the Reporter, Professor Loss, offered the following explanation
for his opposition to any changes.
I would oppose any change. What I said in the task force and in the
Advisory Group was that I would not like to be in the witness chair
before a congressional subcommittee and be asked this question,
which inevitably would be asked: "You mean, Professor, that Merrill
Lynch or some other large firm could know, because it was looking
into an underwriting, that Company X was on it way to bankruptcy,
but by setting up what you are pleased to call a 'Chinese Wall' sev-
eral thousand Merrill Lynch employees could sell that stock to a lot
of widows and orphans?" I would not like to answer that question.
Id. at 337-38. See also ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (C), comment (2) (1980)
(an approach which is more likely to be enacted).
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
V. THE CHINESE WALL AND LIABILITY
FOR INSIDER TRADING
The essential legal question facing an integrated securities firm
with a Chinese Wall that has come into possession of inside infor-
mation in its role as investment banker to a publicly-held company
is whether the nonpublic knowledge of the firm's investment bank-
ing division will be imputed to the firm as a whole, or to its trading
personnel. 8 9 If such an imputation is made automatically, without
regard to the existence of the wall, then the multi-service firm will
be exposed to liability under rule 10b-5190 for any transactions in or
recommendations of the securities of that issuer (that are consis-
tent with the inside information) by the firm's broker-dealer or ad-
189. See, e.g., ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (C) (i) (1980).
190. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). In addition to rule lOb-5, other antifraud provi-
sions may also be implicated with respect to transactions in securities on the
basis of material nonpublic information. See, e.g., § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C § 77q(a) (1982); § 14(3) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1982), and
rule 14e-3 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1983) (tender of-
fers); § 15(c) (1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1) (1982), and rule 15cl-2
promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1983); and § 206 of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982). Unless otherwise indi-
cated, however, this discussion is limited to potential liability under rule lob-
5. First, most of the private litigation in this area is conducted under the ae-
gis of that rule, and the right of a private plaintiff to proceed under rule 10b-5
is "well recognized." Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
By contrast, the Supreme Court's unwillingness in recent years to imply
private rights of action under federal statutes that do not specifically provide
therefor casts serious doubt on the ability of private litigants to proceed
under any of the other antifraud rules, at least to the extent they seek mone-
tary damages. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. (TAMA) v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (no implied private right of action for damages
under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act; private remedies are limited to
suits for recission, injunctive relief, or restitution under § 215); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no implied private right of action under
§ 17(a) of the 1934 Act). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 730-49 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). But see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (private right of action under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act for false
and misleading statement in a proxy).
As to § 17(a) of the 1933 Act in particular, compare Stephenson v. Calpine
Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981) (focusing on the minimal
differences between § 17(a) and rule lOb-5, concluded that a private right of
action exists under the former), with Shull v. Dain, Kaiman & Quail, Inc., 561
F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (no private right
to action under § 17(a)). See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th
Cir. 1980) (no implied private right of action for violation of stock exchange or
N.A.S.D. rules). More importantly, however, for the purposes with which this
Article is concerned, there is no meaningful distinction among the policies of
the several provisions. See Brudney, supra note 29, at 324 n.17. See also 5 A.
JACOBS, supra, note 29, §§ 3, 4.
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visory departments as long as the information remains
nonpublic.191
A. An Aside to Common Law
Common law precedents do not provide an "answer" to either
prong of the imputation question in the context of a "walled" firm's
potential liability under the fraud rules for trading on or tipping
inside information. Nevertheless, they serve as a useful point of
departure for understanding the general attitude of the courts with
respect to what may loosely be termed "corporate knowledge."
The general rule, of course, is that a corporation or other organiza-
tion is charged with all relevant factual knowledge of its officers
and agents, at least if that knowledge is acquired during the course
of their employment.192 This is true whether or not the agents in-
volved actually transmit their knowledge to the corporation's of-
ficers or board of directors.193 This "general rule", however, is at
best only a presumption; even the common law courts relaxed
their view in certain instances. For example, the rule has not been
applied when the circumstances were such to give rise to a "clear
191. See, e.g., Ellind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, Coates v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that the inside information need not relate directly to
the prospects or operations of the issuer. Rule lOb-5 has also been applied to
purely "market information," i.e., "[i]nformation about events or circum-
stances that affect the market for a company's securities but not its earning
power." W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
767 (5th unabridged ed. 1980). See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12(2d Cir. 1981) (misappropriation of inside information relating to forthcoming
tender offers from offerors' investment banker); Zweig v. The Hearst Corp.,
521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) ("scalping"). See also SEC v. Capital Gains Re-
search Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) (scalping by investment adviser). But
cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial
Dynamics Fund, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,323 (2d Cir. 1975) (suggests that there may be a duty to disclose market
information in some circumstances, but that this case was not one of them).
See generally ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1603, comment 2(j) (1980); Fleischer,
Mundhein & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973); Morrison, Silence is Golden:
Trading on Nonpublic Market Information, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 211 (1980).
192. See 19 C.J.S., supra note 181, at § 1078, and cases cited; 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corpo-
rations § 1263, and cases cited (1965). See also Simmons Creek Coal Co. v.
Doran, 142 U.S. 417 (1892); Pacific R.R. v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 111 U.S. 505
(1884). Cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 69, at 459 ("[T]he modern justifica-
tion for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of risk.")
(footnote omitted).
193. 19 C.J.S., supra note 181, at § 1078. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Westing-
house Elect. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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presumption" that the agent who possessed the knowledge in
question (or to whom notice was given) would not in fact commu-
nicate it to the responsible officers of the corporation,194 or when
the officer involved had no duty to report the information
further.195
The second prong of the imputation question-whether "corpo-
rate" knowledge (or knowledge of a principal) is to be attributed to
the particular agents responsible for the transaction involved-is
no more clearly resolved. Like the first inquiry, though, the gen-
eral view of the courts has been to regard the corporate "head" as
possessing the composite knowledge of all of its agents.196 Thus
courts have found a corporate principal liable to a third party for
making a false statement, even though the individual who made
the statement was unaware of its falsity. 9 7 Even here, however,
there is some play in the joints, as courts have been perfectly will-
ing to absolve a principal for failure to communicate essential facts
to his agent if the former was somehow unable to do so.1 98
194. 19 C.J.S., supra note 181, at § 1081. See also J.J. McCaskill v. United States,
216 U.S. 504 (1910) (directors defrauding company); Ruckle v. Roto American
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) (same); George H. Sasser & Co. v. Chuck
Wagon System, Inc., 50 N.M. 136, 172 P.2d 818 (1946) (officer was interested in
the transaction). See also 19 Am. JuR. 2d, supra note 192, § 1266, at 672-73.
195. 19 C.J.S., supra note 181, at § 1081. See also Sutton Manual Insurance Co. v.
Notre Dame Arena, Inc., 108 N.H. 437, 441, 237 A.2d 676, 679 (1968).
196. 19 C.J.S., supra note 181, § 1081, at 619, and cases cited.
197. See, e.g., E.S. Graynor Lumber Co. v. Morrison, 75 S.D. 132, 60 N.W.2d 83
(1953). In that case, the corporation filed a complaint to enforce a mechanic's
lien which overstated the amount of the claim by 35%. The plaintiffs sales
manager was aware of the facts regarding the amount the defendant actually
owed, but the firm's office manager and accountant, who had responsibility
for filing the claim, were not. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint, the court charged the corporate plaintiff with the sales manager's
knowledge that the lien claim was overstated. Id. at 135, 60 N.W.2d at 84. In
the case itself, however, there was of course no legitimate barrier of any sort
within the company to prevent the internal transmission of the correct infor-
mation, and the unfairness to the defendant of the "mistake" is readily appar-
ent.
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 256(1), comment(a) (1933), states that:
If a principal, knowing that an agent is about to conduct a transaction
with inadequate or misleading information, intentionally withholds
information from him for the purpose of enabling the agent honestly
to misstate facts, the principal is subject to liability for his own
fradulent statement if the agent does subsequently misstate the
facts.
See also W. SEAVEY, supra note 24, § 92 at 163; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 356, comment (e) (1958).
198. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 256(1), comment (c) (1933) ("[A] trans-
action is not affected by the knowledge of a principal which he cannot com-
municate to the agent, even though he knows that the agent is acting for him
without such knowledge") (emphasis added). See also Canadian Indem. Co.
v. Tacke, 257 F.2d 342 (9th Cir. 1958) (insured not liable for failure to commu-
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Despite the absence of any clearly mandated common law re-
sult, however, the cases provide a twofold lesson which carries
over to the question of the validity of the Chinese Wall defense to a
charge of insider trading. First, the "general rule" is that the
knowledge of an agent is attributed to the firm as a whole and,
once attributed, is further imputed to those of its agents directly
involved with third parties. This, however, is merely the adumbra-
tion of a policy choice that the principal or firm, as the case may be,
is better suited, at least generally, than the wholly uninformed out-
sider to bear the legal risk of its lack of knowledge. Second, how-
ever, it is to be noted that this presumption can be rebutted in
those instances where there is no particular reason for the corpo-
ration to shoulder this burden, and where the more broad policy
considerations implicated in the dispute suggest an alternative re-
sult. In the investment banker/broker-dealer conflict, then, the in-
quiry must appropriately be focused on the general policies
underlying rule 10b-5 and the antifraud laws in the various con-
texts in which the validity of the Chinese Wall may reasonably be
implicated.199
nicate fact of automobile accident to his agent (his wife) who innocently ob-
tained a predated automobile insurance policy on the same morning as the
accident); Pendergast v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 246 N.Y. 396, 159 N.E.
183 (1927) (in case of a predated marine insurance binder, owner acted rea-
sonably, through unsuccessfully, in attempting a communicate news of loss
of a tug which had sunk before the binder was written to a character who
knew the insurer's identity; insurer held liable for the loss); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 256, comment (e) (1958).
Similarly, a principal is generally not liable for the misrepresentations of
an agent who exceeds his real or apparent authority. See, e.g., Dickinson v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 283 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Mo. App. 1955); Mesce v. Auto-
mobile Ass'n, 8 N.J. Super. 130, 135, 73 A.2d 586, 588 (1950); Texas Co. v. Stone,
232 N.C. 489,491,61 S.E.2d 348, 349 (1950). But cf. Cornfoot v. Fowke, 6 M. & W.
358, 151 Eng. Rep. 450, 455 (1840). (Rolfe, B., held that for a third party to
defend a contract action brought by a principal's agent, the defendant must
show actual fraud by the principal himself in that he gave his agent authority
to make the representation. In Cornfoot, the agent had told the plaintiff that
there was nothing wrong with the house which the defendant rented from the
plaintiff-principal when in fact there was a brothel next door. In the case, of
course, it is questionable whether the agent had made a misrepresentation at
all.)
199. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 471. See also supra note 190. It is a
settled rule of statutory construction that a legislative act should be inter-
preted in light of its underlying purposes. See 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 29,
§ 6.01, at 1-167 (citing 2A A. SuTERLAND, STATUTE AND STATUTORY CoNsTRuc-
TON §§ 45.01-45.11, 56.02 (4th ed. 1973)). As noted, supra notes 145-88 and ac-
companying text, the imputation of knowledge analysis is the approach that
would be mandated by the Federal Securities Code. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE
§ 202(86) (c) (1980).
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B. The Policies of Rule lOb-5
Notwithstanding that neither the draftsmen of rule 10b-5 nor
the Commissioners who adopted it had any clearly articulated ra-
tionale for the rule,200 it is clear through the course of its develop-
ment in the courts and by the Securities and Exchange
Commission that it has come to represent and adumbrate a
number of (generally) mutually supportive goals and policies; poli-
cies which are promoted by the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities acts generally.201
Professor Brudney has articulated four principal functions
served by the disclosure and antifraud provisions of the securities
laws. First (and perhaps foremost), the legislation, particularly
the antifraud rules, serves a "protective function" by operating to
prevent and redress the overreaching of public investors by those
with more acumen in the ways of the marketplace, 202 or who pos-
200. See Freeman, supra note 29, at 922:
We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicat-
ing approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who said,
"Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it
happened.
See generally supra note 29 and sources cited therein. Justice Rehnquist has
remarked that "[w]hen we deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5, we
deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975). Pro-
fessor Loss has also referred to the rule as "[a] swift horse of dubious pedi-
gree."' Lecture by L. Loss, Harvard Law School, Spring 1981.
201. The term "securities acts" refers generally to the six separate statutes passed
by Congress between 1933 and 1940. See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48
Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-77hh (1982); Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803, as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1982);
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-
77bbbb (1982); Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (1982); and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat.
847, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (1982). The Federal Securities
Code would integrate the several acts into a single statute. See ALI FED. SEC.
CODE xix (1980). See also supra note 145. As to the "antifraud provisions,"
see supra note 190.
202. See Brudney, supra note 29, at 334. See also Huges v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 975
(D.C. Cir. 1949), (quoting Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943)): "Te business of trading in securities is one in
which opportunities for dishonesty are of constant reoccurrence and ever
present. It engages acute, active minds, trained to quick apprehension, deci-
sion and action." See also United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768. 775 (1979)
(protection of investors and honest businessmen were goals of the 1933 Act);
Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972) (pre-
vent insiders from taking advantage of uninformed outsiders); Kohler v:
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (rule lob-5 calls for "fair play" by
insiders in the dealings with outsiders).
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sess unearned informational advantage over those with whom they
deal.203 Second, the antifraud provisions reinforce the mandated
disclosure provisions of the securities laws in an effort to serve an
efficiency goal. The notion is that by providing the fullest possible
disclosure of material corporate news, the company's securities
will command a market price which as nearly as possible reflects
their "true" value, thus ultimately promoting allocative efficiency
of investment resources. 20 4
In addition to their protective and efficiency goals, the securi-
ties acts also aim to reduce the overall cost of raising business cap-
ital through restoring trust in the operations of the public
securities markets. The hoped-for result is that by restoring confi-
dence in the integrity of the marketplace, investors will no longer
require an increased return, or "risk premium," to compensate for
their fear of being fleeced. 205 Finally, the disclosure and antifraud
rules serve a regulatory function through reducing the incentives
to engage in fraudulent and manipulative practices. The aspira-
tion is that the willingness to cheat will be tempered by the fear of
getting caught. 06
Of these four aspirations, the antifraud provisions, of which
rule lOb-5 is by far the most frequently invoked, lean most heavily
203. See Brudney, supra note 29, at 334-39. As to the policies of rule 10b-5, see
generally 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 29, at §§ 6.01-6.09.
204. See Brudney, supra note 29, at 334, 337. Buf cf. B. MAL=UL, A RANDOM WALK
DowN WALL STREET (college rev. ed. 1975). The fact that rule lOb-5 has a dis-
closure aspect to it does not, of course, mean that it operates of its own force
to supplant those provisions of the securities laws requiring regularized dis-
closure through reports, filings, proxy statements, and the like. See, e.g.,§ 5 of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) (registration of new securities); § 13(a) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982) (periodic reporting by registered com-
panies); § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982) (content of proxy
statements). See also Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (corporate
disclosure is essentially a matter of business judgment); ALI FED. SEC. CODE
§ 1604(c), comment (4) (1980). What is clear, however, is that rule lOb-5 pros-
cribes false or misleading statements, at least if they can be expected to have
an effect on the market for the company's securities. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980) (false
publicity generally); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (false press release).
See generally F. Mitomi, The Duty to Correct (May 11, 1978) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis in Harvard Law School Library).
205. See Brudney, supra note 29, at 334-35. See also United States v. Chiarella, 588
F.2d 1358, 1362 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (honest markets); Sar-
gent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (investor trust); 5 A.
JACOBS, supra note 29, § 6.08, at 1-185 to -186.
206. See Brudney, supra note 29, at 335-36. See also 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 29,
§ 6.09, at 1-186 (deterrence vs. compensation "as a policy of rule 10b-5). Cf.
§ 16(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982) (reports by statutory insiders).
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toward the '"protective function."207 Thus, the general rule which
has emerged with respect to those in possession of material non-
public information is a contingent one: either its holders must dis-
close it in a way that it will reach the investing public generally,
and hence be incorporated into the market pricing mechanism, or
they must abstain from trading in or causing others to trade in the
securities affected by that information.208 The legal efficacy of the
Chinese Wall, then, as well as that of other protective devices of
integrated financial institutions, must be assessed in light of these
four goals generally, and against the "disclose or abstain" rule in
particular.
C. Rule 10b-5 and the Chinese Wall
In the general case, none of these four goals of the antifraud
laws-investor protection, market efficiency, investor confidence,
or regulation-are compromised unless inside information is actu-
ally used by an integrated firm for market trading purposes, or un-
less it is acquired in such a manner that any transaction is so
fraught with the risk of misuse that denial of access to inside infor-
mation altogether, or precluding the possibility of its use, is less
costly than the effect of that denial on other policies. In the case of
a firm with a Chinese Wall in place, the degree to which inside in-
formation is in fact isolated must be weighed against the threat
which the risk of abusive use of that information by the firm poses
to the policies of the fraud rules. It is only where that threat can be
effectively neutralized by the wall that the multi-service firm in
possession of inside information should be permitted to continue
"business as usual" in its other departments. The remainder of
this section will apply this analytical structure to three activities of
securities firms where either a conflict of duty or conflict of interest
207. See Brudney, supra note 29, at 336. See also id. at 337-38 ("[T] he object of the
disclosure requirement in the antifraud laws is focused more on prohibiting
overreaching than on forcing disclosures.").
208. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912
(1961). Thus, the basic philosophy underlying the rule is that parties to se-
curities transactions should, insofar as it is possible, have equal access to ma-
terial information. See, e.g., Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d
876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972). See also 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 29, § 12.2. But see
Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983) (see supra note 36 for a discussion of
Dirks) Professor Manne, however, argues that executives and officers should
be rewarded for their entrepreneurial ability through recourse to inside infor-
mation for transactional purposes. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET (1966); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23
VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970). But see 0. WMLIuMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND
BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 93-96 (1970); Schotland, Unsafe At Any Price: A Reply to
Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967).
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is inevitably present: (1) retail brokerage activities; (2) own ac-
count trading; and (3) broker-dealer directorships.
1. Broker-Dealer Recommendations
A securities firm which has combined both investment banking
and retail brokerage (or over-the-counter dealer) functions under
one roof may often find itself in the position of recommendating or
executing transactions in securities of an issuer about which its
corporate finance or investment banking department possesses in-
side information. 209 To the extent that its brokerage recommenda-
tions are consistent with the tenor of the inside information
possessed by the firm's investment banking personnel, the firm as
a whole is in constant jeopardy of being charged with improperly
using that confidential information to benefit its trading customers.
In the case of an effectively "walled" firm,2 10 the core legal ques-
tion presented by such a charge is whether the inside information
isolated within the investment banking department will be im-
puted to the firm as a whole, or to its trading personnel. Such an
imputation, of course, will often result in the finding of a "tip" in
violation of rule 1Ob-5.211
The investment banking/broker-dealer conundrum illustrates
the classic case where the multi-service institution is caught be-
tween two "masters." In such a situation, as will be more fully ex-
plored, the policies of the antifraud rules are not compromised
unless it is demonstrated that the firm actually used inside infor-
mation to benefit its retail customers. Absent such a showing, the
firm should not be exposed to liability to the investing public for
their trading losses or to sanctions by the SEC.
That rule 10b-5, at least in the general case, is predicated on the
actual use, as opposed to the mere possession, of material, nonpub-
lic information (and hence that the imputation question should be
answered in the negative) is borne out by the cases arising out of
209. See, e.g., Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
Cf. Alton Box Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977)
(broker-dealer was recommending securities to customers as "prime" invest-
ments without disclosing that its trading department was simultaneously re-
ducing its own inventory in those securities).
210. This section proceeds on the assumption that the firm's investment banking
department is in fact effectively "walled," and that inside information does
not trespass over departmental lines. To the extent that a multi-service insti-
tution, securities firm or otherwise, is unable to maintain sufficient isolation
of inside information, there can, of course, be no room for the Chinese Wall
defense. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (C), comment (5) (1980).
211. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Shaprio v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). See
also supra notes 36 & 191 and accompanying text.
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the Merrill Lynch/Douglas Aircraft fiasco. 2 12 In In re Investors
Management Co. ,213 the SEC brought disciplinary proceedings
against a number of investment advisers, mutual funds, and in-
vestment partnerships to whom Merrill Lynch had "tipped" the
bearish news about Douglas Aircraft's revised earnings forecast,
and who in turn quickly sold (or sold short) Douglas stock. In af-
firming the hearing examiner's imposition of sanctions against all
but one of the respondents, the Commission explained the ele-
ments of a rule lOb-5 trading violation as follows: "We consider
those elements to be that the information in question be material
and nonpublic; that the tippee ... know or have reason to know
that it was nonpublic. . ., and that the information be a factor in
his decision to effect the transaction.''214
As to the last requirement for imposing liability-that the in-
side information somehow affect the tippee's investment decision,
the Commission developed a presumption in favor of a finding of
misuse.
[W] e are of the opinion that where a transaction of the kind indicated by
the information ... is effected by the recipient prior to its public dissemi-
nation, an inference arises that the information was such a factor [in the
decision to trade]. The recipient of course may seek to overcome such
inference by countervailing evidence.
2 1 5
212. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text for the facts of the case. As to
the "use" vs. "possession" dichotomy, see SEC Release No. 16-385, supra note
136, at 70, 353. See also supra note 138 and accompanying text.
213. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971).
214. Id. at 641 (emphasis added). See also id. at 648-49 (Commissioner Smith,
concurring in the result).
215. Id. at 646-47. Thus, the SEC affirmed the hearing examiner's dismissal of the
proceedings against one of the respondents, a large investment adviser, be-
cause the employee who had received the nonpublic information from Merrill
Lynch had not communicated the bearish news to his superior, who made the
decision to sell Douglas stock solely on the basis of available public informa-
tion. The Commission reiterated, however, that it would
[v]iew as suspect the subject to close scrutiny a defense that there
was no internal communication of material non-public information
... where a transaction of the kind indicated by it was effected by
[the] organization immediately or closely thereafter. A showing of
such receipt and transaction prior to the time the information be-
came public should in itself constitute strong evidence of knowledge
by the one who effected the transaction and by the firm.
Id. at 647 n.28.
The SEC's silence on the use vs. possession issue in In re Faberge, 45
S.E.C. 249 (1973), may have been taken by some as an indication that the
Commission was moving toward a possession, as opposed to use, of insider
information standard for purposes of imposing liability under rule lOb-5. As
Lipton & Mazur correctly note, however, the respondents in that case con-
sented to a finding that inside information was in fact used in all but perhaps
two transactions, and thus the issue was not really faced. In any event, any
doubt on this score would have been settled by the SEC in its brief in the
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The SEC's "presumption doctrine," which leaves open the door to
a showing that inside information was not utilized in an improper
manner, has not given way to any more absolute imputation of
knowledge as a matter of law.2 16
A more fundamental reason than stare decisis, however, for not
automatically imputing the knowledge of the investment banking
department of a "walled" firm to its broker-dealer personnel is that
the Chinese Wall, at least in this context, supports, rather than
threatens, the legitimate policies of the fraud rules. There is no
occasion to invoke rule lOb-5 to impose liability for normal broker-
age recommendations under the banner of "investor protection"
unless market investors have actually been victimized through the
knowing use of the inside information. In the absence of such mis-
use, the retail customers of a multi-service firm stand in pari
materia with all other market investors in the affected security.2 1 7
That they may profit from a particular transaction may be a testa-
ment to their relative analytical superiority, or to that of the firm's
investment advisory personnel who recommended the transaction.
Absent a showing that they somehow benefited from inside infor-
mation, however, such transactions do not endanger public inves-
tors in the same security.
It might nonetheless be argued, however, that the Chinese Wall
operates as a disservice to the goals of market efficiency and inves-
tor confidence which also underlie the antifraud rules. Under this
approach, these goals would be more fully realized if immediate
public disclosure of all material corporate and market information
by the issuer, or by its investment banker, were the governing rule
of law.218 To the extent that it can practicably be accomplished,
full and prompt disclosure of all news which might affect the rela-
tive value of an issuer's securities is clearly the preferred ap-
Slade case. See SEC Brief, supra note 114. See also Lipton & Mazur, supra
note 5, at 473 n.43.
216. See SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[W]e need not decide
whether the facts here establish such an inference [that the recipients of in-
side information used it] as a matter of law because the district court found
that inside information had influenced appellant... and that finding was
certainly not clearly erroneous.") (emphasis added). But cf. SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, Coates v. SEC,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) ("[T]he timing [of the transactions] virtually compels the
inference that the insiders were influenced by the by [inside information].").
See also infra note 232.
217. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 472-73.
218. See N. WOLFSON, supra note 5, at 70 ("Swift, total, and immediate public dis-
closure of all material news must be the rule."). See also supra note 131
(quoting SEC Brief, supra note 114, at 12); supra note 204. See generally
Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule 10b-5: Does a Publicly Held Corpora-
tion Have an Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 DENVER LJ. 369 (1973).
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proach, and no one should be permitted to hide behind a "Chinese
Wall" in these circumstances. But it has long been recognized that
issuers have a legitimate right to withhold certain information to
protect themselves in dealings with third parties. 2 19 In addition,
premature disclosure (particularly of "soft" information, such as
forecasts, projections, and the like) before some developments can
be fully verified for accuracy 22O may subject the company to an in-
dependent charge of misrepresentation if the news turns out to be
false.221 Moreover, such premature disclosure may operate to in-
terfere with the efficient pricing of the company's securities, and
thereby also operate to erode investor trust in the operations of the
marketplace.222 Finally of course, there is the danger the disclo-
sure of particularly favorable corporate news, even if it is fully ac-
curate, at a time when the issuer is contemplating public
distribution of new securities might very well subject the company
to a charge that it "jumped the gun" in violation of the registration
provisions of the 1933 Act.223
In addition to these constraints upon issuers against immediate
public disclosure of all material corporate developments, a corpo-
ration's investment banker is confronted with an additional barrier
to disclosure of the confidential results of its investigation into the
company. If securities firms were to immediately make public all
theretofore undisclosed information about issuers which they have
unearthed, and the information ultimately turned out to be incor-
rect, the firm involved would not only be exposed to a charge of
misrepresentation under rule 10b-5, but it might also find itself the
defendant in a suit for libel or defamation brought, either directly
or derivatively, by the corporation itself.2 2 4
219. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), for example, the news of the exceptional
new mineral strike was delayed to enable the company to acquire options on
surrounding property. See also Matarese v. Aero-Chatillon, [1971-1972 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,322, at 91,732 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (issuer had a
"valid business reason" for not disclosing an impending merger agreement
until it was formally approved by its shareholders).
220. See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (dictum) (earnings forecast). See
also ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1604(c), comment 4 (1980). See supra note 174 and
accompanying text for a discussion of § 1604(c).
221. See supra note 204. Cf. James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 587 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1978); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (false press release with insider
trading). See generally BRUDNEY & CHmELSTEIN, supra note 62, at 1066-83.
222. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 62 and sources cited therein.
224. See Solomon & Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule 10b-5: Legal Stan-
dards, Industry Practices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform,
43 FORD. L. REV. 505, 525 (1975). A corporation or other organization may
[Vol. 63:197
MULTI-SERVICE SECURITIES FIRM
These practical and legal difficulties should not, however, be
taken to suggest that a securities firm (whether or not integrated)
which has an investment banking relationship with a publicly-held
company should be permitted to stand idly by while an issuer
knowingly withholds information which it is legally obliged to dis-
close. On the contrary, the firm should take whatever steps are at
its disposal to encourage public companies to make both full and
prompt disclosure of any events material to the issuer or its securi-
ties which it can lawfully make public, and to report any illegiti-
mate intransigence to the SEC and other appropriate regulatory
bodies.225 But the dangers, both to other policies of the federal se-
curities laws, and to the firm itself, of imposing upon it the role of
judge and jury over corporate disclosures are too great to justify
such a rule of law. 226 Confronted with this dilemma, a solid Chi-
nese Wall within the firm which effectively prevents the abusive
use of undisclosed news is clearly the next best thing.
There remains to be considered, however, the effect of legiti-
mizing a Chinese Wall between the firm's investment banking and
broker-dealer departments on the regulatory aspirations of the an-
tifraud rules. As noted, one of the operational premises of the
prohibitions against fraudulent and manipulative practices is that
they will exercise a deterrent effect on conduct that has been legis-
latively determined to serve no useful economic or social pur-
pose.227 In a word, the hope is that the temptation to "stack the
deck" will be ameliorated if the erstwhile card shark must do so in
full view of his fellow players. In the case of a "walled" firm's activ-
ities in recommending and executing transactions for its retail cus-
tomers, the incentives to "cheat" through leaks in the wall are
sufficiently outweighed by both practical and legal considerations
that the isolation technique should be recognized as a legitimate
defense to tipping charges under the antifraud rules. Moreover, as
reported cases in both the securities world and elsewhere aptly
demonstrate, there is very likely to be ample evidence to prove
that a "tip" occurred to enable either a private litigant or the SEC
bring an action for defamation. See W. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 111, at 745.
These difficulties are in addition to the securities firm's obligation to keep
corporate secrets secret. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
225. Indeed, in Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974), the
company's investment banker allegedly did just that. See Shearson Brief,
supra note 79, at 7. See also Chazen & Lipton, Restrictions on Multi-Service
Securities Firms that Possess Inside Information: The Chinese Wall and the
Restricted List, in PLI EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTrrUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
397, 401, 411 (1977) (discussion) (remarks of Mr. Sporkin).
226. But see N. WOLFSON, supra note 5, at 70. But cf. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 28,847 (CCH) (professional responsibilities of se-
curities lawyers).
227. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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to overcome any defense based on a Chinese Wall that, as a factual
matter, did not repel the informational invader.228
At the outset, though, it can scarcely be denied that a securities
firm in possession of inside information has at least some incen-
tives to pass it along to its trading customers, either directly or in
the form of a "buy" or "sell" recommendation. It can hardly be
gainsaid that satisfied customers make the best customers, and
that customers who receive investment advice that yields trading
profits are more likely to remain longstanding customers of the
firm than those who do not fare so well.229 Against this side of the
economic calculus, however, are several considerations which
make it in the integrated firm's self-interest to police the workings
of its inside information policies to prevent improper transmis-
sions of inside information across departmental lines. One of the
greatest of these factors is the prospect of whopping civil liability
to market investors who were (or may have been) on the opposite
side of its customer's transactions. 230
That evidence can be adduced to convince the trier of fact that a
leak occurred is borne out by similar cases.23 1 Moreover, any such
228. See infra notes 229-39 and accompanying text.
229. Thus, the ultimate profit to the firm and its sales representatives from tipping
should probably be expressed as the discounted present value of the commis-
sion or spread received from the particular transaction, plus future commis-
sions resulting from increased business from the customer.
230. In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974), the securities firm, a nontrading "tipper," was held jointly and sever-
ally liable with its trading "tippees" to the plaintiffs, who had purchased the
stock of Douglas Aircraft during the same period that the "tippees" were sell-
ing. See also ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(c) (1980). But of. Fridrich v. Brad-
ford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (broker
defendant who purchased stock on inside information not liable to market
sellers whose sales were not causally 'connected with defendant's
purchases). Moreover, the greater the "leak" in the wall and the trading
which occurs as a result (which may, of course, include the "tippees' tip-
pees"), the more likely it is that it will come to the attention of private plain-
tiffs. To the extent that it is brought as a class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23,
once it is certified, it may not be dismissed or compromised without court
approval. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (same; shareholders'
derivate actions).
231. See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[TIhe cir-
cumstantial evidence sufficed to justify the court's inference that [the tippee]
was getting from [the tipper] something that was not available to the pub-
lic."); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) ("[T]he [tippee's purchase] ...
was 'strong circumstantial evidence that Darke must have passed the
word .... ' ").
Proving the leak will, in the main, require resort to circumstantial evi-
dence. Such evidence, however, is regularly employed in securities cases to
prove knowledge, intent, scienter, and the like. See 1 C. TORCLA, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, § 6 at 4-5 (13th ed. 1972); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRi-
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evidence-such as a change in the firm's outstanding recommen-
dation, an increased volume of transactions in the affected secur-
ity, and the like-is likely to be quite difficult for the firm to rebut,
particularly if the scenario is one in which the SEC's presumption
doctrine is invoked.232 In addition to the risk of civil liability, a
multi-service firm engaged in impermissible tipping risks discipli-
nary action by the SEC.233 It is also is likely to suffer the oppor-
ALS AT COMMON LAw §§ 266-72 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). See also 11 Del. Code
§ 307 (1978) (circumstantial evidence permissible to show states of mind);
United States v. Shelton, 82-1 U.S. TAX CAs. 9166 (7th Cir. 1982) (use of cir-
cumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy); Gower v. Cohn, 643 F.2d 1146 (5th
Cir. 1981) (use of circumstantial evidence to show intent to defraud credi-
tors); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981) (scien-
ter); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) (scienter); Nelson v.
State, 628 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1981) (knowledge that property was stolen); State
v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 624 P.2d 828 (1981) (conspiracy); Upshur v. State,
420 A.2d 165 (Del. 1980) (intent). Indeed, it has been recognized that "[t]he
advantages [of circumstantial evidence] are that, as the evidence commonly
comes from several witnesses and different sources, a chain of circumstances
is less likely to be falsely prepared and arranged, and falsehood and perjury
are more likely to be detected and fail to their purpose." Commonwealth v.
Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 312 (1850) (per Shaw, C.J.).
232. See Chazen & Lipton, supra note 225, at 415. Given the likelihood that there
will be ample evidence to prove a breach of the firm's Chinese Wall, the
SEC's "presumption doctrine," see supra notes 215-16 and accompanying
text, may well be unnecessary to enable either a private plaintiff or the Com-
mission to prove its case. It should be noted that civil plaintiffs proceeding
under rule lob-5 may avail themselves of the liberal discovery provisions of
FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("[T]he
disposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.
No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a
party from inquiry into the facts underlying his opponent's case."). The SEC
is also accorded broad investigative powers under § 21 of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u (1982). Moreover, by placing the "risk of nonpersuasion," 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 231, § 2485, at 285, on the defendant, the presumption
doctrine in effect requires the firm to prove that the fact in dispute did not
occur, a task that may be formidable indeed. A private plaintiff does, of
course, operate at some evidentiary disadvantage in actions against a multi-
service firm in that the latter is in possession of all of the relevant informa-
tion. But this disadvantage is not atypical of civil actions generally, where
the general rule is that the party seeking to establish a fact has the burden of
producing evidence on that point. See generally id. §§ 2485-86, 2489.
233. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933
(1968). The SEC has recently suggested that monitoring of insider trading is
a high priority of the Commission. See Address by Commissioner Bevis
Longstreth before Fed. Bar Ass'n Sec. L. Comm., Nat'l Lawyers Club, Wash-
ington, D.C. (March 17, 1982). In addition, the New York Stock Exchange has
increased the monitoring and analytical capabilities of its "stock watch" de-
partment in recent years, and has also moved to establish an "audit trail" to
more closely match buy and sell orders executed on the Exchange. In 1981,
the N.Y.S.E. opened trading investigations into 78% of the mergers and acqui-
sitions that year involving Exchange-listed companies. Telephone Interview
with Agnes Gauthier, Vice President of Trading Surveillance, The New York
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brium and general loss of reputation which ensues from a public
finding of unethical or illegal behavior by one invested with profes-
sional and fiduciary responsibilities.234
Perhaps the greatest incentive to the integrated firm to ensure
that interdepartmental flows of inside information do not occur,
however, is the very same reason that calls for judicial approval of
the Chinese Wall as a defense to insider trading liability. That, in
short, is the consequence that would result from rejection of the
isolation technique, even in those instances where it can be ex-
pected to operate effectively. A failure to recognize the legitimate
role of the Chinese Wall in these circumstances would seem to
lead inexorably toward the requirement, de facto if not de jure, of
full-scale segregation of investment banking from retail brokerage
and investment advisory services. 235
Perhaps if one were devising a regulatory utopia236 for the se-
curities industry, it would not be wholly irrational to decree that
an individual securities firm could hold out its shingle as an invest-
ment banker, or a broker-dealer, but not both.237 Given the indus-
try and market structure as it has developed, however, the
argument for that result comes quite late to carry the day.238 Even
Stock Exchange (April 6, 1982). Such investigations by regulatory authorities
are regularly relied upon by putative plaintiffs to bring subsequent civil suits.
See generally E. BRODSKY, GUIDE TO SECUarrIES LIrIGATION (1974). As to the
mechanics of SEC enforcement actions in particular, see H. FRIEDMAN, SE-
cu~rriEs AND COMMODnTIEs ENFORCEMENT. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND
CIVIL INJUNCTIONS 1-134 (1981).
234. Cf. M~ndez-Penate, "upra note 5, at 702-04 (banks).
235. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 495.
236. "Utopia" has been defined as "[an] impractical and usually impossible ideal
scheme ... .. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2525 (unabridged ed. 1981)
237. Cf. § 406 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1982) (prohibiting a broker-dealer from providing multiple
sources to an employee benefit plan); § 11(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78k(a) (1982) (providing for various trading restrictions on the combination
of retail brokerage and investment management).
238. See generally Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 495. They note, inter alia, that
mandated segregation would force many small integrated firms out of busi-
ness. This would accentuate industry concentration, increase the cost of un-
derwriting, diminish the market for securities of small, local companies, and
lead to costly duplication of research facilities. See also 1 L. Loss, supra note
29, at 167-68; N. WOLFSON, supra note 5, at 69.
A somewhat less extreme alternative, of course, would be to simply pro-
hibit an individual firm from active involvement in retail activities with re-
spect to securities of companies about which it possesses inside information,
or with which it has an investment banking and corporate advisory relation-
ship. For various reasons, mostly arbitrary, considerations of various formu-
lations of a rule of this type are reserved for Part VI. See infra notes 279-306
and accompanying text. But, as to broker-dealer directorships, see infra
notes 244-60 and accompanying text.
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the SEC has recognized the enormous costs that forced segrega-
tion to the two functions would cause, both in terms of the indus-
try's ability to raise capital for private business, and in its ability to
serve adequately the needs of the investing public. 2 39 Against this
background, then, the upshot is that the only conclusion available
for an integrated securities firm's retail broker-dealer business is
that a good Chinese Wall, like a good fence, will make the invest-
ment banking department a much better neighbor.
2. Investing for the Firm's Own Account
As Lipton and Mazur have recognized, a markedly different set
of considerations applies in the case of a walled firm with inside
information (or access to it) which simultaneously engages in
transactions for accounts in which the firm as a whole, or its princi-
pals, have a proprietary interest. The considerations call for a dif-
ferent result from that concerning retail brokerage activities, even
though transactions for the firm's own accounts are executed by a
separate department of the firm that does not generally have ac-
cess to inside information acquired by its corporate finance
division.240
At the outset, it should be noted (as Lipton and Mazur ob-
served) that the ability of a multi-service firm's own-account trad-
ing division to continue "business as usual" in the face of inside
information is neither essential, nor even necessarily desirable, to
promote market liquidity. Nor is it essential to allow firms in the
securities industry per se to remain competitive with other institu-
tions (such as banks) in the investment management business. 241
Thus, there is no discernible social "good" which is actively pro-
moted by permitting a securities firm to reap trading profits
through market purchases and sales of the securities of public
companies with which it also has an investment banking or corpo-
rate advisory relationship.
In the broker-dealer paradigm, the threat to the policies of the
antifraud laws is sufficiently offset by other considerations to per-
mit an effective Chinese Wall to serve to prevent the automatic im-
putation of inside information throughout the firm. In own-
account investing, however, the threat to those policies is far less
239. See SEC, Statement on Future Structure, supra note 43, at 65,623 ("[T] he cap-
ital-raising ability of the industry and its ability to serve the public could be
significantly weakened."). See also SEC, SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 5,
at 39-40; SEC Brief, supra note 114, at 9 n.11.
240. Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 501-02 (citing, inter alia, O.W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAw 1 (1881) ('"The life of the law has not been logic, it has been
experience.")).
241. Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 500.
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counterbalanced. 242 In own-account trading, the firm, like any
242. The dangers of own-account trading by multi-service firms are aptly illus-
trated by Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980). In that
case, the plaintiffs brought a derivative action on behalf of Olinkraft, Inc.
against Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley had been engaged by Kennecott
Copper Corp. to find a company that it could acquire. Morgan Stanley consid-
ered Olinkraft, and the latter's management cooperated with the firm's Merg-
ers & Acquisitions Department, supplying it with highly favorable internal
earnings projections which were to be used only in connection with a possi-
ble bid by Kennecott. Ultimately, Kennecott did not bid for Olinkraft, but
two other corporations did at a substantial premium above its market price at
the time, whereupon Morgan Stanley's Arbitrage Department purchased
nearly 150,000 shares of Olinkraft common stock on the 'informed conviction"
that a competing offer would be made. Later, Morgan Stanley utilized the
confidential information it acquired from Olinkraft to induce Johns-Manville
Corp. to make a substantially higher offer. Ultimately, Johns-Manville and
Olinkraft came to an agreement in principle to merge, and presumably Mor-
gan Stanley tendered its holdings of Olinkraft stock.
The Second Circuit held, applying Delaware law, that plaintiffs had stand-
ing to bring the action. It nonetheless upheld the trial judge's dismissal of
the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
since the parties had dealt only at arm's length, and the mere receipt of confi-
dential information by Morgan Stanley did not change that relationship.
Judge Oakes, dissenting, felt that "[t] he question presented very briefly is
whether the complaint, broadly construed, states a sufficient relationship be-
tween Morgan Stanley and Olinkraft so as to prevent the former from using
nonpublic material information obtained from the latter for his own profit."
Id. at 800 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Judge Oakes felt that permitting plaintiffs
to state a claim would not overly inhibit investment bankers, and alluded to
the possibility of construing a Chinese Wall between the Mergers and Acqui-
sitions Department and the Arbitrage Department. Even Judge Oakes, how-
ever, was unprepared to decide the validity of the wall in these
circumstances, since the issue had not previously been decided by the Sec-
ond Circuit. Id. at 802 n.4 (citing Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d
398 (2d Cir. 1974)).
The author shares the same general difficulties as Lipton and Mazur in
arriving at a workable definition of own-account trading for the purpose of
translating this prohibition into a manageable rule for the industry to follow.
Surely normal unsolicited dealer and marketmaking activities must be per-
mitted to continue to ensure market liquidity. See Lipton & Mazur, supra
note 5, at 501-02. I must, however, profess sharp disagreement with their con-
clusion with respect to arbitrage transactions by multi-service firms in con-
nection with tender offers, mergers, acquisitions, and the like. Other
potentially manipulative activities, such as post-distribution stabilizing activ-
ities, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7
(1983), and marketmaking generally, promote investment liquidity and mar-
ket depth, or permit a new distribution to be completed without a sharp price
depression. These promote policies which are sufficiently strong to outweigh
the general prohibitions of the antifraud rules. However, arbitrage transac-
tions, like own-account trading generally, present one of the sharpest clashes
between the firm's pecuniary self interest and its duty to refrain from trading
on inside information. Moreover, unlike stabilizing activities, arbitrage trans-
actions do not require the same public disclosure. See SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Rule lOb-7(k), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7(k) (1983). See also SEC
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other market investor with inside information, stands to profit by
the full amount of the difference in the price of the security calcu-
lated without reference to the undisclosed information, and the
"correct" price of that security measured by all relevant factors.
Thus, the threat that self-interest will color the firm's investment
decisions, coupled with the nonexistence of any policy served by
permitting own-account trading to be continued, suggests that the
general rule that the knowledge of any of a firm's agents is that of
the firm itself should not be relaxed.243
3. Broker-Dealer Directorships
In its 1963 Report on Special Study of the Securities Markets,
the SEC noted the prevalence of professionals in the securities in-
dustry who also serve on the boards of directors of publicly-held
corporations. 244 The very existence of such broker-dealer director-
ships, of course, presents the same conflicting obligations to the
issuer, the investing public, and the firm's trading customers that
are faced by an integrated firm which has an investment banking
or corporate advisory relationship with a public company.24 5 Thus,
Securities Exchange Act Rule 17a-17, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-17 (1983) (notices
and reports by block positioners).
243. Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 501-02. In addition, a prophylactic rule for-
bidding transactions for the firm's own accounts while another department is
in possession of inside information has the incidental benefit of preventing
situations in which the firm's trading activities are inconsistent with the rec-
ommendations given to its customers. Cf. Alton Box Board Co. v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977). Also, since no third parties are di-
rectly involved, a suspension of own-account trading need not give rise to any
"signal" that the firm has come into possession of inside information. See
infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
244. The SEC reported that of 4,964 firms responding to its questionnaire, 476 (9.6
percent) stated that firm members, officers, or employees served as directors
of one or more companies whose stock was traded on an exchange, and 995
(20.0 percent) replied that they had directorships in one or more over-the-
counter (OTC) traded companies. Of these, 101 firms (2.0 percent), including
several of the largest underwriters and brokerage houses, were represented
on the boards of at least 10 public companies. SEC, SPECIAL STUDY, supra
note 8, pt. 1, at 428-29.
245. See generally supra notes 24-45 and accompanying text. Thus, some firms
have prohibited their members and officers from serving as corporate direc-
tors. See SEC, SPEcIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 1, at 432; Solomon & Wilke,
supra note 224, at 520. See also Note, supra note 5, at 407-08. As noted, supra
note 53, § 17(c) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79q(c) (1982), prohibits registered public utility holding companies from
having investment bankers on their boards of directors. In addition, the New
York Stock Exchange prohibits partners, stockholders, and employees of spe-
cialists from serving as directors of companies in whose stock they specialize
on the floor of the exchange. N.Y.S.E. Rule 406(b), 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH)
2460. See also 6 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 3222, 3595-96.
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in the wake of the development of the contours of the antifraud
laws, it is not surprising that broker-dealer directorships have
come under increasing scrutiny by both the Commission and
commentators.2 46
Numerous benefits are alleged to ensue to corporations and
their shareholders from having a broker-dealer occupy a seat on
the board. In particular, the broker, by virtue of his general knowl-
edge of business affairs, is said to be able to assist the company in
formulating general corporate policy.247 In addition, the broker is
able to bring his particular expertise regarding the modes and
moods of the securities markets to bear in aid the corporation in its
capital-raising endeavors.248 Third, it has been argued in support
of the practice that the broker-dealer helps maintain a more or-
derly market in the company's securities by acting as its
marketmaker, thereby promoting liquidity and depth for the com-
pany's shareholders, a benefit which redounds to the corporation
through reduced capital costs. 249
It has also been reported that many underwriters feel a certain
responsibility for the post-distribution trading market in newer se-
curities which they have helped put on the market in the first in-
stance. 250 In this regard, at least some firms apparently feel that
their obligation to the company's public shareholders, particularly
in the case of a first offering, extends beyond the underwriting pe-
riod, and that they accept directorships to help ensure that the is-
suer is both honestly and competently managed.25 1 The president
of one firm put it this way:
We do not believe that reputable investment banking houses are willing to
accept the responsibility of underwriting and sponsoring the initial issu-
ance of securities on the over-the-counter market by small and financially
unsophisticated corporations unless a representative is placed on the
246. See supra note 245 and sources cited therin. See also Guttman, Broker-Deal-
ers Serving on Boards of Directors, 77 Comm. L.J. 5 (1972). Cf. Blau v. Leh-
man, 368 U.S. 403 (1962) (investment partnership with a partner on a
corporate board will be treated as a director for purposes of recovery of short-
swing profits under § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982), only if
the partner was "deputized" to represent partnership's interest on the
board); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969) (deputiza-
tion found to hold second corporation of which director was chief executive
officer liable for short-swing profits under § 16(b)), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036
(1970). But cf. § 16(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(d) (1982), which ex-
empts market makers from the operations of § 16(b).
247. Guttman, supra note 246, at 5.
248. Id. See also Note, supra note 5, at 407.
249. See SEC, SPECIAL STUDy, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 43-45; Note, supra note 5, at
407-08.
250. See SEC, SPECIAL STuDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at 44; Note, supra note 5, at 407-
08.
251. SEC, SPECIAL STurly, supra note 8, pt. 1, at 429.
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board to check on the activities of the company and guide it in fulfilling its
responsibilities as a "publicly held corporation," at least during a period of
several years after it has first "gone public.
'2 5 2
Against these supposed benefits of broker-dealer directorships,
of course, are the risks that such a regularized pipeline of confiden-
tial corporate information poses to the policies of the antifraud
rules. In the particular case where the directorship is of a com-
pany that has only recently gone public through the underwriting
efforts of the firm, the incentive to "tip," at least if the company's
prospects unexpectedly go sour, may be considerably stronger
than that present in the typical investment banker/broker-dealer
paradigm. The stockholders of the new company will in all likeli-
hood include a number of the firm's former customers, and to the
extent that the broker-dealer has been placed on the board specifi-
cally to represent their interest, the ability of the director to keep
such bearish news within walls may be sorely strained. Moreover,
unlike more established companies for which there is an active
and continual market, the risk of liability for such "tipping" may be
considerably less.
In many cases, too, the firm may be the principal (if not the
sole) marketmaker for the company's outstanding securities.
Thus, it will likely have a significant proprietary interest in the is-
suer which the firm, however well intentioned, may find difficult to
maintain in the face of bad news from the company.253 In sum,
then, in the case of the typical broker-dealer directorship, the in-
centives to cheat may not be adequately ameliorated by other
considerations.
These threats to all of the policies of the fraud rules suggest
that the normal application of the rule that the firm's knowledge
includes that of its partner or employee-director should not be re-
laxed, even though the firm may have constructed a Chinese Wall
around that particular director.2 54 In addition, upon critical analy-
sis it appears that the benefits that are alleged to flow from broker-
dealer directorships are of quite minimal magnitude. The advan-
tages to corporations, particularly small ones, of the securities pro-
fessional's expertise in business affairs generally can scarcely be
denied. But it is also quite clear that those benefits can be made
equally available to the issuer by an underwriter contracted for in
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr.
157 (1968) (broker-director sold for his own account on receipt of adverse
news while permitting retail salesmen to continue recommending purchases
of the same securities to retail customers).
254. In any event, to the extent that the director is prohibited from transmitting
confidential information to others within the firm, his role as a "Watchdog" for
the company's public shareholders is considerably reduced.
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advance of any new issue, or by the purchase of corporate advisory
services on a more continuous fee-for-service basis. One commen-
tator has already noted that securities firms appear to extract com-
pensation for their directorial services anyway through the
expectation that any future underwriting business of the issuer
will inure to the firm.2 55 Even if this were not the case, however,
there is no apparent policy to justify the inevitable subsidization
which must occur of the corporate clients who receive director-
ships from those who do not. And there is clearly no justification
for permitting that director to continue as the marketmaker for the
same company's securities while he occupies a seat on the issuer's
board.
Furthermore, there are apparently other ways for the securities
firm to assure both itself and the issuer's new public stockholders
that the company is being both competently and honestly man-
aged, without presenting the dangers to the antifraud laws that ex-
ist if the broker-dealer also makes a market in (or actively
recommends) the securities of that issuer. In fact, many market
markers who do not accept directorships have found that other
mechanisms, such as outside directorships, work equally well.256
Such outside directorships might well be filled by others with
financial and managerial expertise, or even by other investment
bankers whose firms are not generally engaged in sponsoring the
aftermarket for the securities of that company. Thus, the upshot is
that broker-dealer directorships do not appear to promote the real-
ization of other policies sufficient to neutralize the dangers that
such a pipeline of inside information poses to the policies of rule
lOb-5 in the case of a firm that is also actively engaged in retail
activities with respect to the company's securities. 257
Lipton and Mazur, however, take issue with this conclusion.
They see little or no difference between the investment banking
and directoral relationships of integrated securities firms and cor-
porate issuers, since typically the broker-dealer director will be a
principal in the same firm that serves as the corporation's invest-
ment banker.258 Having rejected forced segregation in the invest-
ment banking/broker-dealer situation, they would also reject it
with respect to broker-dealer directorships. 259 Their analysis,
however, ignores critical distinctions between the two relation-
255. Note, supra note 5, at 407 (citing SEC, SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 3, at
46).
256. See SEC, SPECIAL STuDY, supra note 8, pt. 1, at 431.
257. See Note, supra note 5, at 408-09.
258. Whether this double symbiosis is of any benefit to the issuer is at least open
to doubt. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
259. Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 497-98.
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ships. Unlike the investment banker/broker-dealer situation,
which in and of itself operates to promote liquidity and depth in
the market without the attendant risks to the policies of the an-
tifraud laws, the broker-dealer directorship, in and of itself, serves
none of these policies. More importantly, as Lipton and Mazur ap-
parently recognize, the investment banking relationship between a
firm and a company tends to be of relatively short duration.2 60
Hence, the opportunities for the firm to obtain inside information
from the issuer are relatively limited, and infinitely more sporadic,
in the investment banking context. In contrast, however, when a
member or employee of the firm occupies a board position, the po-
tential for access to nonpublic news about the company is present
for as long as the firm is represented on the board, which may be
many years. This fact, coupled with the minimal benefits ensuing
from the relationship that cannot be obtained equally well through
other means, sufficiently distinguishes the directorial situation
from that of investment banking. This commands that an excep-
tion to the normal rule of firm-wide imputation of knowledge
should not be created to allow a firm to attempt to wall off one of its
partners or employees who occupies a corporate directorship. Fi-
nally, it should be noted that this rule is not tantamount to full-
scale segregation of any important market functions. The risk of
liability for insider trading is only present if the firm wishes both to
have a directorship and to make a market (or actively make rec-
ommendations) in the company's securities. Thus, if a particular
multi-service institution concludes that a directorship is necessary
to protect the interest of the shareholders or to aid a company, it
need only give up its market making or advisory role.
VI. THE CHINESE WALL AND THE MULTI-SERVICE FIRM'S
OBLIGATIONS TO ITS TRADING CUSTOMERS
An effective Chinese Wall surrounding the integrated securities
firm's investment banking department may operate quite ade-
quately to mitigate the danger that the firm will improperly utilize
confidential information to benefit its retail broker-dealer and in-
vestment management customers. Nevertheless, the very exist-
ence of the wall places the firm in constant jeopardy that its
investment advisory and management personnel will make recom-
mendations and execute transactions that are inconsistent with
the tenor of that inside information.2 61 In these situations, how-
260. See Lipton & Mazur, Reply, supra note 5, at 582 ("[T] he investment banker's
confidential relationships with its clients are generally of much shorter dura-
tion than those of the commercial banker.").
261. See, e.g., Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
(CCH) 1 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
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ever well the firm's Chinese Wall may satisfy its obligation to the
investing public not to tip or trade in violation of the "disclose or
abstain" aspect of rule lOb-5, the isolation policy arguably serves to
frustrate the fiduciary and disclosure obligations owed to the firm's
retail customers.262 As in the insider trading paradigm, the essen-
tial legal question facing the firm in any claim of insufficient disclo-
sure is whether the nonpublic knowledge about the issuer
possessed by its investment banking department will be attributed
to the firm as a whole, and to its broker-dealer and investment
management divisions.263 Such an attribution, of course, will re-
sult in the firm's having made a recommendation, or executed a
transaction for a managed account, in violation of the duties im-
posed upon it both as a common law agent and fiduciary,264 and by
the "shingle theory" developed under the federal securities
laws. 265
Any judicial imputation of knowledge "across the wall," how-
ever, must be premised either on some perceived duty of the firm
to utilize inside information to benefit its retail trading customers
(or at least to save them from financial harm), or upon the premise
that, under the particular circumstance, the firm should have re-
frained from making any recommendation or executing any dis-
cretionary transaction in the tainted securities until the inside
information was made public. As will be more fully developed,
however, there is no justification in the policies of the antifraud
laws for making such an imputation of knowledge in those situa-
262. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
263. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 202(86) (C) (1980). As in the insider trading situa-
tion, common law cases do not provide a definitive answer to the imputation
question. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text. But cf. Hazard v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 159 Misc. 57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936), affd, 257 A.D. 950, 14
N.Y.S.2d 147 (1939), affid, 282 N.Y. 652, 26 N.E.2d 801, cert. denied, 311 U.S. 708
(1940). In Hazard, bondholders of a defunct company brought an action
against the indenture trustee, a bank. The court attributed the knowledge of
one of the bank's non-trust department officers of the obligor's insolvency to
the bank as a whole, even though the trust department was fully segregated
and operated at a different address from the remainder of the bank, because
the entire bank was the trustee under the terms of the indenture. The bank
was nonetheless absolved from liability because it was not "grossly negli-
gent" as required by the indenture agreement. Hazard is distinguishable,
however, from the typical situation of a multi-service securities firm with a
Chinese Wall policy, because the officer's knowledge of the obligor's insol-
vency clearly should have been available to the fiduciary trust department.
The case is also interesting for the trial judge's lamentations of the "ostrich
clauses" in trust indentures, which absolve the trustee from nearly any type
of behavior. Much of this, of course, has since been alleviated by the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1149, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb
(1982).
264. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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tions where the firm's relationship to its corporate client on the
one hand, and its trading customers on the other, merely involves
the performance of fiduciary obligations to two masters whose un-
derlying interests may diverge, but where the firm's own economic
interests are not particularly allied with either. By contrast, how-
ever, in those instances-particularly involving formal underwrit-
ings of new securities-where the investment banker's service to
an issuer inescapably places the firm's interests at odds with those
of its retail customers, imputation of knowledge throughout the
firm supports the policies of the fraud rules, with a minimal corre-
sponding cost in terms of the quality of investment advice the bro-
ker-dealer is able to render. In these latter situations, then, the
multi-service firm should both abstain from making recommenda-
tions concerning, or executing transactions for managed accounts
in, the outstanding securities of the firm's underwriting client. Be-
cause any such recommendations or transactions possess the in-
herent danger of being motivated by the economic interests of the
firm itself, this "hands off' policy is necessary to ensure that the
firm does not give short shrift to the investment performance goals
of its retail clientele.2 66
A. The "Dual Master" Paradigm
The classic instance in which an integrated securities firm may
find itself positioned between two sets of clients whose individual
economic interests may diverge, but where the firm itself is not
peculiarly allied with either, is when its investment banking or
corporate finance department is engaged in providing general
financial or managerial guidance to a publicly-held issuer. So long
as the firm is remunerated on a contracted for, or fee-for-service
basis, and not on the basis of its success in peddling the securities
of that issuer to its retail customers, there is no reason to suppose
that the firm will act in derogation of its fiduciary obligations to its
trading customers in an effort to benefit either itself or its corpo-
rate customer.
In performing its contractual obligations to the issuer, the firm
may, of course, come into possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation about the company or its securities that is contrary to the
thrust of the total mix of publicly-available information about that
company. Once it has acquired any confidential information, the
266. Regardless of the type of relationship between the firm and the user, if it is of
a type that is likely to lead to the acquisition of inside information by the
firm, it should also suspend transactions in the affected securities for its pro-
prietary accounts until that relationship is terminated and any inside infor-




firm is immediately obliged to respect its confidential character, at
least until the issuer releases it from that obligation.267
Simultaneously with the performance of its advisory services to
its corporate client, the firm's retail sales force may be making rec-
ommendations and executing transactions in the outstanding se-
curities of that issuer on the basis of whatever public information
is available regarding that company. To the extent that these retail
transactions result in financial loss to their ultimate beneficiaries,
the firm may be subject to a claim for damages by its retail custom-
ers for those transactions which are inconsistent with all relevant
information possessed by the firm, including the confidential infor-
mation "walled off' in the files of its corporate finance or invest-
ment banking division.268 As noted, however, any attribution of
the nonpublic knowledge of the investment banking department
throughout the firm must somehow ultimately be premised on a
perceived duty of the integrated firm to utilize all information, in-
cluding inside information, to benefit or avoid investment loss to
its trading clients. Alternatively, the notion must be that the firm
should simply avoid any recommendations concerning, or discre-
tionary transactions in, the securities of its corporate clients dur-
ing the pendency of any relationship giving rise to the receipt of
confidential information by the firm. There is no justification for
either premise, however, in these intances where the firm's self-
interest is not somehow allied with that of its corporate client and
at odds with the interests of its retail account holders.
1. Inside Information and Retail Customers
The cases arising under rule lOb-5 make it abundantly clear
that a multi-service securities firm may not, consistent with the
strictures of the antifraud rules, utilize inside information gar-
nered in its role as investment banker to a publicly-held corpora-
tion either to recommend or execute discretionary transactions for
its favored customers.2 69 As the Second Circuit said in Shapiro,
267. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Local 734 Bakery Drivers Pension Fund Trust v. Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L REP.
(CCH) [ 94,565 (N.D. Ill. 1974), affid sub nom. O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Natl
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979); Slade v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] (CCH) 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.), re-
manded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
269. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228
(2d Cir. 1974); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933
(1968); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See also In re Investors
Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971) (unlawful for customers to use such
inside information) (see supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of this case).
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the "[d] ivulging of confidential material inside information to [its]
customers" is a clear violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.27o
Nor may the firm simply make inside information available to all
of its customers; inasmuch as they would still possess unearned
information advantages vis a vis customers of all other securities
firms and the investing public at large, the firm would still be guilty
of impermissible tipping in violation of the rule. Indeed, the wider
the firm's disclosure of inside information (short of public disclo-
sure), the wider the "tippor" liability to which the firm would ulti-
mately be exposed.271
Nonetheless, it might still be argued that the firm is at least
obliged to act to prevent its investment advisory personnel from
270. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d
Cir. 1974). Were it not for the development of the prohibition against trading
on or tipping inside information under the federal antifraud rules, a respecta-
ble common law argument could be made that a fiduciary has a duty to use
confidential information to benefit or prevent harm to his principal. See
Rider, supra note 47, at 81-82 (citing G. COOPER & R. CRIDLAN, THE LAw AND
PROCEDURE OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE 104 (Butterworths 1971)). In North &
South Trust Co. v. Berkeley, [1971] 1 All E.R. 980, an insurance broker that
acted for both the insured and an insurance underwriter received a confiden-
tial assessor's report for the underwriter. The insured demanded delivery of
the assessor's report, and the underwriter brought an injunction action
against the broker to restrain the latter from releasing it on that ground that
the report was its confidential property. The court ruled that the broker was
under a duty to deliver the report to the insured, and that it was irrelevant
that it would have been privileged if it had been in the underwriter's posses-
sion. In the course of its opinion, the court underscored the "fundamental
rule" that an agent cannot place himself in a fiduciary position to a second
principal (the underwriter) without obtaining his first principal's (the in-
sured's) consent, and if he does so, the agent will nonetheless be liable to his
first principal for his inability to fully discharge his duties to the latter. Thus,
"[i]f X, a third party, knowing that A is the agent of P, the principal, enters
into an agreement with A involving duties which are inconsistent with those
owed by A to P, then, the absence of the fully informed consent of P, X acts at
his own peril ...." [1971] 1 All E.R. at 993. Moreover, even at common law, it
is clear that the fiduciary may not use confidential information to benefit him-
self at the expense of his beneficiary. See, e.g., Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2
A.C. 45 (trustee/solicitor and one beneficiary held accountable to the trust for
profits made through the use of confidential information relating to a com-
pany which they had acquired while representing the trust), affg [1965] Ch.
992, affig [1964] 2 All E.R. 187. See also supra note 39. Prior to the Companies
Act 1980, of course, insider trading in Great Britain was not illegal, only "un-
fair." Rider, supra note 47, at 83 (citing Buttle v. Saunders, [1950] 2 All E.R.
193; Chuckmere Brick Co. Ltd. v. Mut. Fin. Ltd., [1971] Ch. 949; Ffrenchh &
Rider, Should Insider Trading be Regulated? Some Initial Considerations,
[1978] 95 SA.L.J. 79, 82-87).
271. In addition, as has been adumbrated earlier, see supra notes 218-24 and ac-
companying text, there are both practical and legal obstacles to requiring the
firm to make public disclosure of all material, inside information which may
come into its possession during the course of an investment banking relation-
ship with a corporate client.
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
recommending (or its trading customers from executing) transac-
tions which inside information in its possession suggests are ill-
advised. Under this formulation of the scope of the broker-dealer's
obligation, the firm would be required, for example, to attempt to
prevent purchases of securities of companies which the firm,
through its investment banking division, knows to be overpriced
because the issuer is having, or about to have, undisclosed
financial difficulties.272 Similarly, the firm would be obliged to act
to prevent its customers from selling securities issued by invest-
ment banking clients which the firm believes, on the basis of inside
information, will make a major new discovery, be subject to a
tender offer, or otherwise to increase in price.27 3 To the extent that
no transactions actually result from the firm's dissuasion, a rule of
this sort has an appealing aura to it. The firm can avoid claims
against it from both dissatisfied customers, and, since there is no
market investor on the other side of its customers' transactions, it
does not run the risk of widespread civil liability for impermissible
272. See, e.g., Herzel & Colling, supra note 5, at 85; Rider, supra note 47, at 81, 89
(citing Jones v. Canaron, 1972(2) N.S.W.R. 236. See also Local 734 Bakery
Drivers Pension Trust Fund v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi-
cago, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 94,565 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (plaintiffs claimed, but the court did not decide, that a multi-service
bank is obliged to utilize inside information to prevent its fiduciary trust de-
partment from making ill-advised purchases), affd sub noma. O'Brien v. Con-
tinental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 593 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1979);
Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,329 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
It is clear, however, that the Securities and Exchange Commission is of
the view that even withdrawal of an outstanding "buy" recommendation on
the basis of material inside information is a violation of rule lob-5. See Com-
plaint filed in SEC v. Celanese Corp., 74 Civ. 3053, 1 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Com-
plaint fied in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb., Inc., 73 Civ. 2458 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Finally, it should be noted that in those circumstances where the firm
does "tip" some customers, but not others, the "untipped" customers have no
cause of action against the firm under rule lOb-5. In two cases arising out of
the Merrill Lynch/Douglas Aircraft proceedings, the Southern District of
New York has ruled that because they were neither purchasers nor sellers of
securities, untipped customers do not meet the requirement of Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1956).
See Smachlo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) $ 93,148 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Shulof v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) T 93,147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Levine v. Sellon, Inc., 439 F.2d
328, 333 (2d Cir. 1971) (dictum) ("[Plaintiff] could hardly be heard to claim
compensation for the premium he might have extracted from some innocent
victim if he had known of the fraud and the buyer did not."). As to the "pur-
chaser" or "seller" requirement for standing under rule lOb-5, see infra note
277.
273. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (rich new




Even such advice not to trade, however, is fraught with both
practical and legal hazards to the firm. In the first place, any trans-
mission of confidential information by the firm acquired in its ca-
pacity as agent to the issuer, whether explicitly or implicitly in the
form of a naked "hold" recommendation, is a breach of the firm's
obligation to its corporate client to keep corporate secrets se-
cret.275 In addition, there is always the danger that the firm's cus-
tomers will pass along the inside information to others who will
utilize it to transact in the affected securities at the current market
price, thereby exposing the firm to potential tipping liability for the
transactions of its "tippees' tippees." 276
More importantly, however, even advice or knowledge that does
not lead directly to market transactions which would otherwise oc-
cur presents the very same abuse that the antifraud rules were
designed to curb in the transactional context. In either instance,
the relevant market for the affected securities is skewed from that
market that would otherwise exist if all investors made their in-
vestment decisions solely on the basis of available public informa-
tion. Further, allowing some investors to avoid the general market
risk of loss attending their investments would smack of the same
inherent unfairness as would reaping untoward gains, and can
thus be expected to further erode investor confidence in the work-
ings of the public securities markets. That this ultimate effect may
occur in instances where transactions are prevented may be even
more marked than in cases where purchases or sales actually oc-
cur, since private litigants are in cases of the former type disabled
from suing to recover their trading losses. 277
It was surely considerations such as these that led the SEC
to remark on the scope of the securities professional's obligation to
its trading customers as follows:
While [the broker] undoubtedly occupied a fiduciary relationship to his
customers, this relationship could not justify any action by him contrary
274. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Court held
that a private plaintiff in a rule l0b-5 action must actually have been a pur-
chaser or seller of securities. See also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1956); A.L.I. FED. SEC. CODE
§ 1722(b) (2d Supp. 1981).
275. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. See also Lipton & Mazur,
supra note 5, at 475.
276. See Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 475. In addition, the SEC might bring
disciplinary proceedings against a firm engaged in dissuading investors from
transacting on the basis of inside information. See supra note 272. The Fed-
eral Securities Code would make this possibility clear. See ALI FED. SEC.
CODE § 1603(b), comment (3) (a) (ii) (1980).




to law. Even if we assume the existence of conflicting fiduciary obliga-
tions, there can be no doubt which is primary here. On these facts, clients
may not expect of a broker the benefits of his inside information at the
expense of the public generally .... 278
2. The Effect of a "Restricted List"
Lipton and Mazur, however, argue that permitting a multi-serv-
ice securities firm which has a confidential relationship with a pub-
licly-held corporation to continue "business as usual" in its broker-
dealer and investment advisory departments would operate to the
detriment of ordinary investors, at least in those instances where
the firm's advice turns out to be imprudent in light of the inside
information known to its investment banking department.27 9 They
suggest that the firm may not rely solely on the Chinese Wall to
restrict interdepartmental flows of nonpublic information. Rather,
in order to avoid liability to its customers for advice which is incon-
sistent with all the information known to it, the firm must suspend
all activities in which a recommendation, express or implied, as to
the investment merits of a transaction in the securities of a corpo-
rate client may fairly be inferred from the communications by the
firm to its customers. 280 In addition, they contend that this "no
recommendation" or "restricted list" policy should be imposed on
the firm's brokerage and advisory departments at the outset of the
firm's relationship with the issuer, and should be continued until
that relationship is terminated.2 81
The obvious merit in Lipton and Mazur's approach is that it op-
erates both to avoid recommendations that are inconsistent with
the total mix of information about the issuer available to the firm
as a whole,282 and also to prevent improper trading or tipping on
inside information if the firm's Chinese Wall proves inadequate to
bar interdepartmental flows of inside information.283 In addition, it
appears to be quite consistent with the approach suggested by the
SEC in the Slade case.284
Lipton and Mazur recognize that the inside information cases
prohibit a securities firm in possession of inside information from
278. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961) (footnote omitted). See 2
A. SCOTT, supra note 27, § 166, at 1265 (trustee is not obliged to violate the law
to benefit the trust); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 61, 166 (1959). See
also supra note 40.
279. Lipton v. Mazur, supra note 5, at 499, 502-03.
280. Id. at 489, 506. See also Chazen, supra note 5, at 553; Solomon & Wilke, supra
note 224, at 536.
281. Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5 at 468, 502-06.
282. See Chazen, supra note 5, at 555.
283. Id. at 556.
284. See SEC Brief, supra note 114, at 4-13.
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utilizing that information to directly benefit its retail brokerage
and investment management customers. 285 They argue, however,
that the firm's customer-oriented disclosure obligations, stemming
from the "shingle theory" cases, also prohibit a firm from making
recommendations that might subsequently turn out to be inconsis-
tent with the inside information available to the firm as a whole at
the time of the recommendation. They conclude, then, that the
only way for both sets of obligations to be accommodated is for the
firm to avoid any recommendations during the pendency of the in-
vestment banking department's relationship with the issuer of the
affected securities.286
A careful reading of the shingle theory cases, however, suggests
that their internal rationale does not extend so far as to require a
multi-service firm's retail departments to suspend normal invest-
ment advisory services merely because another department of the
same firm has come into possession (or is likely to come into pos-
session) of material inside information. Moreover, requiring the
integrated firm to so suspend its advisory functions poses in-
dependent dangers to the policies of the antifraud rules, and has a
deleterious effect on both the investment performance of unso-
phisticated investors and in the firm's ability to serve adequately
its trading clientele. Thus, such a rule ought not to be superim-
posed on the industry in the absence of a showing that it is re-
quired by the economic realities of the firm's relationships with its
various customers.
As noted, the premise of the shingle theory is that in many in-
stances a broker-dealer, merely by hanging out his shingle, im-
pliedly warrants that he will deal fairly with the investing
public.287 Thus, among other things, a firm may not take an exces-
sive spread on dealer transactions;2 88 nor may it deal with a cus-
tomer as a market maker in the underlying securities without
disclosing that fact.2 89
In addition, a number of the early cases decided by the Com-
mission or the courts found that the broker-dealer's implied war-
ranty of fairness had been breached through its failure to disclose
material factual information relating to the investment. The early
cases, primarily involving "boiler room blitz" activities of over-the-
counter securities houses, 290 led to the following articulation of the
285. Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, at 470-74.
286. Id. at 474, 502-05. See also Chazen, supra note 5, at 559-60.
287. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
288. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786
(1943).
289. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Chasins v. Smith,
Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970). See also supra note 42.
290. See, e.g., In re Mayo & Co., 41 S.E.C. 944 (1964); In re Norman Joseph Adams,
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grounds for imposing duties beyond that of common law fraud:
The essence of [the "shingle theory"] is that in certain circumstances one
who sells securities to the public-who hangs out his shingle-implicitly
warrants the soundness of statements of stock value, estimates of a firm's
earnings protential, and the like. When a firm conceals known informa-
tion inconsistent with this "implicit warranty of soundness" it has omitted
a material fact without which the statement made would be
misleading.
2 9 1
The propriety of imposing sanctions upon a firm for engaging in
the fraudulent activities involved in the typical "boiler room" oper-
ation can hardly be disputed. Indeed, resort to the shingle theory
was probably necessary in light of the positive misrepresentations
that inevitably seem to accompany that type of sales campaign.
The cases in which the disclosure aspect of the shingle theory has
been applied have not, however, stopped with such blatantly egre-
gious conduct by industry professionals. In 1962 the SEC de-
scribed the "adequate basis" requirement in the following terms:
[I]t is a violation of the anti-fraud provisions for a broker-dealer to recom-
mend a security unless there is an adequate and reasonable basis for the
recommendations and further... such recommendations should not be
made without disclosure of facts known or reasonably ascertainable, bear-
ing upon the justification for the recommendation. As indicated, the mak-
ing of recommendations for the purchase of a security implies that the
dealer has a reasonable basis for recommending securities which, in turn,
requires that, as a prerequisite, he shall have made a reasonable invest-
ment. In addition, if such dealer lacks essential information about the is-
suer, such as knowledge of its financial condition, he must disclose this
lack of knowledge and caution customers as to the risk involved in
41 S.E.C. 501 (1963); In re Harold Grill, 41 S.E.C. 321 (1963); In re Banner Sec.,
Inc., 41 S.E.C. 304 (1962); In re MacRobbins & Co., 41 S.E.C. 116 (1962), affid
sub nom. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). See also Kahn v. SEC, 297
F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961).
It has been observed that:
Generally speaking, a boiler room in its full flower means an or-
ganization which is engaged almost exclusively in selling securities
over the long-distance telephone to customers whose names are de-
rived from lists obtained from either prior boiler rooms or compilers
of lists, and where the only criterion for a saleman's performance is
how many sales can be made at the lowest cost of long-distance tolls,
with the result that the high pressure really builds up. Hence the
name boiler room.
Usually the securities they sell are somewhat obscure, partly be-
cause these securities are easier to get hold of in quantity, and par-
tially because the boiler room prefers to have a security about which
there is not any information available, so nobody will check up on
what they say or at least until it is too late.
SEC, SPECIAL STuDy, supra note 8, pt. 1, at 265 (footnote omitted) (remarks of
Philip A. Loomis, Jr.). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(boiler room sales of commodities).
291. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring).
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purchasing the securities without it. 2 9 2
Taken to its literal extreme, this formulation of the firm's obliga-
tion to its trading customers would require it to avoid any recom-
mendation, or execute any transaction that is inconsistent with
any inside information known to any department of the firm. It is
clear, however, that the theory does not extend that far.2 93 More-
over, the cases in which the obligation has been brought home do
not command such a wooden application of the rule to impose lia-
bility upon an effectively walled firm merely because it possesses
inside information that is inconsistent with the firm's overall rec-
ommendation. In the vast majority of the "adequate basis" or
"Know Thy Security" doctrine cases, the broker-dealer involved
was on both sides of the informational fence, and made knowing
false statements or half-truths (or widely optimistic and un-
founded predictions) concerning the future value of the customer's
investment.294 In many cases, it was also clear that the omitted
292. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6721, at 3, 2 FED. SEC. I REP.
(CCH) 22,758 (Feb. 2, 1962). As noted, supra note 43, the Commission is of
the view that this obligation extends to unsolicited transactions as well. See
SEC, Statement on Future Structure, supra note 43. But see infra note 293
and sources cited therein.
293. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974) (lower expecta-
tions of customers who make independent investment decisions); Canizaro v.
Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 286-89 (E.D. La. 1974), affd per curiam, 512
F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975); Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa.
1969). Cf. Anderson v. John P. Chase, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. 95,009 (CCH) (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (investment adviser not liable for
trading losses of sophisticated investor when parties by contract specifically
limited the scope of the advisory services defendant was to provide), affid
mem. No. 75-7239 (2d Cir. Nov. 18, 1975). But cf. In re Scientific Control Corp.
Sec. Litig., 71 F.R.D. 491, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dictum) ("As a general matter,
the securities laws do not distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisti-
cated investors; both are entitled to the protections of its disclosure and an-
tifraud provisions."). See also S. JAFFE, supra note 8, § 7.02, at 132:
[A] second problem arises when the standards of liability imposed in
Commission enforcement cases are applied to brokerage firms which
engage in secondary trading transactions . . . A literal reading of
some enforcement cases would require a due diligence investigation
for each sale effected by the broker, notwithstanding commission
limitations which limit the charges to five per cent of the sale pro-
ceeds. The economic issue presented is whether the law requires a
$1,000 investigation for a $1,000 transaction, when the commission
will be less than $50.00.
See generally N. WOLFSON, R. PmLrps & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS,
DEALER& AND SECURrIES MARKETS 2.09 (1977 and Supp. 1979).
294. See, e.g., Feeney v. SEC, 564 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1977); Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856
(2d Cir. 1970); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970);
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366 F.2d
446 (2d Cir. 1966), modified on other grounds, 377 F.2d 665 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 991 (1967); In re Aircraft Dynamics Int'l Corp., 41 S.E.C. 566
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information could (and should) have been lawfully disclosed,295
and the securities involved were often of new and highly specula-
tive companies for which, ex hypothesi, there was little or no pub-
lic information available. 296 Further, even in those cases where the
firm making the recommendation was genuinely ignorant of the
challenged facts, there is the air of an ostrich-with-its-head-in-the-
sand attitude on the firm's part whereby it continued to recom-
mend purchases despite strong warning signals that all was not as
had been made out to be.297 Finally, in at least some of the deci-
sions, the firm had been actively trading for its own account in a
manner that was wholly at odds with the advice it was simultane-
ously giving to its retail customers.298
The reported cases, then, all involve the appearance if not the
reality of real fraud or bad faith. Thus, they stand in marked con-
trast to the situation in which a multi-service securities firm makes
a recommendation after it has conducted a thorough investigation
of the merits of the investment based on all of the publicly-avail-
able knowledge about the securities involved. To extend the
threadbare language of these cases to impose liability on a firm
merely because its investment banking department possessed con-
tradictory inside information-which it was prohibited from dis-
closing-would represent an unwarranted addition to the
obligations imposed on the securities industry.2 99 -
In addition to the dearth of support in the shingle theory cases,
the imposition of such a rule would pose positive dangers to the
policies of the antifraud rules. The most significant of these is the
(1963); In re Alexander Reid & Co., 40 S.E.C. 986 (1963); In re Biltmore Sec.
Corp., 40 S.E.C. 273 (1960).
295. See, e.g., Feeney v. SEC, 564 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1977); Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
296. See, e.g., Feeney v. SEC, 564 F.2d 260 (8th Cir,. 1977); In re Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,149
11977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 81,365 (Nov. 9, 1977); In
re Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743,
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 77,306 (Nov. 12, 1965).
297. See, e.g., Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir.
1977); University Hill Found. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 93,772 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But cf. Carroll v. Doolittle, 21
Misc. 2d 203, 191 N.Y.S.2d 398 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (at common law, a broker has no
duty to inquire behind the decisions of an investment banker).
298. In Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977), for
example, the defendant was sharply reducing its own inventory in Penn Cen-
tral commercial paper at the same time that it was touting it as a "prime"
investment to the plaintiff. See also Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 266
Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1968) (state law). Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 376 U.S. 180 (1963) (scalping by investment adviser).
299. See also Chazen, supra note 5, at 559-63.
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almost inevitable "signal" effect that results when a major securi-
ties house places a particular security on a master list that is "off
limits" to its retail sales force. Lipton and Mazur attempt to allevi-
ate this effect by requiring that a firm list a security as soon as the
investment banking department enters into any relationship with
a corporate issuer that is likely to give rise to the receipt of inside
information by the firm. By this technique, they argue, the mere
act of listing will not be perceived as a signal to the investment
community that the firm has come into possession of inside infor-
mation. Nor would it reveal the character--confirmatory or contra-
dictory-of that information relative to the available public
information about the issuer.300 As Chazen correctly observes,
however, the very act of listing a security must be analyzed in the
context of a market in which rumors may be every bit as powerful
a motivating transactional force as confirmed facts.3 01 As he notes,
"[i] magine, for example, the market impact of a notice that a pub-
lic company, rumored to be a prospective tender offer target, had
been placed on the restricted list of an investment banking firm
known to have counseled the rumored tender offeror. '302
As Chazen's example illustrates, the mere act of listing a secur-
ity will often either fan the flames of existing rumor, or indepen-
dently give rise to new ones. In either event, the listing procedure
operates to cause market transactions that would not otherwise oc-
cur on the basis of available public information about the issuer
and its securities. In so doing, of course, the restricted list proce-
dure endangers the goal of allocational efficiency of investor re-
sources and also operates, at least in those instances (which are
likely to be many) where the rumored facts do not materialize, to
further erode public confidence in the workings of the securities
markets.
In addition, there is probably good reason to believe that such a
blanket "no recommendation" or "restricted list" procedure will be
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce within the firm itself. A large
institution, such as Merrill Lynch or Paine, Webber, which has a
large and widely diverse retail sales force, may have considerable
difficulty in preventing "side" recommendations by overly enthusi-
astic brokerage personnel who have (or think they have) some-
thing to offer that the rest of the investment community does not
share.303 In the absence of a showing that a Chinese Wall, stand-
300. Lipton & Mazur, supra note 5, 505. See also id. at 469-70, 483-84, 485 n.112, 486-
87; Lipton & Mazur, Reply, supra note 5, at 585-86.
301. Chazen, supra note 5, at 575.
302. Id. See also Paine, Webber Brief, supra note 106, at 15-17.
303. An institution is generally liable for the securities law violations of its em-
ployees. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981);
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 1970) (failure ade-
quately to supervise employees). See also § 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o
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ing alone, does not operate adequately to restrain the abusive
practices at which it is aimed, these additional difficulties should
not be visited upon the industry. In sum, if the cure is worse than
the disease, the patient may well be advised to remain a little bit
ill.
A requirement that integrated firms must suspend their normal
advisory functions whenever one department has, or is likely to
acquire, confidential information, also carries with it an adverse ef-
fect on the quality of service which the multi-service firm can offer
its retail customers, and thus operates adversely on the invest-
ment performance of its customers' portfolios. Each time that se-
curities of a particular company are added to the firm's "hands off"
list, the overall number of securities about which the firm can pro-
vide meaningful investment advice is reduced. Moreover, the ef-
fect of this reduction could be disproportionate, depending upon
the companies whose securities are actually listed. The restriction
of transactions in particularly active stocks will have a much more
severe effect on the firm's overall quality of service than will the
listing of less active, more thinly-traded securities.3 0 4 Even with
relatively inactive issues, however, a listing by the firm that is a
principal (or sole) market maker for the issuer's securities will
render it extremely difficult for most investors to obtain any mean-
ingful advice about the issuer. Thus, the imposition of a "re-
stricted list" requirement for the securities of a firm's corporate
clients may, in the long run, impact most severely on small, indi-
vidual investors who have little choice but to rely on the advisory
services of the firm.305
(1982) (controlling person liability); § 20 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1982)
(controlling person liability); Lipton v. Mazur, supra note 5, at 482 n.91. But
cf. SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 95,034, at 97,613 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (employer not liable for the personal
rule 10b-5 violation of its employees either under the theory of respondeat
superior or aiding and abetting when employees were not acting within the
scope of their employment, and where employer had acted reasonably to pre-
vent such violations).
304. See Chazen, supra note 5, at 565.
305. See generally id. at 563-67. See also Rider, supra note 47, at 94
The problem with the restricted list technique is that it may place
clients of large financial intermediaries at a significant disadvantage,
as they could find themselves deprived of investment advice for a
considerable proportion of the investment market. Moreover the
managed funds that the firm may be responsible for are also placed
at a significant trading disadvantage.
In addition, of course, the restricted list technique frustrates whatever obliga-
tion a broker has to provide continuing advice to customers who invest in
securities on the basis of the broker's recommendation. See, e.g., Complaint
filed in Mascola v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 95,470 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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Finally, there is the added danger that the adverse effects on
the quality of investment advice which a multi-service firm is able
to provide will spill over to other securities that, even though not
on the firm's restricted list, may be a part of the same industry as
the company whose securities are actually listed. Some investors,
both individuals and institutions, have a penchant for investing in
securities of companies involved in particular industrial or com-
mercial activities. By the same token, the research and advisory
departments of some securities firms have developed a reputation
for offering particular expertise concerning securities of compa-
nies engaged in particular lines of business activity. When the par-
ticular investor and the firm which specializes, in whole or in part,
in specific industries, are brought together, the odds for a happy
and successful "investment marriage" are likely to be quite good.
If the firm, however, is disabled by virtue of a relationship between
its corporate finance division and a publicly-held issuer within that
industry from rendering any advice at all about the securities of
that issuer, not only has the investor lost the services of the firm
that may well be best suited to render the advice he seeks, but also
the relative value of the firm's advice concerning other companies
within the same industry is also undermined.
It is axiomatic that "value" is a relative concept, and thus the
"value" of any particular investment can be meaningfully ascer-
tained only in reference to the "value" of marginal substitutes.
Thus, for example, Eastman Kodak's investment banker is dis-
abled from advising its customers concerning the investment mer-
its of Kodak stock during the time that it is serving the company in
an advisory capacity, the firm's advice about the securities of simi-
lar companies, such as Polaroid, is also less meaningful to the
firm's retail customers.3 06
The sum of these considerations leads inexorably to the conclu-
sion that, in the absence of a clear justification for doing so, the
knowledge of a multi-service securities firm's corporate finance or
investment banking department should not automatically be im-
puted throughout the firm if the firm itself is able to effectively iso-
late that information and prevent its misuse for transactional
purposes. Such an automatic imputation as a matter of law would
leave the firm with only one safe course: an internal restricted list
prohibiting its advisory personnel from giving any advice about the
securities of any of the firm's corporate clients during the full
course of any relationship (long or short) that may yield inside in-
306. Hence any firm that serves as the investment banker or provides financial
advice to a large and actively traded "blue chip" customer would be generally
disabled from formulating broad portfolio strategies for mutual funds and
other large investors. See Chazen & Lipton, .supra note 225, at 401.
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formation to the firm. The effect of such a rule, as we have seen, is
detrimental both to the policies of the fraud rules and to the quali-
ty of service which the firm would be able to provide its retail cus-
tomers. As in the insider trading situation, then, the policies of the
securities laws are best served in these instances by an effective
Chinese Wall, standing alone. And the Wall, if it is effectively im-
plemented and monitored, will operate to make the various depart-
ments of the multi-service institution much better neighbors.
B. The "Conflict of Interest" Paradigm
In the main, a "naked" Chinese Wall policy within an integrated
securities firm will operate adequately to reconcile the conflicting
obligations arising from the combination of investment banking
and broker-dealer activities. There are instances, however, in
which the firm's relationship with its corporate client is so struc-
tured that its own economic interests are inescapably placed at
odds with those of its retail trading and investment management
clientele. In these instances, any favorable "buy" recommenda-
tions by the firm concerning the securities of its corporate client
possess the inherent danger of being motivated by the firm's own
interests rather than concern for the investment performance of its
customers' market purchases or that of its managed portfolios. In
those cases where the firm's interest is so firmly implicated in this
manner, imputation of all knowledge within the firm to the firm as
a whole serves the purpose of legally reflecting, as accurately as
possible, the relative economic interests of the parties as well as
the relationship of the securities firm to the outside world.
An examination of the role of the investment banker generally
in the underwriting and distribution of new securities serves as a
useful point of departure for delineating those situations in which
the integrated firm's financial interest as a whole is likely to di-
verge from that of its trading customers. In the process of under-
writing a new issue of corporate stock, the investment banker
occupies the position of "middleman" between the corporation
(the "issuer") and the ultimate purchasers of the newly issued
stock or debt.307 When the firm thus puts its formal underwriting
307. See generally JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 35, at 19-28; 1 L. Loss, supra note
29, at 159; PRACTC1CG LAW INsTrruTE, When Corporations Go Public (C. Is-
raels & G. Duff ed. 1962); Berman, "Role of Underwriting and His Counsel," in
PLI Going Public Workshop 67 (A. Sommer & S. Friedman co-chairmen 1970);
Wing, Guidelines for Underuriting Activity, 25 Bus. LAw 397 (1970). Section
2(11) of the 1933 Act defines the term "underwriter" for the purposes of that
act as "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers
or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security .....
15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1982). See also § 2(a)(20) of the Investment Company
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"hat" on, its role is essentially that of a salesman. Unlike other
commodities, such as automobiles, foodstuffs, and toasters, there
is no established public demand for the securities of most issuers,
and this is particularly true of new and unseasoned companies
who are going to the market for the first time. "Securities are sold,
not bought.. ,"308 and the underwriter is the salesman of first
instance.
That the underwriter is essentially rewarded for his ability to
find a nice home for commodities that might otherwise go begging
is reflected in the compensation structure for underwriting new is-
sues as compared with brokerage fee for executing trades in the
aftermarket.
Salesmen's underwriting commissions are generally two, three, or four
times the rate negotiated on trading outstanding issues of stock. A risky
venture may even boost underwriters' compensation to six or seven times
the secondary market rate. Obviously, there must be a selling effort to
launch a new issue. The more generous commissions provide the market-
ing incentive.309
Thus, in the course of selling its allotment of a new issue of se-
curities, the financial interest of the underwriting house, whether
or not it is simultaneously engaged in retail broker-dealer activi-
ties, is inescapably at odds with the interests of its customers. It is
in the former's interest to secure the highest possible per share
price for the commodities offered, an interest quite at odds with
the rational investor's desire to receive the greatest amount of "in-
trinsic value" for each invested dollar.
In the case of the investment banking firm that also engages in
retail brokerage activities (the "integrated" firm), however, this in-
herent conflict of interest is manifest far in advance of the actual
distribution of the securities comprising the new issue. It is pres-
ent even with respect to customers to whom the firm has no expec-
tation that it will ultimately sell any part of its underwriting
allotment. From the embryonic stages of any underwriting rela-
tionship between a securities firm and a corporate issuer, the
firm's interest in receiving the highest possible price for the securi-
ties that will ultimately be offered (and, in cases of firm commit-
ment underwriting, the danger that the firm will be "stuck" with
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2 (20) (1982); BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 741 (5th ed.
1979).
308. N. WOLFSON, supra note 5, at 6. As to the problem of "hot issues," see SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4150, [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. Svc. L. REP.(CCH) 76,671 (Oct. 22, 1959); JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 35, at 659-66;
Prifti, The "Hot Issue", 24 Bus. LAw. 311 (1968); Rotberg, The "Hot Issue", 17
Bus. LAw. 360 (1962); Sowards & Mofsky, The "Hot Issue'". Possible Hidden
Causes, 45 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 802 (1971).
309. N. WOLFON, supra note 5, at 6; id. at 33-37 (underwriters' compensation).
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any portion of its allotment which remains unsold) if the deal is
closed makes it also in the interest of the integrated firm to foster
and promote a favorable attitude on the part of the investing public
toward that issuer. Similarly, unlike other flat fee-for-service advi-
sory relationships in which the firm may engage, an underwriter
may also be allied with its corporate client in its desire to forestall
dissemination of any unfavorable news about the company, espe-
cially if immediate public disclosure can legitimately be
avoided.3 10 Thus, as long as any self-interested relationship, such
as an underwriting, is "in the offing" between the firm and a corpo-
rate issuer, any "buy" recommendation made by firm, even with
respect to the outstanding securities of that issuer, carries with it
the intrinsic danger that it is tainted by the firm's interest in suc-
cessfully distributing the forthcoming new issue. Thus, any rec-
ommendations made by the firm to purchase securities of that
issuer may or may not reflect a dispassionate analysis of the in-
vestment merits of the transaction, an analysis which the firm's re-
tail customers have every right to expect.31 '
That this undesirable effect on the neutrality of the firm's in-
vestment advice during the course of a formal underwriting may
exist is illustrated by the facts of the Slade case.3 12 According to
the plaintiffs, Shearson's investment banking department was
playing both sides of the fence. While it scrupulously concealed
any adverse nonpublic information it may have had about Tidal
Marine, its corporate client, Shearson also simultaneously trans-
mitted extremely favorable public information about Tidal Marine
to its retail brokerage personnel, and required the latter to use that
information in formulating any personal recommendations they
might make.3 13 Thus, the Slade plaintiffs characterized the entire
situation in the following terms:
The essence of Shearson's position is that the investment banking depart-
ment is the investment banking department and the sales department is
the sales department and the twain must never meet. Even if this were a
correct formulation of law, it would not avail Shearson on the facts of this
case. For the facts here show that the banking department and the sales
department together made up the effective sales team .... [Tl he invest-
ment banking department was inundating the sales department with re-
peated bulletins, all of which ... were designed to show that Tidal was
growing rapidly.... These bulletins were all transmitted to the sales de-
310. See generally supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
311. Similarly, purchases by the firm for accounts of its managed portfolios which
operate to increase the activity (and hence the price) in the issuer's securi-
ties possess the same inherent dangers.
312. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,329, remanded 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974) (see supra notes 78-
134 and accompanying text for a discussion of Slade).
313. Slade Brief, supra note 96, at 5.
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partment by the investment banking department .... However ignorant
the salesmen may have been of the troubles of Tidal, the investment bank-
ing department admittedly knew of them. Yet, here was the investment
banking department falsifying the truth by withholding material adverse
facts while at the same time demanding that the salesmen represent false
facts to Shearson's customers .... In short, this is a simple situation
where Shearson, as a corporate entity, was touting stock by misrepresent-
ing to its customers.
3 1 4
However accurate (or not) the Slade plaintiffs characterization
of the facts may have been, there can be no doubt that there is a
danger of such unwarranted "touting" in those situations where it
is in the interest of the integrated firm to promote a favorable cli-
mate toward its corporate client. Moreover, it benefits the firm as a
whole to foster and create such a climate, even for the outstanding
securities of its underwriting clients. Accordingly, the situation
need not be as extreme as that positied by the Slade plaintiffs to
evoke justifiable concern that, when push comes to shove, the re-
tail trading and investment management customers of the multi-
service firm will get the shorter end of the firm's loyalites. 3 15 This
danger is inescapable during any prospective formal underwriting.
The burden should therefore fall on the firm to demonstrate that
any transactions it has recommended (or executed for discretion-
ary accounts) during the pendency of any such relationship are
consistent with the whole of the information possessed by the firm.
And neither courts nor the Commission should hesitate to impute
the knowledge of the firm's investment banking department, confi-
dential or not, throughout the institution.31 6
314. Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
315. Even if the firm does engage in impermissible "tipping" to inform its trading
clients of adverse news about an underwriting client, there is good reason to
believe that it would be done selectively in favor of large institutional con-
cerns. Compare In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C.
933 (1968), and In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971), with
Shulof v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 93,147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), and Smachlo v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. T 93,148 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
316. That a greater duty to purchasers of securities is imposed on underwriters
than upon aftermarket broker-dealers is well recognized and borne out by the
cases. Compare Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 929 (1976), on remand, 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir.
1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), and University Hill
Found. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), with Mar-
bury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) and Phillips
v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969). See also In re Heft, Kahn
& Infante, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 379 (1963); In re Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33
(1953). In addition, in the case of underwritings which are registered under
the Securities Act of 1933, the underwriter will be liable for any misrepresen-
tation in the registration statement unless it meets specified standards of in-
vestigation. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (5), (b) (1982). See also supra note 11.
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It should be noted, though, that treating the firm as a single en-
tity for the purpose of measuring its knowledge concerning recom-
mended transactions gives rise to the alternative danger that
integrated firms will in fact transmit confidential information
about their underwriting clients throughout the firn. Thus, any
recommendations or transactions in the securities of those clients
will bear the taint of inside information and result in liability
under the "disclose or abstain" aspect of rule 10b-5.317 This di-
lemma need not exist. All the firm needs to do to avoid liability is
to suspend any recommendations concerning the securities of its
underwriting clients until the commencement of the actual sales
campaign (if the deal is formalized) for the distribution of the new
issue.
It can be argued, of course, that imposing a "restricted list" or
"no recommendation" policy in these instances will result in the
same "signalling" effect and diminution in the quality of the firm's
investment advice as would the imposition of such policies across
the board during the pendency of other types of confidential rela-
tionships with an integrated firm's corporate clients. 318 As a prac-
tical matter, however, these effects are likely to be rather minimal
in the context of the typical underwriting. Unlike other relation-
ships, which may extend over a long period of time, the time period
preceding a distribution of new securities tends to be a rather
short one. It is, after all, in the mutual interest of the issuer and
the underwriter alike to get the new issue onto the market as soon
as possible before current market conditions change for the
worse.3 1 9 Thus, the adverse effects that are likely to ensue from
listing are of relatively small magnitude in these circumstances.
More importantly, the critical differences between the economic
position of the securities firm in the underwriting context, as op-
posed to other corporate advisory relationships, are ones which
cannot be compensated for adequately without some reinforce-
ment of the firm's isolation policies. Further, once the formal sales
campaign begins, the firm is perfectly free to resume normal oper-
ations and to become a member of the selling group for the pur-
pose of distributing its allotment in the underwriting. At this latter
stage, however, there can be no excuse for either misrepresenting
facts or withholding information which would be material to a cus-
tomer's decision to purchase the newly-issued stock.320
317. See supra note 269.
318. See generally supra notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
319. Cf. Lipton & Mazur, Reply, supra note 5, at 582.
320. See, e.g., § 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982). It should be noted that
there may be other activities of multi-service firms, such as wholesale
marketmaking of securities of the firm's corporate clients (where the firm




The construction and maintenance of interdepartmental Chi-
nese Walls to accommodate the conflicting legal duties of multi-
service securities firms and other financial institutions has been a
salutary development within an industry that is distinguished by a
plethora of conflicts and constant opportunities for fiduciary abuse.
I have attempted to demonstrate that, in the main, a Chinese Wall
can be expected to work effectively to isolate material inside infor-
mation with the firm. The device thus merits legal sanction, so
long as the firm is not engaged in relationships that cause its own
economic interests to diverge markedly from either that of the in-
vesting public or its retail clientele. When the firm's own interests
are likely to be implicated, however, as is typically the case during
prospective underwritings of new securities, and is always the case
when the firm engages in trading in securities for its proprietary
accounts, a Chinese Wall, standing alone, does not respond ade-
quately to the danger that its own interest will color its trading and
advisory activities. Thus, the firm that elects to engage in these
activities while one of the departments is in possession of relevant
inside information must do so at the risk that the inside informa-
tion possessed by the firm will be imputed throughout the
institution.
The principal advantage of this imputation approach, derived
from that suggested by the proposed Federal Securities Code, is
that it serves to attribute the relevant knowledge of the integrated
firm's various departments in accordance with the economic reali-
ties of its activities. Moreover, because it provides meaningful
standards to ascertain the knowledge of the multi-service institu-
tion in the various contexts in which the isolation technique is im-
plicated, it bears the seeds of legislative or administrative fruition
into predictable guidelines for the industry to follow. Congress or
the Securities and Exchange Commission, then, should undertake
to consider and adopt a formal rule along these lines, and bring an
end to the confusion and divergence of views that has attended the
perplexing conundrum of the servant who serves two masters.321
the same types of dangers as do "buy" recommendations preceding a new
distribution. More study should be devoted to this possibility, and firms in
this position should be sensitive to the dangers inherent in these dual
activities.
321. Cf. Matt. 6:24 (King James).
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